THE CHAIRMAN, RAILWAY BOARD AND ORS. v. MRS. CHANDRIMA DAS AND ORS

Citation: [2000] 1 S.C.R. 480

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: S. SAGHIR AHMAD, R.P. SETHI

Judgment text

THE CHAIRMAN, RAILWAY BOARD AND ORS. v. MRS. CHANDRIMA DAS AND ORS. - JA,~UARY 28, 2CGO [S. SAGHIR AH. \IAD AND R. P. SETHI, JJ. J Constitution of India, 195(}-Articles 32, 226--Public Law Remedies-Availability oj:. _claim of compensation in a writ petition under Article 226 from the Railways for the offence of rape committed by its employees on the victim, a Bangladeshi nationaf--i'vfaintainability of-Held, Public Law Remedie1· have also been extendcd to the realm oftort and would be available notwith. ~tanding that a suit could be filed for damages under Private Law, where public functionaries are involved and the matter relates to the violation of Fundamental Rights or the enforcement of public duties-- kinds at Howrah Railway station were also claimed. The true nature of the petition, therefore, was that of a petition filed in public: interest. The existt.

Once of a legal right, no doubt, is the foundation for a petition under artick 226 and a bare interest, may be of a minimum nature, may give locus standi to a person to file a Writ Petition, but the concept of "Locus Scandi' has undergom. : a sea change, as we shall presently notice. In Dr. Satyanara}ana Sinha v. S Lal & Co. Pvt. Led. , AIR (1973) SC 2720 = [1973) 2 sec 696, it was held that the foundation for exercising jurisdiction under Article 32 or Article 226 is ordinarily the personal or individual ri·5ht of the petitioner himsdf. In writs like Habeas Corpus and Quo Wlranto, the rule has been relaxed and modified. In S. P. Gupta & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. , AIR (1982) 149 = [1981J Supp. SCC 87, the law relating to locus standi was explained so as to give a wider mt::aning to the phrase.

This Court laid down that practising lawyers havt undoubtedly a vital intert:st in the independence of the judiciary; thty would certainly be interested in challt:nging the validity or constitutiona. ity of an action taken by the State or any public authority which has th~ effect of impairing the independence of the judiciary. " It was further observed that ''lawyer's profession was an essential and integral part of the judicia; system; they could figuratively be described as priests in the temple of justice. They have, therefore, a special interest in preserving the integrity and independence of the. judicial system; they are equal partners with the Judges in the administration of justice. The lawyers, either in their individual capacity or as represent.

ing some Lawyers' Associations have the locus standi to challenge the circular letter addressed by the Union Law Mmister to the Governors and Chief Ministers directing that one third of p the Judges of the High Court should, as far as possible, be from outside the States. '' In the context of Public Interest Litigation, however, the Court in its various J udgmcnts has given widest amplitude and meaning to the concept of locus standi. In People's Union for Demoractic Rights and Ors. v. Union ofIndia & Ors. , AIR (1982) SC 1473 ~ (1982J 3 SCC 235, it was laid down that Public Interest Litigation could be initiated not only by filing formal petitions in the High Court but even by stnding letters and telegrams so as to provide easy access tu Court. (Sec also : Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India & Ors. , AIR (1984) SC 802 = [198412SCR67 = (1984) 3 SCC 161 and State of Himachal Pradesh v. Student's Parent Medical CHA;R:-.! AN RAILWAY BOARD '· MRS. CHANDRIMA DAS (S. SACiHIRAHMAD.

JJ 495 College, Shimla & Ors. , AIR (1985) SC 910 = (1985] 3 SCC 169 on the right to approach the Court in the realm of Public Interest Litigation). In Bangalore Medical Trost v. B. S. Muddappa and Ors. , AIR (1991) SC 1902 "' [1991I :I SCR 102 °• [1991 I4 sec 54, the Court hdd that the restricted meaning of aggrieved person and narrow outlook of specific injury has yidded in favour of a broad and wide construction in the wake of Public Interest Litigation. The Court further observed that public-spirit.. :d citizens having faith in the rule of law arc rendering great social and legal service by espousing causes of public nature. They cannot be ignored or ovt:rlooked on technical or conservative yardstick of tht: rule of locus standi or absence of personal loss or injury. Tht:rc has, thus, been a spectacular expansion of the concept of locus standi. The concept is much wider and it takes in its stride anyone who is not a mere "busy-body".

Having regard to the nature of tht: petition filed by respondent Mrs. Chandrima Das and the rdid claimed thaein it cannot be doubted that this petition was filed in public intt,rcst which could legally be filed by the respondent and thi;: argument that sht: could not tilt: that petition as there was nothing personal to ht:r involved in that petiton must be rejt:cted. It was m;xt contended by tht: learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, that Smt. Hanuffa Khatoon was a fort:ign national and, therefort:, no relief under Public Law could be granted to her as tht:re was no violation of the Fundamt:ntal Rights availablt: under the Constitution. It was contended that the Fundamental Rights in Part III of the Constitution arc available only to citizens of this country and since Smt. Hanuffa Khatoon was a Bangaladeshi national, she cannot complain of the violation of Fundamental Rights and on that basis she cannot be granted any relief.

This argument must also fail for two masons; first, on the ground of Domestic Jurisprudence based on Constitutional provisions and secondly, on the ground of Human Rights Jurisprudence based on the Universal Declaratation of Human Rights, 1948, which has the international recognition as tht:: "Moral Code of Conduct" having bt::en adopted by the Gt:nt::ral Asst::mbly of the L:nited Nations. We will comt:: to the question of Domestic Jurisrudence a little later as we intend to first consider the principles and objects behind L'niversal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, as adopted and proclaimed by the United Nations Gconeral Assembly Resolution of 10th December, l948. The 496 SVPRliMb COURT REPOR'l'S [2000] LS. C. R. preamble, inter alia, sets out as under: Whereas recognition of the l"IHERENT DlG'IITY and of the equa: and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of fn:edom, ;ustice and peace in the world.

Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have n:sulted in ba n who died in an accident caused by the negligence of the driver of a Govt. vehicle. Reference may also be made to the decisions of this Court in State of Gujarat v. Memon Mahomed Haji Hasan AIR (1967) SC 1885 and Smt. Basava Korn Dyamogouda Patil v. State of Mysore, AIR (1977) SC 1749. These principles were reiterated in N. Nagendra Rao & Co. v. State ofA. P. , AIR (1994) SC 2663 = (1994) 6 SCC 205 and again in CHAIRMA:, KAil WAY BOARD v. MKS. CHANDRI. \fA :. JAS ;s. SAUHIRAHMAD.. 1. ; 503 State ofMaharashtra v. Kanchanmala Vijaysing Shirke, (1995) ACJ 1021 SC [1995] 5 sec 659 = JT (1995) 6 sc t55. Rdiancc placed by the counsel for th.. : appellants on the deci~ion of this Court in Ka. ituri Lal Ralia Ram Jain v. State ufAJ'. , AIR (1905) SC 1039 ~~ [1965) 1 SCR 375, cannot hdp him as this decision has not been follow.. :d by this Court in the subsequent decisions, including the decisions in State of Gujarat v.

Memon Mahomed Haft Hasan and Smt. Ba. i·ava Kom Dyamoguuda Patil v. State of Mysore (supra). The decision in Kasturi Lat's case was also severdy criticised by Mr. Secrvai in his prestigious book · Constitutional Law of India. A three Judge Bench of this Court in Common Cause, A Regd. Society v, Union of India, [1. 999] 6 SCC 667 also did not follow the decision in Ka. i·turi Lal's case (supra) and observed that the efficacy of this decision as a binding precedent has been eroded. The theory of Sovereign power which was propounded in Kasturi Lal's case has yielded to new theories and is no longer available in a welfare State. It may be pointed out that functions of the Govt. in a welfare State are manifold, all of which cannot be said to be the activities relating to exercise of Sovereign powers.

The functions of the State not only relate to the defonct: of the country or the administration of justice, but they extend to many other spheres as, for exampk, education, commercial, social, economic, political and even marital These activities cannot be said to be related to Sovereign power. Running of Railways is a commercial activity. Establishing Yatri Niwas at various Railway Stations to provide lodging and boarding facilities to passengers on payment of charges is a part of the commercial activity of the Union of India and this activity cannot be equated with the exercise of Sovereign power. The employees of the l. Jnion of India who are deputed to run the Railways and to manage the establishment, including the Railway Stations and Yatri Niwas, are essential components of the Govt. machinery which carries on the commercial activity. If any of such employees commits an act of tort, the Union Govt.

, of which they are the employees, can, subject to other legal requirements being satisfied, be held vicariously liable in damages to the person wronged by those employees. Kasturi Lal's decision, therefore, cannot be pressed in aid. Moreover, we are dealing with this case under Public law domain and not in a suit instituted under Private Law domain against persons who, utilising their official position, 504 SUPREME COGRT REPORTS (2C00) 1S. C. R. A got a room in the Yatri Niwas booked in their own name where the act complained of was committed. No other point was raised before us. The appeal having no merit is dismissed with the observation that the amount of compensation shall be made over to the High Commissioner for Bangladesh in India for payment B to the victim, Smt. Hanuffa Khatoon. The payment to the High Commissioner shall be made within ! three months. There will be no order as to costs. M. P. Appeal dismissed. . {;'