THE BUCKINGHAM AND CARNATIC CO. LTD. v. VENKATIAH AND ANR.
Citation: [1964] 4 S.C.R. 265; 1963 INSC 162
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR , K.N. WANCHOO, K.C. DAS GUPTA
Judgment date:
Case summary
1963 INSC 162. Supreme Court of India judgment dated 1963-08-02. THE BUCKINGHAM AND CARNATIC CO. LTD. v. VENKATIAH AND ANR. Read the judgment and case...
Judgment text
266 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] 4 S. C. R. SUPREME . COU! tT ·REPOR:fS 265 sense of "a reduction in rank" a~ distingnisheo from the termination'. of his employment ahd he fairly conceded that he ·could not point ~o any. We wo1! ld, therefore, answer the reference by saying that the word 'removable' in the reference means l'efil. Ovable from liis appointment in the >ense of terminatihg- J:is appointment and signifies the penalty numbered 6 in Rule. 3 of All fodia Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, '1955 where the ex-pression is expanded to mean 'removal f~om. the servi$e ,which shall not disqualify for future employment'. The ·reference is answered accordingly. --- ' THE BUCKINGHAM AND CARNATIC CO. LTD. ti. VENKATIAH AND ANR. ,(P. B. GAJENDJ nding Order S(ii). CIVIL APPELLATE JuRISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 874 of 1962 . . A.
pjl is to prcvem any punitive action being taken agaimt the employee during the period that he is ill, there is not much of protection given to him at all, says Mr. Dolia. There is no doubt some force in this argument: but as we have already observed, the words used ins. 73(1) read with sub-s. (2) cannot reasonably lead to the construction for which Mr. Dolia contends. It would, we think, be unreasonable, if not illegitim:1. te, to construe the relevant section merely on the hypothesis that the legislature intended to provide a larger protection to the employees when the said hypothesis cannot be worked out in the light of the words used by the st:1. tute. By Tirtue of the power conferred on the State Gov-ernment by s. 96 to mak:e rules, certain regulations had been framed under the Act in 1950. Chapter III of these Regulations deals with the benefit claims. Regulations 53 to 86 in this Chapter are concerned with the certification and claims for sickness and temporary disablement.
Regulation 54 provides for the persons competent to issue medical certificate and Regulation 55 required that the Medical Certificate should be filled in the prescribed form. Regulation 57 deals with the Medical Certificate on first exa- /. mination and Regulation 58 refers to the final Medical Certificate. Regulation 63 prescribes the form of claim for sickness or temporary disablement. An insured person intending to claim sickness benefit has to submit the said forqi to the appropriate Local Office by post or otherwise. Regulation 64 lays down that if such a claimant fails to submit to the appropriate Local Office by post or otherwise the first medical certificate or any subsequent medical certificate within the period. therein prescribed, he shall not be eligible for that benefit in respect of the period indicated thereunder.
It is in the light of these regulations that Regulation 53 has to be considered, This regulation provides that every insured person claiming sickness benefit shall furnish evidence of sickness in respect ·of the days of his sickness by means of a medical certificate given by an Insurance Medical Officer in accordance with the Regulations in the appropriate form. There is, however, a proviso to Regulation 53 which says that the Corporation may accept any other evidence of sickness or temporary disablement if in its opinion the circumstances of any particular case so justify. , In the present case, the Regional Director has accepted the Civil Assistant Surgeon's certificate under the proviso to regulation 53 when he directed that cash benefit may be paid to Venkatiah under s.. 73(1).
Having regard to these Regulations, it is difficult to sec how the view taken by the Regional Directors abour the effect of the certificate issued by the Civil Assistant Surgeon can be said to be binding on the appellant. There is no provision in the Act or the Regulations to which s. 73(1) refers by which it could be contended that once the illness of an insured employe~ is accepted by the appropriate authority under the Act, it must automatically be accepted by the employer in dealing with the ~id employee's case under the Standing Orders. Therefore, the argument that inconsistent results may folloyv if tvrn views , are allowed to be taken about the illness of a given employee, does not help the appellant. Besides, as we have already indicated, this argument has hardly any relevance in view of the construction which we are inclined to put on s. 73 ( 1) of the Act. In view of our construction of the said section, Mr.
Dolia' s argument that there is in-consistency between the said section and Standing Order Gajendragadkar, S(ii) also has no validity. Before parting with this case, we ought to add that at the very outset, Mr. Sastri for the appellant made it clear to us that the appellant was fighting this appeal not so much to resist the order of reinstatement passed in favour of Venkatiah as to get a decision from this Court about the true scope and effect of s. 73(1) of the Act. In other words, he argued that this case was fought as a test case on the question of ,the construction of the said section. Therefore, when we suggested to Mr. Sastri that the appellant who is a very big prosperous employer should not resist the reinstatement of a single employee whose case has been brought to this Court, he assured us that he would recommend to the employer to take Venkatiah back on the terms prescribed by the Labour Conrt in the first instance in this case.
In the result, the appeal is allowed, the order passed by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court is set aside and that of the Single Judge restored. There would be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed•
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