THE CENTRAL INDIA SPINNING AND WEAVING AND MANUFACTURING COMPANY LIMITED, THE EMPRESS MILLS, NAGPUR v. THE MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, WARDHA

Citation: [1958] 1 S.C.R. 1102; 1957 INSC 115

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI , BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA, SYED JAFFER IMAM, J.L. KAPUR, P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR

Judgment date: 1957-12-18

Case summary

1957 INSC 115. Supreme Court of India judgment dated 1957-12-18. THE CENTRAL INDIA SPINNING AND WEAVING AND MANUFACTURING COMPANY LIMITED, THE EMPRESS...

Judgment text

110. 2 SUl'RElVIE COURT REPOR'l. 'S (1958) ~~ 1967 1 7, 1951, purporting to dismiss the appellant from service was Kkem Oha>Ui inoperative and tha. t the appellant was a member of the scr- v. vice at the date of the institution of the suit out of which this Th, Union~ India appeal has arisen. The appellant wi! I get costs throughout in and 0 er• all courts. He must pay all court foes that may be due from Da• o. J. him. Under order XIV, Rule 7 of the Supreme Court Rules were direct that ! he appellants could be paid his fees which we assess at Rs. 250. 1961 Deumber, 1. S Appeal allowed. THE CENTRAL INDIA SPINNING AND WEAVING AND MANUFACTURING COMPANY, LIMITED, THE EMPRESS MILLS, NAGPUR v. THE MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, WARDHA (BH,\GWATI, 13. P. SINHA, JAFER IMAM, J. L. KAPUR and GAJENDRAGADKAR JJ. ) Terminal tax-Goods in transit passing through Municipal limits-If can be taxed-Impo~'. ed into and exported from- Connotation of-C. P. & Berar Municipalities Act, 1922 (C. P. II of 1922). s.

66(1)(0). Section 66(I)(o) of the C. P. and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922, empowered the municipalities to impose "a terminal tax on goods or animals imported into or exported from the limits of a municipality". The respondent framed rules for the impo- sition of terminal tax. The appellant transported bales of cot- ton from Yeotmal to Nagpur by road and the vehicles carrying the goods passed through the limits of respondent municipality. The goods were neither unloaded nor reloaded at Wardha but \Vere merely carried across through the munic~pal area. The respondent col1ected terminal tax on these goods on the ground that they were exported by the appellant from the limits of the respondent municipality. The appellant disputed his liability to pay terminal tax, and claimed a refund: Held, that the goods which were in transit and were merely carried pcross the limits of the municipality were not liatle to terminal tax.

Terminal tax on goods imported into or exported from the limit~ of a municipality was payable on goods on their journey ending within 1hc municipal limits or commencjng therefrom and not where the goods were merely • S. C. R SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1103 in transi. t and that their terminus elsewhere. Terminal tax levj, 196'1 able under s. 66(! )(0) must have reference to some activity within the municipal area i. e .. the entry for the. purpose of re- The Central Iniia Spinning and maining within that area or the commencement of the jounrey Weaaingand from that area. Manufacturing . . ,, l "b . . Company, LimKetl, The words "imported mto do not mere Y mean rmgmg Tiie Empress Mills into" but comprise something more i. e. , incorporating and mix- Nagpur ' ing up of the goods with the mass of the property in the local v. area.

Similarly, the words "exported from" do not merely in- The Municipal dicate "taking out" but have reference to the taking out of Oommi~ Wartlha goods which had become part and parcel of the mass of the property of the local area and will not apply to goods in transit i. e. brought into the area for the purpose of being transported out of it. CIVIL APPELLATE JuRISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 119 of 1953. Appeal by special leave from the order dated September 11, 1950, of the Nagpur High Court in Miscellaneous Civil Case No. · 77 of 1946. C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India and M. S. K. Sastri, for the appellants. A. V. Vishwanatha Sastri, G. J. Ghate and Naunit Lal, for the respondent. 1957. December 18. The following Judgment of the Court was delivered by KAPUR J. -This is an appeal by Special Leave against a judgment and order of the High Court of Judicature at Nagpur dated February 14, 1950 and the question for deci- sion turns upon the construction of s. 66(1)(0) of the C. P.

& Berar Municipalities Act (Act II of 1922) which in this judgment will be termed the Act. A short recital of the facts· of the case will suffice for its decision. The appellant is a company which. has its spin- ning and weaving mills at Yeotmal. The appellant's bales of cotton are transported from Yeotmal to Nagpur by road and vehicles carrying them pass through the limits of Wardha Municipality. The goods being in transit, the vehicles carry- ing them do no more than use the road which traverses the municipal limits of Wardha a,nd is a P. W. D. road. The goods are neither unloaded nor reloaded at Wardha but are merely KapurJ. 1104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1958) 1951 carried across through the municipal area. The Municipal The Oent .... l ln imports. They provide; (! ) On the following goods exported by rail or road a terminal tax shall be levied at the rate noted against each; at 2 as. per maund of 40 seers; Cotton .................... .

(2) On the following goods imported by rail or road a terminal tax shall be levied at the rate noted against each. Then follows the schedule. The High court was of the opinion that "The words 'export' and 'import' have no special meaning. They bear the ordinary dictionary meaning, which has been the founda- tion for the decisions to which I have referred in. the opening portion of my opinion. These words mean only 'taking out of and bringing into'. " The appellant's contention is that the words 'imported into or exported from' do not merely mean 'to bring into' or to carry out of or away from but also have reference to and imply the termination or the commencement of the journey of the goods sought to be taxed and therefore goods in tran- sit which are transported across the limits of a Municipal Committee are neither imported into the municipal limits nor exported therefrom.

It is also contended that even if the words 'imported into or exported from' are used merely to mean "to bring into" or "to carry out of or away from" the qualifying of the tax by the adjective "terminal" is indi- S. 0. R. SUPREME COUH! l' H. EPOHTS 1107 cative of the terminus ad quem or terminus a qua of the 1957 journey of the goods and excludes the goods in transit. The 1•11c Central India respondent on the other hand submits that the tax is leviable 8pinn_ing and merely on the entry of the goods into the municipal limits Wilfeao~~cta~ h . . h d h d " . I" h " anu,a unng or on t elf exit t erefrom an t e wor · termma as Company, Limited, reference to the termini of the jurisdictional limits of the 'l'he Empre11• Mil~. municipality and not to the journey of the goods.

The effi- Nag::'r cacy of the relative contentions of the parties therefore re- The Municipal quires the determination of the construction to be placed on Committee, Wardha the really important words of which are "terminal tax", Kapur J. "imported into or exported from" and "the limits of the Municipality". In construing these words of the statute if there are two possible interpretations then effect is to be given to the one that favours the citizen and not the one that imposes a burden on him. 'Import' is derived from the Latin word importare which means 'to bring in' and 'export' from the Latin word expor- tare which means to carry out but these words are not to be interpreted only according to their literal derivations. Lcxico-logically they do not have any reference to goods in 'transit' a word derived from transire bearing a meaning similar to transport, i. e. , to go across.

The dictionary mean- ing of the words 'import' and 'export' is not restricted to their derivative meaning but bear other connotations also. According to Webster's International Dictionary the word "import" means to bring in from a foreign or external source; to introduce . from without; especially to bring (wares or merchandise) into a place or country from a foreign country in the transactions. of commerce; opposed to export. Similarly "export" according to Webster's International Dictionary nieans "to carry away; to remove; to carry or send abroad especially to foreign countries as merchandise or commodi- ties in the way of commerce; the opposite of import". The Oxford Dictionary gives a similar meaning to both these words. The word "transit" in the Oxford Dictionary means the action or fact of passing across or through; passage or jour- 1108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958] 1957 ney from one place or point to another; the passage or carri- Th• o. ,..

ral Indw age of persons or goods from one place to another; it also Bpfoningand means to pass across or through (something) to traverse, to ff' eaoing and Manufar:Juring cross. Even according to the ordinary meaning of the words ~:~,:_;;,! :~~. which is relied upon by the respondent, goods which are in Nagpw transit or are being transported can hardly be called goods v. Th• Municipal 'imported into or exported from' because they are neither Oommmu, Wardho being exported nor imported but are merely goods carried Kapur J. across a particular stretch of territory or across a particular area with the object of being transported to their ultimate destination which in the instant case was Nagpur.

The respondent's counsel sought to support his argu- ment by referring to the following cases decided by various Indian High Courts where the words 'import' and 'export' were construed as meaning 'bring in' or 'take out of or away from' and it was also held that goods in transit are also covered by the words 'imported into' or 'exported from'. In Re Rahimu Bhanii(') which was a case of a criminal prosecution for refusal to pay octroi on the ground that oc- troi was not due on goods in transit, the court gave a literal meaning to the word "import" and held that as the goods had been brought within the limits of the Municipality they were liable to octroi under the Rules which provided for a refund, which could be applied for. The definition of octroi seems to have been ignored in that case. In Narottamdas Harjivandas & Co. v. Bulsar Town Municiplity(') the tax wa~ imposed on goods in transit.

and the argument raised was that the municipality had no power to impose a terminal tax upon such goods as were not meant for consumption within the limits of the Municipality. The court held: "In our opinion there is no force in this contention. The Municipal Rules and Bye-laws dealing with the terminal tax define it as 'an octroi levied on the import into the said Municipality of goods specified in the Terminal Tax Sche- dule, such octroi not being liable to be refunded. ' 'Import' is (') (1897) I. L. R. 22 Born. 843. (') I. L. R. (1941) Born, 97, 103. S. C. R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1109 defined in the Rules as meaning 'conveying goods by Rail- 1957 way or by Ship or otherwise into Municipal limits'. It is Tht c;en1;a1 India clear therefore that the tax is leviable on all goods entering f;:;;;i;:: :: Municipal limits whether they are intended for consump- 0 Manufact":ri'! f' , . . h" th . h h h I . . ompany, Limite.

d, ' tion wit tn e city or w et er t ey are mere y m transit The Empreas Mills, through the city to some other place". Nau;:r Tht Municipal This decision rested on the definition of the words "import" Committee, Warrlha and "terminal tax" without taking into consideration the Kapur J. meaning of 'octroi' which implies consumption, use or sale. Besides these observations were really obiter because the court held that. the goods never entered the limits of the Municipality and consequently no tax was chargeable. Dalvadi Maganlal Bhagwandas v. Ahmedabad Munici- pality(') was a case in which bricks manufactured within the limits of the Abmeda:bad Municipality had in order to be car- ried to the place of business of the munfacturer, which was in another part of the town, to be temporarily taken out of the limits of the Municipality and re~entered at another point. The re-entry was held to be "import" on the basis o.

f the dic- tionary meaning of the word and because "import" had no reference to and was not qualified by any consideration of the place of manufacture or place of consumption. Raja- dhyaksha J. , said at p. 137: "There is no such limitation on the meaning of the word "import" which must be given its ordinary meaning". and mmittee, Wardlta out of the Port" and therefore included coals taken out of Kapur J. the port in a steamer as "bunker coals" that is, coals taken on board for the purpose of consumption on the voyage. The argument that the term "exported" must receive a qualified interpretation and that it means taken for the purpose of trade only was rejected. Lush J. said at p. 461 :- "There is nothing in the language of the Act to shew that the word "exported" was used in any other than its ordinary. sense ............

Construing the words of the Act upon this principle, we feel bound to hold that coals carried away from the port, not on a temporary excursion, as in a tug or pleasure-boat, which intends to return with more or less of the coals on board, and which may be regarded as always constructively within the port, but taken away for the purpose of being wholly consumed beyond the limits of the port, are coals "exported" within the meaning of the Act". Now three things clearly imerge from that (Muller's case; (l) that the word "export" was not applied to coals in transit because the coals were taken from the port and started jour- ney from there and would be included in the phrase "taken out" of the port and (2) that temporary taking out was not "export" as was held in Magan/al Bhagwandas v. Ahmedabad Municipality('); (3) that the test is the intention with which the goods were brought in or taken out.

· ' It was urged that in accordance with the current authority of the different courts of India, a different interpretation should not be placed on the words of the section but this argument is of little avail in a case where the decision has (') (1874) 9 Q. B. 457. ('} IL. R. (1945) Bom, 132, 1112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1968) 1951 not )Jeen acquiesced in for long or the authorities are not The Central Indio absolutely unanimous. Moreover it is not a case of disturbing i;r. :;;~:. :f: the course of construction which has continued unchallenged Man•f•cluring for such a length of time as to acquire the sanction of conti· Con•pany, Limited, d d · · 1 · d h ' h f The Empru8 Milla, nue ec1s1ons over a very ong period an t ere ts t ere ore Nagpur no principle which will preclude this court from correcting v. The Municipal the error. See William Hamilton and John Hamilton v. Committee,. Wordlla William Baker('). The Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway KopurJ. Company v.

The Mayor, Alderman, and Burgesses of the Borough of Bury('). Pate v. Pate('). In another case Wilson v. Robertson(') under the statute the duty was imposed on all goods "imported into or exported from Berwick harbour" which extended down the Tweed to the sea but no part of it extended above the bridge. Goods were brought up the river in a sea-going vessel which having first used rings and posts put up by the Harbour Commis- sioners in order to moor while lowering the masts, passed through Berwick Bridge, and unloaded her cargo about two hundred yards above the bridge and beyond the limits of the harbour. ft was held that goods were not "imported into" the harbour so as to make any dues payable in respect of them. The argument raised there was that as there was no har- bour down the Tweed except Berwick and though the goods were actually unloaded above the Berwick bridge and out of the limits of the harbour it was substantially imported into the harbour.

The vessel in that case was obliged to stop before passing the bridge and avail herself of the benefits of the machinery and works provided by the Commissioners and that was part of the means used towards the unloading of the vessel and it was argued that this would amount to import. Lord Cambell C. J. said : "The argument on behalf of the plaintiff would be very pertinent if addressed to a Committee of the House of Com- mons in favour of making the harbour dues payable in such a case as the present. We can, however, look only to what (') (1889) 14 App, Cas. 209, 220, 222. (') (1915) A. C. 1100, 1108. (') (1889) 14 App. Cas. 417, 420. (') (1855) 24 L. J. Q. B. 185. 8. C. R. SUPREME COUR'r REPORTS the legislature has enacted, in order to see whether this bur- 19S7 then is cast upon the defendants. The dues are only to be T/'8 Oentra! India paia upon goods imported into the harbour of Berwick, the 'fl:::t:u:::; limits of which are defined by the .

Act, and which does not Manuf~ extend above the bridge. Now, bas this iron been so imported? ~zir,:~~~~. It is admitted that, if it had been carried through the bridge Nagpur v. to a port higher up the river, no dues would have been pay- Tie Municipal able; and the plaintiff's counsel by that admits himself out OommiUU, War& of court" ................... These observations support the sub- x;;;; J. missions against the meaning of "export" or "import" being merely taking out of or bringing into. Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. Twigge(') was a case of goods shipped from a foreign port under a through bill of lading to Liverpool, landed in London and sent from there to Liverpool in another ship and it was held that such goods were imported into Liverpool ports beyond the seas and not from London. The transit began at Singapore and ended at Liverpool and was not broken by the transhipment irt London. By giving to the words "imported into or exported from" their derivative meaning .

without any reference to the ordi- nary connotation of these words as used in the commercial sense, the decided cases in India have ascribed too general a meaning to these words which it appears from the setting, context and history of the clause was not intended. The effect of the construction of "import" or "export" in the manner insisted upon by the respondent would make rail-borne goods passing through a railway station within the limits of a Muni- cipality liable to the imposition of the tax on their arrival at the railway station or departure therefrom or both which would not only lead to inconvenience but confusion, and would also result in inordinate delays and unbearable burden on trade both inter Sta. te and intra State. It is hardly likely that that was the intention of the legislature. Such an interpreta- tion would lead to absurdity which has, according to the rules of interpretation, to be avoided. (') (1898) 67 L. J. Q. B. 604.

J,jl'(D) 3 SOI-G 1114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1958] 1967 Chief Justice Marshall dealing with the word "importa- T'M c:. ;;;;i India tion" said in Brown v. State of Maryland('): Spinning and 1Veaving an& "The practice of most commercial nations conforms to Mannfaetur,. g th" "d D t" d" h · h d c~mpany, Limited, 1s 1 ea. u 1es, accor mg to t at practice, are c arge on The EmPre" Mills, those articles only which are intended for sale or consumption Xagpvr . h Th . . v. m t e country. us sea-stores, goods imported and re-export- 0 Tl ... Munwici! "! L ed in the same vessel, goods landed and carried over land for omniittee, am1i. a . - the purpose of bemg re-exported from some other port, goods li:apur J. forced in by stress of weather, and landed, but not for sale are exempted from the payment of duties. The whole course of legislation on the subject shows that in the opinion of the legislature the right to sell is connected with the payment of the duties".

Continuing the learned Chief Justice at p. 447 observed: "Sale is the object of importation, and is an essential ingredient of that intercourse, of which importation constitutes a part. It is as essential an ingredient, as indispensable to the existence of the entire thing, then, as importation itself ....... .. . . . . . . . . . . . . " This supports the contention raised that "import" is not merely the . bringing into but comprises something more i. e. "incorporating and mixing up of the goods imported with the mass of the property" in the local area. The concept of "import" as implying something brought for the purpose of sale or being kept is supported by the observations of Kelly C. B. in Harvey v. The Mayor and Corporation of Lyme Regis('). There the claim for a toll was made under the Harbour Act and the words for construction were "goods landed or shipped within the same cobb or harbour". Con- struing these words Kelly C. B.

said : "The ordinary meaning and purport of the words is per- fectly clear, namely, that tolls are to be paid on goods sub- stantially imported; that is, in fact, carried into the port for the purpose of the town and neighbourhood. " Similarly the word "export" has reference to taking out of goods which had become part and parcel of the mass of the property of the local area and will not apply to goods in (') (1827i 12 Wheat 419, 442; 6 L. Ed. 678, 686. (') (1869 4 Ex. 260, 262. S. C. R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1115 transit i. e. brought into the area for the purpose of being 195'1 transported. out of it. If the intention was to tax such goods 'I'M oe;;;;j India then the word used should have been "re-exported" which '/t,. ~':;,,,";f means to export (imported goods) again; Re-exportation means Manufactu;ri'! g h · f · d d Oomzxm,y, Limitd, t e exportation o llllporte goo s. PM Empre•• Milla, Nagpur Even assuming that the words ..

imported into" or "ex- The M~nicipal ported from" could be restricted only to their derivative mean- Committee, Waralla ing and thus. construed to mean only "brought into or taken Kapur J. out or away from" this general meaning it was submitted by the appellant is qualified by the use of the prefix "terminal" used adjectively with the word "tax", which makes it neces- sary to determine the meaning of the term "terminal tax". And the question then arises does it have reference to the jurisdictional limits of the Municipality or to the ultimate termination or· the commencement of the journey of the goods as the case may be. In dealing with this the High Court said : "It remains to consider wha. t is signified by the word "terminal". It is obvious· that it could refer either to the termi· ni of the goods or the termini of the Municipality. It is clear to me that the word "terminal" refers not to the destination ·Or origin of the goods but to the termini of the Municipal limits. Digby, J.

, pointed out that it refers to the traffic rather than the origin of the goods". According to the Oxford Dictionary "terminal" means . end, boundary; situated at or forming the end or extremity of something; situated at the end of a line of railway; forming or belonging to, a _railway terminus. "Terminus" means the point to which motion or action tends, goal, end, finishing point; sometimes that from which it starts; starting point. An end; extremity; the point at which :Something comes to an end. . In Corpus Juris Vol. 62 it is stated at p. 729 that "termi- nal" in connection with transportation means inter alia "the filed beginning or ending point of a given run". 1116 SU1'RftJ. c\1H COU HT HBl'ORTS [1958] 1957 If "terminal" besides the above meaning has an additional '1.

'lte Central India n1eaning al~o and that meaning signifies the termini or the fl:::/;:::::i jurisdictional limits of the municipal area even then the Manufacturing construction to be placed on the term should be the one [,;:;'};:,';f;. f:'. :f:tf. ; that favours the tax-payer, in accordance with the principle Nagyur of construction of taxing statutes. which must be strictly Tl .. M~nicipal construed and in case of doubt must be construed against OommiU... Wardha the taxing authorities and doubt resolved in favour of the· Kayur J. tax-pa,yer. In Crawford on Statutory Constructions in para. 257 at p. 504 the following passage pertaining to construc- tion of taxing statutes taken from Bedford v.

Johnson(') is quoted : "Statutes levying taxes or duties upon citizens will not be extended by implication beyond the clear import of the language used, nor will their operation be enlarged so as to embrace matters not specifically pointed out, although standing upon a close analogy, and all questions of doubt will be resolved against the government and in favour of the citizen, and because burdens are not to be imposed beyond what the statute expressly imparts''. In that case the court refused to regard automobile parking lots as falling within the scope of a statute which imposed a tax on general warehouse storage establishments. On this principle the word "terminal" must in the context be construed as having reference to terminus and has to be read to connote the idea of the end of something connected with motion and not that of an intermediate stage of a journey.

It would be quite legitimate to examine the legislative history of these "terminal taxes" which would be a useful aid to construction of clause (o) of s. 66(1). In the last cen- tury a tax known as Octroi ·payable on the entry of goods in a local area for consumption, use or sale therein was introduced. In 1920 an optional substitute called "terminal tax" came into existence by virtue of item 8 of Schedule Il of the Scheduled Tax Rules framed under s. 80A(3)(a) of (') 102 Colo 203, 78 Pac (2) 373. S. C. R. SUPREME COURfl' REPOH'l'S the Government of India Act, 1915 as amended in Item 8 was as follows: 1117 1919. 19fi7 7'1'4 Cenlral India n goods or passengers, carried by railway, sea or air; taxes -on railway fares and freights". In the State List the item No. 52 which is as follows: "Taxes on the entry of goods into a local area for con- sumption, use or sale therein" . and Item No. 56 is: "Taxes on goods and passengers carried by road or on inla~d waterways".

The legislative history of this tax thus shows that octroi was leviable on the entry of goods in a local area when the goods were for consumption, use or sale therein. The sub- stituted tax was terminal tax on goods imported into or exported from a local area and by rules this tax in the case of Wardha Municipal Committee was imposed on certain . class of goods imported and on others exported by railway or :road. In 1935 the terminal tax was made leviable on goods Ku. purJ. 1118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1958] wsr carried by railway or air but the tax on entry of goods was 'l'ke Ot! llt. al India imposable on goods for consumption, use or sale in a local Spinning and B h h . . Wearing""" area. ot t ese taxes have been contmued by the Constttu- 0 ManufactunLi ·"!!. , tion. If the pre 1920 octroi and the post 1935 cess or tax on ompany,m•-· f d' bl df · Tke Emprua Milk, entry o goo s IS pa.

ya e on goo s or consumption, use or N'::pu' sale, can it be said that the Constitution Act of 1915 as T!.. M"nicipal amended in 1919 or the Rules made thereunder intended to Oommitte,e~ Wardlia KapurJ. vary the nature of the tax by the introduction of item 8 in Sch. II under the Scheduled Tax Rules i. e. the tax became leviable on entry of goods or on their being taken out with- out their acquiring the qualification of incorporation with the mass of property of the local area. The presumption is against the imposition of new burdens. In the absence of clear intention to the contrary the incidence of the tax levi- able under item 8 of Sch. II of the Schedule Tal! < Rules is incapable of having a. different complexion from that which it had before 1920 or that which was clearly given after 1935. It was said in U. S. v.

Fi~her('): "that it is in the last degree improbable that the legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights, or depart from the general system of la. w, without expressing its intention with irrestible clearness" ................. . It is also a recognised principle of construction that general words and phrases however wide and comprehensive they may be in their literal sense must usually be construed as being limited to the actual objects of the Act. There is no evidence that the actual object of the Act in the present case was to extend the powers of the Municipalities to imposing the tax on articles which ·were in the course of transit. That by the substitution of terminal tax on goods im- ported into a local area the nature of the tax had not been altered from wha.

t it was when octroi was in force or when instead of "terminal tax" octroi (without refund, was substi- tuted is clear from the decision of the Federal Court in Puniab Flour and General Mills' case(') which is discussed in a later (') (1804 2 Cranch 358, 390; 2 L. Ed. 304. (') [1947) F. C. R. 17. S. C. R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1119 part of this judgment. Therefore terminal tax on goods im- 19a7 ported or exported is similar in its incidence and is payable The Central bul:,. on goods on their journey ending within the municipal limits ~·;;~q:;;t or commencing therefrom and not where the goods were Manufacluring_~ 1 • • h h · · l l" · h d h . Company, Limit. ,. , mere. y m transit t rough t e mumc1pa 1m1ts and a t elf The EmJYTe•s Milla, terminus elsewhere. Nagpitr v, The vires of the tax has not been assailed but the differ- c:~f~:~i=hr. ence in the language of the two items in Lists I and II has - been pressed . before us for the purpose of showing that the Kapur J.

word "terminal" implies the terminus of a. journey and not the end of the jurisdictional limits of a municipality. Terminal in item No. 58 of List l of the 1935 Constitution Act has reference to the terminus of carriage of goods. There is no reason to give to this word a different meaning in item No. 8 of Scheduled Tax Rules under the Government of India Act of 1915 or in clause (o) of s. 66(1) of the Act. The two sets of taxes in Lists T and II have different qualities. The "termi- nal tax" under item No. 58 of List I arises at the end of journey by railway wherever the end may be in relation to particular goods and under item No. 49 of List II the tax or cess on entry of goods whatever the nomenclature is im- posable when the goods enter a local area for consumption, use or sale therein. The two sets of taxes are so distinct tha.

t they may be imposed simultaneously, one when they reach their destination at the end of a railway journey and the other when they enter the limits of a local area for the object above-mentioned. But in both cases the activity in regard to the motion of the goods ends, in the cne case as the goods are carried no further by railway and in the other as their entry is for consumption, use or sale. Keeping in view the terms and language and the legislative history of the section 66(1) we are unable to enlarge the terms of the section by mere construction so as to include within its operation goods which are in transit and are being trans- ported across the jurisdictional limits of the Municipality. The Federal Court in Punjab Flour and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Chief Officer, Corporation of City of Lahore(') considered the meaning of the word "terminal" in a case (') [1947] F. C. R. 17. II20 SUPHEME COUR'. 1. ' REPOHTS (1958) 1901 which was brought from Lahore.

There the Municipality T40entra1I,. ,UO of Lahore imposed a terminal tax in 1926 cakula,ted on the :;pin•~ng ancl gros; weight of consignments or per tail as the case might ~:,~;! i~:;1 119 be, at the rates and on the articles specified in the schedule, c. ;. Po•Y· IAmit<tl, imported into \he Municipality by rail or by road. By a noti- T1,. E,mpr.. , . lfilu, fication of 1938 the Municipality in supersession of that tax ·' "~~ imposed a new tax called "Octroi (without refund)" which Tl .. M~•iciPQl was to be similarly calculated on the gross weightage of the Oommi~Wanllia consignments imported into the limits of the Municipality. Karw. r J. This in tum was replaced by the imposition of a new tax also called "Octroi (without refund)" on consignments im- ported into the limits of the Municipality. The appellant's contention in that case was that the tax imposed was a "terminal tax" on goods carried by railway and as such not imposable.

The Municipality argued on the other hand that it was a tax within the provisions of Entry No. 49 of List II and as such could be imposed with the previous sanction of the Provincial Government under s. 61(2) of the Punjab Municipalities Act. The following passage from the judgment of Spens C. J. shows the meaning to be attached to the word ''terminal": "There appears to us a definite distinction between the type of taxes referred to as terminal taxes in Entry No. 58 of List J of Sch. 7 and the type of taxes referred to as cesses on the entry of goods into a local area in Entry Na. 49 of List IL The former taxes must be (a) terminal (b) confined to goods and passengers carried by railway or air. They must be chargeable at a rail or air terminus and be referrable to services (whether of carriage or othern. ,se) rendered or to be rendered by some rail or air transport organisa. tion. The essential features of the cesses referred to in Entry No.

49 of List II are on the other hand simply (a) the entry of goods into a definite local area and (b) the requirement that the goods should enter for the purpose of consumption, use or sale therein ........................................................... . In our judgment there is no limitation to be implied in Entry No. 49, List IJ, in regard to the manner in which goods may be transported into a local area. It follows that S. C. R SUPRK\:l. E COUH. '1' LUWOR. TS ll21 so far· as rail-borne goods are concerned the same goods may 196? well be subjected to taxation undex Entrv No. 58 of List I 'l'he o~ India as well to local taxation under Entry No. ' 49 of List II. The fr;~':; ::1' grounds of taxation under the two entries are, as indicated 0 ManufactLiit! ::~ .. 0111pany, ,, ....... -above. radically different, and there is no case for suggesting Tkt Em11reas Mi1l8, that taxation under the one entry limits or interferes in any N~ -way with taxation under the other". a::!

:;:'Jtelia Therefore according to the Federal Court "terminal" has reference to the terminus of the railwa. y or air i. e. , the end of journey. The tax imposed in that case was held not to be a terminal tax but merely a cess on entry of goods into the ·local area within Entry No. 49 of List II even though it was imposed on rail-borne goods entering the municipal area. It is a noticeable feature of s. 66(1) that apart from the terminal tax there are 14 other heads of taxation imposable by the Municipality and in the case of each one of these 14 heads the tax is on some activity which takes place within the jurisdictional limits of the Municipality. This supports the contention of the appellant that the terminal tax leviable under cl. (o) properly construed must have reference to some activity within the municipal area i. e. , the entry for the purpose of remaining within that area or commencement of journey from that area.

We are, therefore, of the opinion that the terminal tax under s. 66(1)(0) is not leviable on goods which are in transit and are only carried across the limits of the Municipality; and would therefore allow this appeal, reverse the decision of the Nagpur High Court. The appellant will have its costs in this court and in the High Court. Appeal allowed. Kapur-J.

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