THAKUR PRATAP SINGH v. SHRI KRISHNA GUPTA AND OTHERS.
Citation: [1955] 2 S.C.R. 1029; 1955 INSC 70
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: SUDHI RANJAN DAS , VIVIAN BOSE, NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI, B. JAGANNADHADAS, BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA
Judgment date:
Case summary
1955 INSC 70. Supreme Court of India judgment dated 1955-12-02. THAKUR PRATAP SINGH v. SHRI KRISHNA GUPTA AND OTHERS. Read the judgment and case details on...
Judgment text
2S. C. R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1029 power of pardon thereunder is different from "per- sonal rights, privileges and dignities" which have been dealt with under articles XVI and XVII in the fol- lowing terms. "XVI. The Ruler of each Covenanting State, as also the members of his family, shall be entitled to all the personal privileges, dignities and titles en- joyed by them, whether within or outside the terri- tories of the State, immediately before the 15th day of August, 1947. XVII. ( 1) The succession, according to law and custom to the gaddi of each Covenanting State and to the personal rights, privileges, dignities and titles of the Ruler thereof is hereby guaranteed". There is thus no substance in any of the arguments on which the ca~ for the appellant can possibly be presented. This appeal is accordingly dismissed. THAKUR PRAT AP SINGH f). SHRI KRISHNA GUPTA AND OTHERS. [S. R. DAs, ACTING C. J. , V1v1AN BosE. BHAGWATI, fAGANNADHADAS and B. P. SINHA JJ. ] Jilt!
ction Dispute-Rule requiring candidate to state occupati-:m in nomination paper-If mandatory in character-Duty of Court- Central Provinces and Berar Municipalities Act (II) of 1952, ss. 9(1) (iii) (c), 23. The appellant was a candidate for the office of President of the Municipal Committee, Damoh. The nomination was made in an o\d form under the old rules which required a candidate to enter his caste. Under the new rules this was changed and occupation had to be stated instead, which none except the respondent No. I had done. Objection to the validity of the appellant's nomination paper was overruled by the Supervising Officer. The appellant secured the highest number of votes and was declared elected. The respondent No. 1, thereupon, filed the election petition. He failed in the Elec- tion Tribunal which held that the defect was not substantial and was curable.
The High Court, however, reversed this decision in revision, holding that failure to comply with any of the provisions set out in the rules was fatal and in such cases the nomination papct should be rejected. 1955 ThaiaalaOllU EwfirwotM V amd v. Th• SIDie of T rav1111&0t1-Cochin ]opullldhad1J1 J. 1955 Decem6'r 2. 1955 ' T"4Tcur PraJap Singh v. Shri Krishna Gupta ond otkrs 1030 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1955] Held, that the rule requiring the occupation of the candidate to be st. ated in the nomination form was directory an rd "occupation" or placed a line against it, or just left it blanks ? How is the case any different, so far as the merits are concerned, when a man who has a occupation does not disclose it or misnames it, especially as a man's occupation is not one of the qualifications for the office of Presi- dent.
We are clear that this part of the form is only directory and is part of the description of the candi- date ; it does not go to the root of the matter so long as there is enough material in the paper to enable him to be identified beyond doubt. It was also argued that there was a reason for re- quiring the occupation to be stated, namely, because section 15(k) of the Act disqualified any person who "holds any office of profit" under the Committee. But disclosure of a candidate's occupation would not necessarily reveal this because the occupation need only be stated in general terms such as "service" or 1955 T""""1 Pralap Singli v. S/irl Krisluta GuJi. and olbers Bos1 J. 1955 Thakur ITatap Singh v. Shri Krishna Gupta and othns Bose J. 1034 -SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1955} "agriculture" and need not be particularised ; also, in any event, section 15 sets out other grounds of dis- qualification which are not required to be shown in the form. As regards our earlier decision.
That was a case in which the law required the satisfaction oI a parti- cular official at a particular time about the identity of an illiterate candidate. That, we held, was the substance and said in effect that if the law states that A must be satisfied about a particular matter, A's satisfaction cannot be replaced by that of B ; still less can it be dispensed with altogether. The law we were dealing with there also required that the satis- faction should be endorsed on the nomination paper. That we indicated was mere form and said at page 488- "If the Returning Officer had omitted the attestation because of some slip on his part and it could be proved that he was satisfied at the proper time, the matter might be different because the element of his satisfaction at the proper time, which is of the substance, would be there, and the omission formally to record the satisfaction could probably, in a case like that, be regarded as an unsubstantial technicality".
A number of English cases were cited before us but it will be idle to examine them because we are concerned with the terms of section 23 of our Act and we can derive no assistance from decisions that deal with other laws made in other countries to deal with situations that do not necessarily arise in India. The appeal succeeds and is allowed with costs here and in the High Court. The order of the High Court is set aside and that of the Civil Judge restored.
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