THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, WEST BENGAL, CALCUTTA v. RAJA BENOY KUMAR SARAS ROY

Citation: [1958] 1 S.C.R. 101; 1957 INSC 55

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI , T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR, J.L. KAPUR

Judgment date: 1957-05-23

Case summary

1957 INSC 55. Supreme Court of India judgment dated 1957-05-23. THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, WEST BENGAL, CALCUTTA v. RAJA BENOY KUMAR SARAS ROY. Read...

Judgment text

S. C. R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 101 THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, 1957 WEST BENGAL, CALCUTTA May, 23 v. RAJA BENOY KUMAR SARAS ROY (BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA AYYAR and J. L. KAPUR JJ. ) Income-tax-Exemption-Income from sale of forest trees, if . and when agricultural income-"Agriculture", Meaning of-Indian Income-tax Act (XI of 1922), ss. 2(1), 4(3) (viii). The question for decision in this appeal by the Commissioner ·of Income-tax was whether a sum of Rs. 51,978 shown by the assessee in his return as income from his forest land was agricultural income within the meaning of s. 2(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act and was as such exempt from taxation under s. 4(3)(viii) of the Act. The forest was of spontaneous growth, 150 years old, and consisted of sal and piyasal trees. It was in parts denuded of trees from time to time by destructive elements and the . assessee had to plant fresh trees in those parts. Considerable amount of human labour and skill lmd to be applied year after year for .

maintaining the forest, protecting the offshoots from the stumps of the trees that had been cut and sold and in reviving its denuded parts by fresh plantation. The staff employed by the assessee performed such operations as· pruning, weeding, felling, clearing, cutting of channels, guarding the trees and sowing seeds by digging the soil in the denuded areas. The Income-tax Officer rejected the assessee's claim of exemption an added a sum of Rs. 34,430 to the assessable income, allowing a sum of Rs. 17,548 as expenditure. The Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax confirmed the assessment. The Appellate Tribunal held that the sowing of seeds were few and far between and the income, derived as it was from jungle products, was not agricultural income within the meaning of the Act.

The High Court took a contrary view, held that tillage of the soil was not essential, and the income was agricultural income as human labour and skill had been expended on the land itself and answered the question in favour of the assessee. No attempt was, however, made by the Income-tax Authorities to ascertain the income actually derived from the trees planted by the assessee, nor were any materials placed on the record from which its exact amount could be ascertained, but having regard to the magnitude of the expenditure shown by the assessee as against the total income this Court held that a substantial portion of it must have been derived from the trees planted by the assessee. Held, that the income actually derived from the trees planted by the assessee was agricultural income within the meaning of s. 2(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act and no attempt having been . , [1958J made to ascertain its exact amount and a fresh enquiry being Commissioner u!

'de~irable after such a long lapse of time, the appeal must be d1sm1ssed. The term 'agriculture' in s. 2(l)(b)(i) of the Indian Income-tax Act connotes the entire and integrated activity of an agriculturist Kumar performed on the land in order to raise its produce and consists of such basic and essential operations, requiring human skill and labour on the land itself, as the tilling of the soil, sowing of the seeds, planting and similar operations on the land and such other subsequent operations, performed after the produce sprouts from the land, as weeding, digging of the soil around the growth, removal of undesirable under-growths, tending, pruning, cutting, harvesting and marketing. But these subsequent operations, if unconnected with the basic operations, cannot by themselves constitute agriculture.

It is only when the land is subjected to such integrated activity, that it can be said to be used for 'agricultural purpose' and its income called agricultural income within the meaning of the Act. . Case-law discussed. Whatever is produced by such agriculture must be an agricultural product and the ambit of the term 'agriculture' cannot be confined merely to the production of grain and food for men and cattle but must extend to all products of the land that have some utility either for consumption or trade and commerce. Fruit and vegetable plantations, groves, pastures, articles of luxury such as betel, coffee, tea, spices, tobacco etc. or commercial crops like cotton, flax, jute, hemp, indigo etc. as also forest products such as timber, sol and piyasal trees, casuarina plantations, tendu leaves,. horranuts etc. can come within its ambit. Murugesa Chetti v. Chinnathambi Goundan, (1901) I. LR. 24 Mad. 421 and Raja of Venkatagiri v. Ayyappa Reddy, (1913) I. LR. 38 Mad.

738, disapproved. Such an extended meaning of the term 'agriculture' and it& processes and products can be tenable only where there is cultivation, which means the basic operations, and can never be disso-ciated from them. There is, therefore, no warrc1. nt for its further extension so as to include activities which are in some way connected with or dependent on land, such as breeding and rearing of livestock, dairy-farming, butter and cheese making and poultry-farming. Moo/ji Sicko & Co. , In re, (1925) 10 T. C. 341 and Commissioner of Income-tax v. K. E. Sundara Mudaliar, (1950) 18 l. T. R. 259, disapproved. Although human labour and skill are required both in the performance of the basic as well as the subsequent operati~ns, it is only in the case of the basic operations alone that such skill and labour can be said to have been spent on the land itcself, and this distinction becomes important where they arc disjointed and do ,.

not form an integrated activity, as in the case of products of land 1957 that are of spontaneous growth where hunian skill and labour are The Commissioner· spent merely in fostering the growth, preservation and regenera-of Income-tax, tion of such products. West Bengal, Calcutta -Judicial opinion is unanimous that products which grow wild v. on the land or are of spontaneous growth and do not involve any Raja Benoy Kumar human skill or labour on the land, and all that the assessee has. Sahas Roy to perform in respect of them is only to collect them for consump--tion and marketing, are not products of agriculture and the income derived from them is not agricultural income within the meaning of s. 2(1) of the Act. When, however, the assessee performs subsequent operations on these products of land, the nature of those operations will have to be determined in the light of the principles enunciated above. Held.

further, that there is no basis for the argument that the· demarcation of- agriculture and forestry as separate head~ of legislation in Entries 14 and 19 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution has the effect of making them mutually exclusive. Income from forestry coming within the definition of 'agricultural income' contained in s. 2(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act will be agricultural income under Entry 46 and thus fall within the purview of that Act. . CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 165of1954. Appeal from the judgment and order dated May 27, 1953, of the Calcutta High Court in Income-tax Reference No. 35 of 1952. G. N. Joshi and R. H. Dhebar, for the appellant. Jyotish Chandra Pal and D. N. Mukherjee, for the respondent. 1957. May 23. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 1 BHAGW ATI, J . -This appeal with certificate of fitness Bhagwati · under s.

66A(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act (XI of 1922) is directed againstthe Judgment and order of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta on a reference under s. 66(1) of the Act. The respondent owns an area of 6,000 acres of forest land assessed to land revenue and grown with Sal and Piyasal trees. The forest was originally of spontaneous growth, "not grown by the aid of human skill and 1957 laobur" and it has been in existence for about 150 1 he Commissioner years. A considerable income is derived by the assessee 0 1 ,Income-tax, from sales of trees from this forest. The assessment JI est Bengal, . h. h h. ,. . 1 d d [Calcutta year m w 1c t 1s 1orest mcome was ast taxe un er . s'" v the Indian Income-tax Act was 1923-24 but thereafter R a;a ''"'Y numar d '11 1944 45 h' h . h · Sahas Roy an ti - w 1c 1s t e assessment year m ques- J(-. tion, it was always left out of account. The assessment 8 0 1 ,.

"' " • for 1944-45 also was first made without including therein any forest income, but the assessment was subse-quently re-opened under s. 34. In response to a notice under s. 22(2) read with s. 34 of the Act, the respondent submitted a return showing the gro$s receipt of Rs. 51,978 from the said forest. A claim was, however, made that the said income was not assessable under the Act as it was agricultural income and was exempt under s. 4(3) (viii) of the Act. The Income Tax Officer rejected this claim and added a sum of Rs. 34,430 to the assessable income as income derived from the forest after allowing a sum of Rs. 17 ,548 as expenditure. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner confirmed the assessment and the Jncome-tax Appellate Tribunal also, was of opinion that the said income was not agricultural income but was . income derived from the sale of jungle produce of spontaneous growth and as such was. not covered by s. 2(1) of the Act.

At the instance of the assessee the Tribunal referred to the High Court under s. 66(1) of the Act two questions of law arising out of its order, one of which was: "Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of this case, the sum of Rs. 34,430 is "agricultural -income" and as such is exempt from payment of tax under section 4 (3) (viii) of the Indian Income-tax Act? " The Tribunal submitted a statement of case from which the following facts appear as admitted or established : "(i) The area covered by the forest is about 6,000 acres, trees growing being Sal and Piyasal; (ii) It is of spontaneous growth being about 150 years old. It is not a forest grown by the aid of human skill and labour;· (iii) The fores·t is occasionally parcelled out for the purposes of sale and the space from which trees The sold are cut away is guarded by forest guards to ' protect offshoots; (iv) It has been satisfactorily proved that R<rja .

considerable amount of human labour and care is being applied year after year for keeping the forest alive as also for reviving the portions that get denuded as a result of destruction by cattle and other causes; (v) The staff is employed by the asscssee to perform the following specific operations; (a) Pruning, . (b) Weeding, (c) Felling, (d) Clearing, (e) Cutting of channels to help the flow of rain water, (f) Guarding the trees against pests and other destructive elements, (g) Sowing of seeds after digging of the soil in denuded areas. " The Tribunal found that the employment of human labour and skill in items (a) to (f) was necessary for the maintenance and upkeep of any forest of spontaneous :growth. Regarding item (g), however, it found that the said operation had been performed only occasionally and over a small fraction of the area where the original growth had been found to have been completely denuded.

Such occasions were however few and far between, the normal process being that whenever a tree was cut, a stump of about 6" height was left intact which sent forth offshoots all round bringing about fresh growth in course of time. This went on perpetually unless an area got ·otherwise completely denuded. The reference was heard by the High Court and the · High Court held that actual cultivation of the land was not required and as human Jabour and skill were spent for the growth of the forest the income from the forest was agricultural income. It accordingly answered the above question in the affirmative. The Revenue obtained the requisite certificate of fitness for appeal to this Court and hence this· appeal.

The question that arises for consideration in this appeal is whether income derived from the sale of Sal Kumar and Piyasa/ trees in the forest owned by the assessee which was originally a forest of spontaneous growth "not grown by the aid of human skill and labour" but on which forestry operations described in the statement of case had been carried on by the assessee involving considerable amount of expenditure of human skill and labour is agricultural income within the meaning of s. 2(1) and as such exempt from payment of tax under s. 4 (3) (viii) ofthe Indian Income-tax Act.

Section 2(1) of the Act defines agricultural income and states (so far as it is relevant for the purposes of this appeal) : (l) "agricultural income" means: (a) any rent or revenue derived from land which is used for agricultural purposes, and is either assessed to land-revenue in the taxable territories or subject to· a local rate assessed and collected by officers of the Government as such : (b) any income derived from such land by : (i) agriculture, or (ii) the performance by a cultivator or receiver of rent-in-kind of any process ordinarily employed by a cultivator or receiver of rent-in-kind to render the produce raised or received by him fit to be taken to market, or (iii) the sale by a cultivator or . receiver of rent-· in-kind of the produce raised or received by him, in respect of which no process has been performed other than a process of the nature described in sub-clause (ii); ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . ........

·- Section 4(3) of the Act provides:- "(3) Any income, profits or gains falling within-the following classes shall not be included in the total income of the person receiving them; (viii) Agricultural income .................. " Even though "agricultural income" which is exempted under s. 4(3) (viii) of the Act is defined in The s. 2(1) as above, there is no definition of "agriculture" or "agricultural purpose" to be found in the Act and it therefore falls to be determined what is the connota- R • . -tton of these terms. An argument based on entries 14 and 19 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution may be disposed of at once. It was urged that entry No. 14 referred to agriculture including agricultural education and research, protection against pests and prevention of plant diseases while entry No.

19 referred to forests and there was therefore a clear line of demarcation between agriculture and forests with the result that forestry could not be comprised within agriculture. If forestry was thus not comprised within agriculture, any income from forestry could not be agricultural income and the income derived by the assessee from the sale of the forest trees could not be agricultural income at all, as it was not derived from land by agriculture within the meaning of the definition of agricultural income given in the Indian Income-tax Act. This argument, however, does not take account of the fact that the entries in the lists of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution are heads of legislation which are to be interpreted in a liberal manner comprising within their scope all matters incidental thereto. They are not mutually exclusive.

If the assessee plants on a vacant site trees with a view that they should grow into a forest, as for example, casuarina plantations and expends labour and skill for that purpose, the income from such trees would clearly be agricultural produce. It has to be remembered that even though this demarcation between agriculture and forestry was available in the Lists contained in the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, no such demarcation existed in the Devolution Rules made under the Government of India Act, 1919, and in any event the definition of agricultural income with which we are concerned was incorporated in the Indian Income-tax Acts as early as 1886, if not earlier: vide s. 5 of the Indian Income-tax Act 1886 (II of 1886).

It has also to be remembered commi1Sio11er that in spite of this demarcation between agriculture and forests in the Constitution, taxes on agricultural income are a separate head under entry 46 of List II of the Seventh Schedule and would comprise within '"sa1i':YR0':". , their scope even income from forestry operations provided it falls within the definition of agricultural income which according to the definition given under Art. 366(1) means agricultural income as defined for the purposes of the enactments relating to Indian Income-tax. The terms "agriculture" and "agricultural purpose" not having been defined in the Indian Income-tax Act, we must necessarily fall back upon the general sense in which they have been understood in common parlance. "Agriculture" in its root sense means ager, a field and culture, cultivation, cultivation of field which of course implies expenditure of human skill and labour upon land.

The term has, however, acquired a wider significance and that is to be found in the various dictionary meanings ascribed to it. It may be permissible to look the dictionary meaning of the term in the absence of any definition thereof in the relevant statutes. As was observed by Lord Coleridge in R. v. Peters(') : "I am quite aware that dictionaries are not to be taken as authoritative exponents of the meanings of words used in Acts of Parliament, but it is a well-known rule of courts of law that words should be taken to be used in their ordinary sense, and we are therefore sent for instruction to these books. " Cozens-Hardy, M. R. , also said in Camden (Mar-quis) v. l. R. C. (') : "H is for the Court to interpret the statute as best it may. In so doing the Courts may no doubt assist themselves in the discharge of their duty by any literary help they can find, including of course the consultation of standard authors and reference to well-known and authoritative dictionaries.

" Turning therefore to the dictionary meaning of 1957 "agriculture" we find Webster's New International 11ie Commissioner Dictionary describing it as "the art or science of of Income-tax, 01 cultivating the ground, including rearing and manage- w<! a1:':i'f% • ment of livestock, husbandry, farming, etc. and also . . v. 10 including in its broad sense farming, horticulture, Ra /1f:YR~;"'ar forestry, butter and cheese-making etc. ". Murray's Oxford Dictionary describes it a~ "the science and art Bhagwati J. of cultivating the soil; including the allied pursuits of gathering in the crop and rearing livestock; tillage husbandry, farming (in the widest sense)". In .. ,,..

Bouvier's Law Dictionary quoting the Standard Dictionary "agriculture" is defined as "the cultivation of soil for food products or any other useful or valuable growths of the field of garden; tillage ; husbandry; also, by extension, farming, including any industry practised by cultivator of the soil in connection with such cultivation, as breeding and rearing of stock, dairying, etc. The science that treats of the cultivation of the soil". In Corpus Juris the term "agriculture" has been "" understood to mean : · "art or science of cultivating the ground, especially in fields or large quantities, including the preparation of the soil, the planting of seeds, the raising and harvesting of crops, and the rearing, feeding and management of livestock; tillage, husbandry and farming. In its gerleral s_ense the word also includes gardening or horticulture". Bhasyam Ayyangar J. in Murugesa Chetti v. 1 Chinnathambi Goundan ( ) gave the following dictionary meanings of agriculture a.

s culled out from the Century Dictionary anc! Anderson's Dictionary of Law: "The primary meaning of agriculture is the / cultivation of the ground (The Century Dictionary) and in its general sense it is the cultivation of the ground for the purpose of procuring vegetables and fruits for the use of man and beast including gardening or horticulture and the raising or feeding of cattle and other stock (Anderson's Dictionary of Law). Its less general and more. ordinary signification is the cultivation with the plough and in large areas in order to raise food for man and beast (The Century Dictionary) or, Commissioner in other words, "that species of cultivation which is intended to riase grain and other field crops for man and beast. " (Anderson's Dictionary of Law). Horticulture, which denotes the cultivation of garden or sa'f. ":. '&;mar orchards, is a species of agriculture in its primary and more general sense. " Ramesam J.

in Panadai Pathan v Ramasami Chetti (') referred to the following connotation of 'agricultrure'; "Wharton's Law Lexicon adopts the definition of "agriculture" in 8 Edw. VII, c. 36, as including "horticulture, forestry, and the use of land for any purpose of husbandry etc. In 10 Edw. VII, c. 8 s. 41, it was defined so as to include the use of land as "meadow" or pasture land or orchard or osier or woodland, or for market gardens, nursery grounds or allotments, etc. In 57 and 58 Viet. c. 30 s. 22, the term 'agricultural property' was defined so as to include agricultural land, pasture and woodland, etc.

" These are the various meanings ascribed to the term ·"agriculture" in various dictionaries and it is significant to note that the term has been used both in the narrow sense of the cultivation of the field and the wider sense of comprising all activities in relation to the land incl~ding horticulture, forestry, breeding and rearing of livestock, dairying, butter and cheese-making, husbandry etc. It was urged on behalf of the assessee that the Court should accept the wider significance of the term and include forestry operations also within its connotation . even though they did not involve tilling of the land, sowing of seeds, planting, or similar work on the land.

The argument was that tilling of the land, sowing of the seeds planting or similar work on the land were no doubt agricultural operations and if they were part of the forestry operations carried on by the assessee the subsequent operations would certainly be a continuation of the same and would therefore acquire the characteristic of agricultural operations. But the absence of these basic operations would not necessarily make any difference to the character of the subsequent The operations and would not divest them of their character of agricultural operations, so that if in a particular case one found that the forest was of Ra' ·f c • spontaneous growth , even so i 1orestry operations were carried on in such forests for the purpose of furthering the growth of forest trees, these operations would also enjoy the character of agricultural opera· tions. If breeding and rearing of livestock, dairying, butter and cheese-making etc.

, could be compri~d within the term "agriculture", it was asked, why should these also be not classed as agricultural operations. Considerable stress was laid on the fact that s. 4(3) (viii) of the Act enacted a provision in: regard to the exemption of "agricultural income" from assessment and it was contended that exemptions should be liberally construed. Reliance was placed on the observa~ tions of Vishwanatha Sastri J. in Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. K. E. Sundara Mudaliar(1) : "Exemption from tax granted by a Statute should be given full scope and amplitude and should not be whittled down by importing limitations not inserted by the Legislature. " Mookerjee J. in Commissioner of Agricultural Income -tax, West Bengal v. Raja Jagadish Chandra Deo Dhabal .

Deb (2) also expressed himself similarly : "and the present day view seems to be that where an exemption is conferred by statute, that clause 'has to be interpreted liberally and in favour of the assessee but must always be without any violence to the language used. The rule must be construed together with the exempting provisions, which must be regarded as paramount. " (1) (1901) I. L. R. 24 Mad. 421, 423. (1) (1922) I. L. R. 45 Mad. 710. He also quoted a passage from The Upper India Chamber of Commerce v. Commissioner of Income-tax, C. P. & U. P. (3) : (1)[1950] 18 I. T. R. 259, 271. (3) [1947] 15 I,T. R. 263, A. LR. 1948 All, 7n (g) (1949] 17 I. T. R. 426, 438. M2SC-S "It is needless to observe that, as in the present case, we are concerned with the interpretation of an exemption clause in a taxing statute that clause must b f; 'bl l'be 11 ' d d · f: e, as ar as poss1 e, 1 ra y construe an m avour of the assessee, provided no violence is done to the ,,.. u111ar l d ,, anguage use .

It was also pointed out that "Taxes on agricultural income" formed a head of legislation specified in item 46 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and should be liberally construed, with the result that agriculture should be understood in the wider significance of the term and all agricultural income derived from agriculture or so understood should be included within the category. There was authority for the proposition that the expression "agricultural land" mentioned in Entry 21 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, should be interpreted in its wider significance as including lands which are used or are capable of being used for raising any valuable plants or trees or for any other purpose of husbandry. [see Sarojinidevi v. Shri 1 Krishna Anjanneya Subrahmanyam ( ) and Megh Raj v. Allah Rakhia (').

While recognizing the force of the above expressions of opinion we cannot press them into service in favour of the assessee for the simple reason that "agricultural income" has been defined in the Constitution itself in Art. 366(1) to mean agricultural income as defined for the purposes of enactments relating to Indian income-tax and there is a definition of "agricultural income" to be found in s. 2(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act. We have therefore got to look to the terms of the definition itself and construe the same regardless of any other consideration, though, in so far as the terms "agriculture" and "agricultural purposes" are concerned, we feel free in view of the same not having been defined in the Act itself to consider the various meanings which have been ascribed to the same in the legal and other dictionaries. (1) I. L. R. (1945) Mad. 61 (2) [1942] F. C. R. 53,62. We may also note here the dictionary meanings of 1957 the terms "Forestry" and "Cultivation.

" The Shorter The c;;;;;;issioner Oxford Dictionary, Vol I. page 735, gives the meaning of Income-tax, of "forestry" as the "science and art of forming and wc:i,::,i;:ai, cultivating forest~, management of growing timber. " R . B v. Kumar Webster's New lnternationtal Dictionary, Vol. I,· a''Sat:J:~oy page 990, gives the following meaning of forestry: "Science and art of farming, caring for, or culti- Bhagwati J. · vating forests; the management of growing timber. " Webster's New International Dictionary. Vol. I, page 643, while talking of cultivation says that "to cultivate" means "(i) to prepare, or to prepare and use, for the raising of crops; to till; as to cultivate the soil; to loosen or break up the soil about. (growing crop or plants) for the purpose of killing weeds, etc. especially with a cultivator, as to cultivate the corn; (2) to raise, or foster the growth of, by tillage or by labour and care; to produce by culture; as to cultivate roses; to cultivate oysters.

" Whether the narrower or the wider sense of the term / .. agriculture" should be adopted in a particular case depends not only upon the provisions of the various statutes in which the same occurs but also upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The definition of the term in one statute does not afford a guide to the construction of the same term in another statute and the sense in which the terin has been understood in the several statutes does not necessarily throw any light on the manner in which the term should be understood generally. The decided cases disclose a variety of opinions in regard to the connotation of the terms "agriculture" and "agricultural purposes. " At one time "agriculture" was understood in its primary sense of cultivation of field and that too for production of food crops for human beings and beasts.

This limited interpretation could not be adhered to even though tilling of the land, sowing of the seeds, planting or similar work on the land were the basic operations, the scope of the crops produced was enlarged and all crops raised on the land, whether they be food crops or not were included in the produce raised by agriculture. There was however another school of thought which extended the term "agriculture" and included Commissioner within its connotation not only the products raised by the cultivation of the land but also allied activities which had relation to the land and operations which Kumar had the . effect of fostering the growth, ~reservation and mamtenance as also the regenerat10n of the products of the land, thus bringing within its compass not only the basic agricultural operations but also the further operations performed on the products of the land even though they were not necessarily accom-panied by these preliminary basic operations.

AB against these cases which dealt with these preliminary basic operations and also the further operations either by themselves or•in conjunction with the former which of course necessarily involved in the expenditure of human skill and labour in carrying out those operations, there were instances of products of land which grew wild or were of spontaneous growth without the expenditure of human skill and Jabour and which it was agreed on all hands could not be comprised within "agriculture" and the income from which could not fall within the definition of "agricultural income". We shall briefly discuss the various cases dealing with these different aspects and try to evolve some principle therefrom which would serve as a guide in the determination of the question before us. Kunhaven Haji v. Mavan (') was the earliest case in which it was held that a lease of a coffee garden wai; not an agricultural lease within the meaning of Transfer of Property Act, s. 117.

The case however concerned itself with the situation where as far as the Court could gather from the Karar the lease was of the coffee plants only. There was no further discussion of the legal position and it may be noted that Shephard, J. , who was a party to this decision stated in the later case of Murugesa Chetti v. Chinnathambi Gounden (2) that he was wrong in the opinion he expressed with regard to a coffee garden in this case. Murugesa Chetti v. Chinnathambi Goundan (2) also was concerned with s. 117 of the Transfer of Property Act. The lease there was a lease of land for the cultivation of betel and the Court held that such a lease was an agricultural lease falling under s. 117. Bhashyam Ayyangar, J.

, who delivered the main judgment of the Court discussed the dictionary meanings of the term "agriculture" and stated that in s 117 of the Transfer of Property Act it • was used in its more general sense as comprehending the raising of vegetables, fruits and other garden products as food for men or beast, though some of them may be regarded in England as products of horticulture as distinguished from agriculture. The learned Judge considered the distinction between "agriculture" and "horticulture" and observed : ''The distinction between agriculture when it is used otherwise than in its primary and more general sense and horticulture is a fine one even in England and in India, especially, it will be impossible in the case of several products of the land to draw a line between agriculture and horticulture according to English notions.

The only practical distinction which I can suggest and one which will give effect to the policy of the Legislature in exempting agricultural leases from the operations of section 107, etc. , of the Transfer of Property Act is to regard as agriculture, as distinguished from horticulture, not only all field cultivation by tillage but also all garden cultivation for the purpose chiefly of procuring vegetables or fuits as food for man or beast and other products fit for human consumption by way of luxury, if not as an article of diet. " (1) (1893) l. L. R. 17 Mad. g8. (2) [1901) l. L. R. 24 Mad. 421, 423. He then discussed the policy of exemption setting out the observations of Cave. J. in Ellis & Co. v. Hilse (1): "The very object of this exemption is the well-known one of favourin$ agriculture-an old object of English Legislation in favour of a very important industry", and stated: "This observation of Mr.

Justice Cave will apply with much greater force in this country where the agricultural industry is more important than in England and is one that is common to wet cultivation (') {1889) L. R. 23 Q. B. D. 24. as to garden and dry cultivation, the object of all such cultivation being chiefly to procure food for men and cattle and other products of the soil which are usually consumed by the people as gentle stimulants or by way of luxury. Betel leaf is an article of daily consumption with all classes in this country as tobacco leaf is with most classes and betel vine is generally grown side by side with plantations, the products of which are among the chief articles of vegetable food. " The lease in that case being one for the cutivation of betel was therefore held to be agricultural lease and Shephard, J. , agreed with this conclusion revising the opinion which he had expressed earlier in Kunhavan Haji v. Mavan (supra). In Raja of Venkatagiri v.

Ayyappa Reddy (') the question was whether land usually fit only for pasturing cattle and not for cultivation, i. e. , ploughing and raising agricultural crops, was "ryoti" land, though it might have been "old waste" and a tenant of such land was a "ryot" and any amount agreed to be paid for pasturing cattle was "rent" within the definitions of s. 3 of the l\1adras Estates Land Act (Mad. 1 of 1908). The Court held that such land was not "ryoti" land inasmuch as it was not fit for ploughing and raising agricultural crops. The ordinary meaning of "agriculture" was taken to be "the raising of annual <:>r periodical grain crops through the operations of ploughing, sowing, etc. " (Per Sadasiva Ayyar, J. , at page 741). The Chief Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras v. Zamindar of Singampatti (') was a reference arising out of the assessment for income-tax under Act VII of 1918 of the income derived by the Zamindar of Singampatti from forests and fisheries within the ambit of his Zamindari.

The assessee objected to the assessment (i) on the ground that the income was agricultural income within the meaning of s. 4 of the Act and therefore, not chargeablP. to income-tax; (ii) that the (1J [1913) I. L. R. 38 Mad. 738. (•) [19,>]I. L. R. 45 Mad. 5•8 (F. D. ) assessment was illegal as contravening the terms of his permanent sanad for the Zamindari and the provisions of Regulation :XXV of 1802; The Court held that where the peishkush of a permanently ' settled estate was fixed in commutation not only of the rentals of the cultivated lands but also of all income Ra'~a1 which might be derived from forests or fisheri~s, both under the terms of the sanad and s. I of Regulation :XXV of 1802, these incomes were exempt from further taxation by the Government, and s. 3 of the Income-tax Act did not abrogate this exemption.

In view of this conclusion the Court did not think it necessary to determine whether income from forests or fisheries came under the definition of "agricultural income". The Court, however, pointed out that "a reference to Murray's and Webster's dictionaries shows that the word "agriculture", while sometimes used in the narrow sense of the art or science of cultivating the ground, is also used in a much wider sense so as to include even "forestry'', according to Webster. In which sense it was used by the framers of the Income-tax Act would be a matter for determination and to this end it would not be out of place to consider the probable reason for the exemption of agricultural income from income-tax. No other reason is suggested than the equity of exempting from further burden income· which had already paid toll to the State in the shape of land revenue. " The question, therefore, whether the income from forests would be "agricultural income" within the meaning of s.

4 of the Income-tax Act was thus· left open and the decision that income from forests was not liable to income-tax was reached under the terms of the Sanad of s. I of Regulation No. 25 of 1802. Kaju Mal v. Salig Ram (1) was concerned inter alia with a field in which tea was grown and the question was whether the land fell within the definition of "agricultural income" or "village imrooveable property" as given in s. 3(i) and (ii) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1905. The Court held that fields planted with tea bushes were fields used for agricultural (1) [1919) P. R. No. 19. p. 237. purposes and this decision was affirmed by the Privy Commissioner Council in Kaju Mall v. Salig Ram (1). It was held that the words "agricultural purposes" in s.

2(iii) of the Punjab Alienation of Land Act, 1900, included the Kumar cultivation of tea; consequently, land which was not occupied as the site of any building in a town or village, and was occupied or let for the cultivation of tea was "agricultural land" within the meaning of s. 3(i) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1905. Emperor v. Probhat Chandra Barua (')was a case under the Indian Income-tax Act and the classes of income derived from permanently settled estates were "1. Income from fisheries. 2. Income from land used for stacking timber. 3. Income from pasturage. " The income from the first two heads was certainly not agricultural income or income derived from "land which is used for agricultural purposes" within the meaning of ss. 2 and 4 of the Act. But income derived from pasturage was held to be agricultural income which could not lawfully be charged with income-tax. There was a difference of opinion between Rankin, J. , and Page, J.

, in regard to the liability of income from fisheries and income from land used for stacking timber based on the construction of the Permanent Settlement Regulations of 1793. But that is immaterial for our present purposes. What is material is that both the learned Judges were unanimous in their opinion that income from pasturage was income derived from "land which is used for agricultural purposes" and was, therefore; within the exemption given by s. 4(3) (viii) to agricultural income as defined by s. 2(l)(a) of the Act. In Kesho Prasad Singh v. Sheo Pragash Ojha (') the Privy Council held that a grove was not land "held for agricultural purposes" within the meaning of s. 70 of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1901, affirming the decision of the High Court of Allahabad that it was impossible to hold that that section had any application whatever to such a property as the grove in fact was. (1) (1223] I. L. R. 5 Lah. 50. (2) (1924] I. L. R. 51 Cal. 504. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v.

T. Manavedan Tirumalpad (') was also a decision under the Indian Income-tax Act (XI of 1922) and the assessee there was assessed by the Income-tax Officer for the year 1928-29 on the amount received by the sale of timber trees cut and removed from the forests. The Rq;~·~~'. "'"" question was whether these amounts were liable a-s such to income-tax and the Court observed : " ....... we are unable to distinguish between the income derived from the sale of paddy which is grown on land and the income derived from the sale of timber cut in a forest; but the profits earned from the sale of paddy would be assessable to income-tax but for the special exemption given to that income in the Income-tax Act, by reason of its being agricultural income. There is such exemption in the case of income derived from the sale of timber.

" There is no further discussion to be found in the judgment which would throw light on the question whether such receipts by the assessee were agricultural income and as such exempt from income-tax. The later decision of the Madras High Court in Chandrasekhara Bharathi Swamigal v. Duraisami Naidu (2) however contains an elaborate discussion as to the connotation of the term "agriculture". The case arose under the Madras Estates· Land Act (Mad. I of 1908) and the question which the Court had to consider was whether growing casuarina trees, i. e. , trees for fuel, was an agricultural purpose so as to make the person who held the land for that purpose a "ryot" within the meaning of the Madras Estates Land Act. The Court held that land held for growing casuarina trees was not land held for purposes of agriculture and the person holding the land for that purpose was not a "ryot" within the meaning of the Act. '. Vhile . delivering the judgment of the Court Reilly, J.

, embarked upon a consideration of what the term "agriculture" meant and came to the conclusion that agriculture could not be defined by the nature of the product cultivated but should be defined rather by (1) [1930) I. L. R. 54 Mad. 21 (S. B. ) (2) [1931) l. L. R. 54 Mad. 900. [19581 the circumstances in which the cultivation was carried The Commissioner on. He observed at page 902 : • h "I agree wit the remark of Shephard, J. , in Murugesa Chetti v. Chinnathambi Goundan (0 that a Kumar man who plants or maintains trees for firewood is not in ordinary parlance an agriculturist. If we take the strict meaning of "agriculture" according to its derivation, it means the cultivation of a field, the cultivation of an open space, as opposed to horticulture,. the cultivation of a comparatively small enclosed space. The cultivation either of the field in agriculture or of the garden in horticulture cannot be confined, I think, to any particular product.

With great respect, I do not agree with the opinion of Bhashyam Ayyangar, J. , in Murugesa Chetti v. Chinnathambi Goundan (')that agirculture implies production of things useful as food for men or beast or other products fit for human consumption by way of luxury. That appears to me to be too narrow an interpretation. Still less do I agree with the opinion expressed by Sadasiva Ayyar, J. , in Raja of Venkatagiri v. Ayyappa Reddi that agriculture is confined to the production of grain crops. I can see no reason why the cultivation in open spaces of such useful products as cotton, jute, . flax and hemp should not be agriculture. Indeed I think agriculture cannot be defined by the nature of the products- cultivated but should be defined rather by the circumstances in which the cultivation is carried on. In some cases it has been suggested that agriculture is confined to tillage. I think it can easily be shown that agriculture was carried on in this ~orld before ploughs were invented.

In the p~nt day in many places cultivation is done with spades and not with ploughs, but the planting of timber or firewood trees, which are to stand on the land for a considerable number of years, forming plantations or woods or forests, appears to me to be opposed to the idea of agriculture, the cultivation of an open space. It is true that for the purpose of growing trees in a plantation it may be necessary first to prepare the land. (1} [1901] I. L. R. 24 Mad. 421, 423 (>} [1913] I. L. R. 38 Mad. 738. Later on it may be necessary to protect and water the young plants. Still later it may be necessary to thin out the plantation. But, when the land is covered with trees which had to stand on it for a number of years, sometimes as long as a century, during most of R which period the land itself is untouched, to describe that as agriculture appears to me inappropriate.

To my mind it is something very different from the cultivation of a field or of an open space It may be noticed that in Kesho Prasad Singh v. Sheo Pragash Ojha (1) their Lordhips of the Privy Council approved · of the opinion expressed by two learned judges of the Allahabad High Court that land let for a grove was not let for an agricultural purpose. It happened that the case then under consideration was one arising under the Agra Tenancy Act. But in that Act there is no definition of 'agriculture'. Therefore both the learned judges of the Allahabad High Court and their Lordships of the Privy Co1~ncil were, we may take it considering what is the meaning of the word 'agriculture' in its general sense. I may mention also that in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Manavedan Tint-malpad (2) a Full Bench of this Court remarked that income from cutting timber was not agricultural income.

" It may be noticed that the learned Judge enlarged the connotatiqn of the term "agriculture" by having regard to the circumstances in which the cultivation was carried on rather than the nature of the products cultivated and embraced within the scope of the term not merely the production of things useful as food for man or beast or other products fit for human consumption by way of luxury but also such useful products as cotton, jute, flax and hemp, though he stopped short at those products and hesitated to include therein growing of trees in plantation where the land was covered with trees which have to stand on it for a number of years. The last case to be referred in this series in that of Deen Mohammad Mian v. Hulas Narain Singh (2) where it was held that an orchard is an agricultural Commissioner land. It WaS Observed : "The case of an orchard is quite different. Orchard d. .

d be trees or manly are, an can presumed to have been, plante~ b~ men after preparation of the ground whic~ is cult1vat1on and seasonal crops are gathered. Frtut trees also require seasonal attention such as pruning and digging of the soil around the roots and it cannot be said that this ceases to be cultivation merely because the whole tree is not replanted every year . .... ... • . . . . . . . . . . . In my opinion the land in suit is agricultural land; it is land from which by preparing the soil and planting and cultivating trees the raiyat expects to enjoy periodical returns in the way of produce for food. " This was a further extension of the idea which had germinated in the opinion expressed by Reilly, J. , in Chandrasekhara Bharathi Swamigal v. C. P. Duraisami Naidu (') and even plantation of trees in orchards which did not require to be replanted every year was included in the connotation of the term "agriculture".

A still further extension of the term is to be found in the following observations of Vishwanatha Sastri, J. , in The Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. K. E. Sundara Mudaliar (2) at p. 273 : "It is a matter of ordinary experience, at least in this part of the country, that mango, cocoanut, palrnyra, orange, jack, arecanut, tamarind and other trees are planted usually in an enclosed land, and that these trees do not yield any fruit or crop in the early years of their growth. They remain on the land for a Jong number of years yielding fruit only after their maturity. There is no reason why the planting, rearing, watering, fencing and protection of such trees and the gathering of their fruits during the annual seasons should not be held to be "agriculture''. There is some kind of cultivation or prodding of the soil at the inception when the planting is done and sub-sequently also at intervals.

In the case of coffee grown on hill slopes, there is no ploughing or tillage as in the (2) (1952) 23 Pat. L. T. 143, 152 (1) {1 93 1} I. I •. R . 5'i Mad. 9<x1 S. C. R. SUPREME COURT REPO. RTS 123 case of wet and dry fields; but it cannot be maintained that growing coffee is not an agricultural operation. Coffee and tea plants stand on the soil for many years, and their produce is gathered periodically. In the padugai lands or lands lying between the sandy bed and flood bank of rivers, plantains are grown in many places in deltaic tracts. Young plants are often brought and planted in pits dug for the purpose in a row with sufficient interspaces. Trenches are dug by the side of a row of plantain trees in order to catch and detain water. The plantain trees last for about two years, and from each tree off-shoots spring up and grow in place of the parent tree. There is thus a natural replenishment of the plantain garden.

It cannot be said that the raising of plantains is not an agricultural purpose. Similarly in the case of sugarcane the plants stand on the land for two years or a little more, and there are usually two cuttings. Castor plants stand for some years on the soil and the seeds are periodically gathered in. Ba,inboo is often planted in enclosed lands by digging pits, filling them with sand and manure and then planting the young stalks in a bunch at suitable distances. Watering is done for-the first 2 or 3 years. Every year, the land surrounding each bamboo cluster is dig with a spade and small earthen ridges are put up so as to catch and retain rain water. Bamboo plants attain maturity in about 3 or 4 years, and the thorny branches which grow on the main stem are then fit to be cut off and used for fencing purposes .................... I am unable to see why these operations are not agricultural operations.

" The cases above noted all of them interpret the term "agriculture" in its narrower sense, though there is a marked progress from the extremely narrow construction put upon it by Bhashyam Ayyangar J. in Murugesa Cehtti v. Chinnathambi Goundan C) to some-what wider connotation thereof adopted by Reilly J. in Chandrasekhara Bharathi Swamiga/v. C. P. Duraisami Naidu (2) and by Vishwanatha Sastri J. in The Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. K. E. Sundra- (2) [1931) 1. L. R. 54 Mad. gJo. Muddaliar ('). It is interesting to note that all throughout these cases runs the central idea of either t\ll3:ge of thke landhor sodwinhg. ohf . seeds orhplanting_ or s1m11 ar wor on t e 1 an w IC mvests t e operat10n with the characteristic of agricultural operations and whenever that central idea is fulfilled there is the user of land for agricultural purposes and the income deriv-d h f b . 1 1 . e t ere rom ecomes agncu tura mcome.

There were, on the other hand, decisions which interpreted the term "agriculture" in the wider sense as including all activities in relation to the land even though they did not comprise these basic agricultural operations. King Emperor v. Alexander Allen (') involved the interpretation of the expression "land used solely for agricultural pruposes" in sub-s. (3) of s. 63 of the Madras District Municipalities Act (Mad. IV of 1884) as amended by the Madras District Municipalities Amendment Act (Mad. III of 1897) and the Court held that the lands on which potatoes, grain, vegetables, etc. , were grown, as well as pasture land, were used "solely ior agricultural purposes" within the meaning of the sub-section. The court adopted the definition of agricultural land given in the Agricultural Rates Act (59 and 60 Viet. , Chap. 16) s.

9: "The expression "agricultural land" means any land used as arable, meadow, or pasture ground only, cottage gardens exceeding one-quarter of an acre, market gardens, nursery grounds, orchards, or allotments, but does not include land occupied together with a house as a park, gardens other than as aforesaid pleasure grounds or any land kept or preserved mainly or exclusively for purposes of sport or recreation or land used as a race course. " and also the meaning ascribed to it in Murray's Oxford English Dictionary quoted above and observed: "We also note that it is there pointed out that the restriction of the word agriculture to tillage as in the following quotation is rare. The lands were not fields for agriculture but pastures for cattle. We believe that we cannot do better than follow these definitions in (I) [1950) 18 l. T. R. 059, 071. - . attempting to decide what, for the purposes of sub-section (3) of section 63 of the Municipalities Act, are or The .

are not lands used solely f~r agricultural . P~rpo. ses •••••••••• 4 ; We do not consider that any distinction can be drawn between large and small plots of lands R 01 on which roots of grain are cultivated. All such land must be held to be land used solely for agricultural " h h purposes .... Counsel has urged be 1ore us t at t ese t10-called waste lands are pasture lands and as such should be held to be lands used solely for agricultural purposes .... 1 , •••• If, therefore, it could be shown · that these so-called waste lands were in reality pasture grounds or lands used for "rearing livestock", we should certainly decide that they were lands used solely for agricultural purposes. " The learned Judges there were inftuenced by the dictionary meaning of the term agriculture as given in Murray's New Oxford Dictionary and understood the term agriculture in the wider sense as including the user of land for rearing livestock also. In Panadai Pathan v.

Ramaswami Chetti (') a lease of land was given for growing casuarina trees and the question was whether such a lease was a lease for agricultural purposes within the meaning of s. 117 of the Transfer of Property Act. The Court held that it was a lease for agricultural purposes and therefore did not require a registered instrument for its creation. Spence J. in the course of his judgment differed from the opinion of Bhashyam Ayyangar, J. , in Murugesa Chetti v. Chinnathambi Goundan (2) that the word agriculture in its more general sense comprehends the raising of vegetables, fruits and other garden products as food for man or beast, if the learned Judge intended thereby to limit it to the raising of food products. For to so restrict the word would be to exclude flower, indigo, cotton, jute, flax, tobacco and other such cultivation. He also differed from the opinion expressed by Sadasi Ayyar J. in Seshayya v. Rajah of (1) [192~) l. L. R. 45 Mad. 7rn. (2) [1901) l. L. R. 24 Mad.

421, 423. Pittapur (') and Rajah of Venkatagiri v. Ayyappa comlftissi<Jw Reddi (2) that agriculture meant the raising of annual or periodical grain crops through the operation of ploughing, sowing, etc. , as such definition would exclude sugarcane, indigo, tea, ftower, tobacco, and Y betel cultivation from agriculture. He then referred to the dictionary meaning of the term "agriculture" as given in the Oxford Dictionary and the Bouvier's Law Dictionary set out above and observed : "In my opinion agriculture connotes the raising of useful or valuable products which derive nutriment from the soil with the aid of human skill and labour; and thus it will include horticulture, arboriculture and silviculture, in all cases where growth of trees is effected by the expenditure of human care and attention in such operations as those of ploughing, sowing, planting, pruning, manuring, watering, protecting etc.

" Ramesam, J, who delivered a concurring judgment referred to the definition of agriculture adopted in Wharton's Law Lexicon and was of opinion that it would include the use of land as "meadow or pasttsre o;- orchard or osier or woodland, or for market gardens, nursery grounds or allotments etc. " but would exclude all cultivation of fibrous plants such as cotton, jute and linen and all plants used for dyeing purposes, such as indigo, etc. , and all timber trees and flowering plants etc. According to him, the rearing of a casuarina plantation requires some preparation of the ground and subsequent care by watering the plants and he was therefore of opinion that rearing of casuarina trees was an agricultural purpose within the meaning of s. 117 of the Transfer of Property Act. It may be observed however that according to both the learned Judges some preparation of the ground or some expenditure of human care and attention in such operations as those ploughing, sowing, planting etc.

, was considered essential for constituting these operations agricultural operations. In Commissioner of Income-tax, Burma v. Kokine Dairy, Rangoon (') the question was whether income (1) [1916) 31 ~l. L. J. 2IJ. 1; 1916 M. W. N·. :166. (3) (1936] 61.. 1'. R. 'jo2,509. {:. l) [191:11 I. L. lt. 38 ~lad. 73H. from a dairy farm and the milk derived from the farm 1957 is agricultural income and exempt as such from income- Tire commissioner 0 tax. Roberts C. J. , who delivered the opinion of the fw. IncBeome-talax, estng, Court o serve b d : Calcutta "Where cattle are wholly stall-fed and not pastured R . B v. K 1 upon the land at all, doubtless it is trade and no a "sa%::YRo;mar agricultural operation is being carried on; where cattle BhagwatiJ. are being exclusively or mainly pastured and are none the less fed with small amounts of oil-cake or the like, it may well be that the income derived from the sale of their milk is agricultural income.

But between the two extremes there must be a number of varying degrees, and the task of the Income-tax Officer is to apply his mind to the two distinctions and to decide in any particular case on which side of the fence, if I may use the term, the matter falls". He then referred to the case of Lean and Dickinson v. Ball (1) where Lord Cullen had said that he proceeded on the footing that the case, which was one dealing with poultry-farming, was one in which the poultry derived sustenance to a material extent from the produce of the ground. This method of approach was on a par with the one adopted by Lord Wright in Lord Glanely v. Wightman (2) where it was observed : "If authority were needed the provisions just quoted do at least show that profits of 'occupation' include gains from the animal produce as well as the agricultural, horticultural, or arboricultural produce of the soil; ............

equally it is obvious that the rearing of animals, regarded as they must be as products of the soil-since it is from the soil that they draw their sustenance and on the soil they live-is a source of profit from the occupation of land, whether these animals are for consumption as food (such as bullocks, pigs or chickens), or for the provision of food (such as cows, goats or fowls), or for recreation (such as hunters or race horses), or for use (such as draught or plough horses). All these animals are appurtenant to the soil, in the relevant sense for this purpose, as much as trees, wheat crops, flowers or roots though no doubt they differ in obvious respects. Nor is it now material towards determining what are pro- Commissioner ducts of occupation that farming has developed in its Income-tax, use of mechanical appliances and power, not only in Bengal, h I h' .

h h' d sue matters as p oug mg, reapmg, t res mg, an so Kumar forth, but in sue~ ancient methods of preparing its Roy products as makmg cream, butter or cheese. The J. farmer is still dealing with the products of the soil, and (2) (1925) 10 Tax Cas. 341. M2SC6l-9 Schedule B covers the income. " The House of Lords were dealing with the profits of occupation of land not with income derived from user of land for agricultural purposes and therefore not restricted in their interpretation of the term "occupation" and all these activities which were described therein might as well have been comprised within the scope of the taxing statutes. What we have, however, to see is whether these activities fall within the connotation of the terms "agriculture" and "agricultural purpose" which are the only terms to be considered for bringing the income derived therefrom within the definition of agricultural income in s. 2(l)(a) of the Indian Income-tax Act. In Moolji Sicka & Co.

, In re (') Derbyshire C. J. understood the term "agriculture" in a wider sense as including operations not only on the land itself but on the shrubs which grew on the soil and were according to him a part of the soil. The assessees were ' manufacturers of biri, a kind of cigarette consisting of tobacco wrapped in tendu leaves. The tendu plant was of entirely wild growth and propagated itself without human agency in jungle and waste lands. The assessees had taken several villages on "lease" for plucking the leaves of such plants and the work done by the assessees consisted in pruning the trees and burning the dead branches and dried leaves lying on the ground.

The Court held that the profits accru-ing to the assessees by the sale of tendu leaves was not exempt as agricultural income but to the extent to which pruning of the tendu shrub occurred, there was in a technical and legal sense a cultivation of the soil in which the shrub grew and therefore so much of the income as was shown by the assessee to be profit derived from the collection and preparation so as to make them fit to be taken to the market, of tendu leaves produced by the pruning of the tendu shrubs R was exempt as agricultural income under s. 2(1) and s. 4(3)(viii) of the Indian Income-tax Act. The learned Chief Justice observed : "Cutting back or pruning the wild tendu clearly contributes to the growth of the leaves in that shrub and I am prepared to hold that the pruning of the shrub is a cultivation of the shrub and as the shrub grows in the soil and as a part of it, is a cultivation of the soil in a legal and technical sense.

" The word cultivation was here understood by the learned Chief Justice not only in the sense of cultivation of the soil but in the sense· of cultivation of the tendu shrubs which grew on the soil and were therefore a part of it. The operations which were performed on the shrubs were certainly not operations performed on the soil itself and the opinion expressed by the learned Chief Justice has certainly given an extended meaning to the term cultivation and used with reference to the soil. It is significant however to observe that cultivation of the soil was considered an essential ingredient which rendered the income derived from the tendu leaves agricultural income within the meaning of its definition s. 2(1)(a) of the Act. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras, v. K. E. Sundara 1l1udaliar (1) contains a further extension of this idea where Vishwanatha Sastri J. Observed at p. 274: "Pasture land used for the feeding and.

rearing of livestock is land used for agricultural purposes: Emperor v. Alexander Allen (2). Rearing of livestock such as cows, buffaloes, sheep and poultry is included in "husbandry". These animals are considered to be the products of the soil, just like crops, roots, flowers and trees, for they live on the land and derive their sustenance from the soil and its produce : Glanely v. Wightman (3); Commissioner of Income-tax, Burma v. (1) [1939] 7 J. T. R. 493· (2) [1933] A. C. 618 (H. L. ) 638. (1) [1950] 18 I. T. R. 259, 271. (3) [1933) 1 A. C. 616 (H. L:) 638. (2) [ 1901) I. L. R. 25 Mad. 627 629, 630. Kokine Dairy Co. ('). It is therefore not legitimate, in my opinion, to confine the word "agriculture" to the cultivation of an open field with annual or periodical l'k h . . b . crops 1 e w eat, nee, rag1, cotton, to acco, JUte, etc.

Casuarina is usually raised on dry lands of poor quality, %:~YRo;mar and it is usual to find the same land used alternatively for the cultivation of ordinary cereal crops like ground- I h 1 k d " h · · nut, gingel y, c o am, ambu, etc. , an 1or t e ra1smg of Casuarina plantations. The land bears the dry assessment whatever be the nature of the crop raised. " This enlarged connotation of the. term "agriculture" has been tinged by the dictionary meanings ascribed to it in Murray's Oxford Dictionary and the Webster's Dictionary quoted above which understood the term as including the allied pursuits of rearing, feeding and management oflive-stock and also including husbandry, farming horticulture, etc. , in the widest sense, as also butter cheese-making etc. We shall have to consider at the appropriate stage as to how far such enlargement is warranted by the definition of "agricultural income" as given in s. 2(l)(a) of the Indian Income-tax Act.

The cases above noted all of them involve some expenditure of human skill and labour either on the land or the produce of the land, for without such expenditure there would be no question of the income derived from such land being agricultural income. Where, however, the products of the land are of wild, or spontaneous growth involving no expenditure of human labour and skill there is unanimity of opinion that no agricultural operations were at all involved and there is no agricultural income. In such cases, it would be the absence of any such operations rather than the performance thereof which would be the prime cause of the growth of such products. The' cases bearing on this aspect of the question may be noted. Kaju Mal and others v. Salig Ram (')is the earliest case where a stretch of natural forest came in for consideration.

It was a forest land and it was held to be agricultural land or land used for purposes sub-servient to agriculture or for pasture, and therefore exempt from pre-emption under s. 4 of the Punjab • Pre-emption Act, 1905. . There was no discussion of any legal principles in Raja that decision but when we come to the next case of Province of Bihar v. Maharaja Pratap Udai Nath Sahi Deo (1) which was a case under the Bihar Agricultural Income-tax Act (Bihar VII of 1938), we find the ratio of these decisions laid down in clear terms. The assessees there derived their income from "Bankar" and "Phalkar". "Bankar" was income derived from the sale of wood from virgin jungles or jungles not actually cultivated; and "Phalkar" was income derived from the fruits of wild jungle trees and bushes. The question was whether this income was agricultural income within the meaning of the term as defined in the Act. Harries C. J.

, who delivered the judgment of the Court observed : "Bankar" : It appears that this head of income was derived from virgin jungles or jungle land not actually cultiv'. '. ted. A few forest guards appear to have been employed to protect the property, but it cannot be said that the trees have grown as the result of cultivation. They appear to have grown naturally in the jungles without the intervention of the human agency, and in my view the growth of these trees cannot be said to result from the cultivation of the soil. In fact, it was the absence of cultivation that permit-ted the area to develop into a jungle ................ " "Phalkar" : This is income derived from wild jungle fruits, and it cannot be said that the fruit gathered is the result of the cultivation, but, on the contrary, it is the result of the absence of cultivation.

Trees and bushes yielding these fruits grow not on cultivated soil but on the land not under cultivation and frequently the more neglected and wild the land is the thicker grow these wild bushes and trees yielding such crop. Practically in all cases the crop is the result of want of cultivation and not the result of cultivation. (2) (1919) P. R. No. I! J p. 237. (1) [1941) g I. T. R. 313, 328. In my judgment it is 1,ot established lhat the income described as phalkar in these cases is income derived from land used for agriculture or from agri- · · 1 J culture and is, therefore, not assessable to agncu turn income-tax. " In Raja Mustafa Ali Khan v. Commissioner of 1 Income-tax, U. P. & C. P. ( ) which went up to the Privy Council, the Oudh Chief Court held that income from the sale of forest trees growing on land naturally and without the intervention of human agency even if the land was assessed to land revenue, was not agricultural income within the meaning of s.

2(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act. The court followed an earlier decision given by it in the case of Maharaja of Kapurthala v. Commissioner of Income-tax. C. P. & U. P. (2) in which the court had discussed the meaning to be ascribed to the term "agriculture" and observed at page 93: "A fiscal statute should no doubt be construed strictly, and, if there be any doubt about its construction, the subject must be given the benefit. But we do not feel any doubt that the expression "land used for agricultural purposes" in the Income-tax Act does not extend to forests of spontaneous growth, where nothing is done to prepare the soil for trees to be planted therein, and where the growth of the trees is not fostered by tillage. We should not be justified in giving the taxpayer the benefit of the dictionary definition when it is not disputed that the meaning of the term "agricultural" cannot be extended for the purpose of the Income-tax Act to all the secondary implications therein suggested.

We therefore construe the term in its primary sense. We accordingly hold that income from the sale of forest trees of spontane0us growth growing on land which is assessed to land revenue is not agricultural income within the meaning of section 2(1) (a) of the Income-tax Act. " Yuvarajah of Pithapuram & Anr. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras (') was also a case where the (1) [1945] 13 l. T. R. 9U. (g) [1946] 14 I. T. R. g>, 99· (2) [ 1945] 13 l. T. R. 74, 93. assessee derived income from forests of spontaneous growth by the sale of wood, bark, leaves, other The 0 usufruct of trees minor forest produce and licence fees ' • • and from trees that had grown wild m non-forest areas. The Zamindari of Pithapuram was a permanently R . S l R ul a1a sett el d estate un er t e d h P ermanent ett ement eg ation (Regulation XXV of 1802) and it was contended . f .

that the imposition of income-tax in respect o income other than agricultural income derived from a permanently settled estate would not be a breach of Regulation XXV of 1802 relating to permanent settlement. Reliance was placed in support of this positiun on the decision in Chief Commissioner of Income-tax v. Zamindar of Singampatti (1). It was , however. , held that the case was impliedly overruled by the decision of the Privy Council in Probat Chandra Barua v. King Emperor (2) and the Court proceeded to consider whether income derived from forests of spontaneous growth by the sale of wood, bark, leaves, other usufruct of trees, minor. forest produce and licence fees and from trees which have grown wild in non-forest areas was agricultural income within the meaning of s. 2(1) of the Income-tax Act.

The Court observed : "There is ample authority for holding that income derived from trees which have grown wild is not agricultural income but without the aid of authority, we should have no hesitation in saying that to describe it as such would involve a distortion of the meaning of the word 'agriculture'. and such income was accordingly held to be ~. ot agricultural income within the meaning of s. 2(1) of the Act. (It may be noted that the appellant preferred an appeal to the Privy Council against this decision but the same was dismi~sed vide Yuvarajah of Pithapuram & Anr. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras (3). Benoy Ratan Banerji v. CC'mmissioner of Income-tax, U. P. , C. P. & Berar (4) was another case in which the assessee derived income from the sale of timber from the Zamindari on which there had been for many commissioner years, a number of forest trees, khar and wild plants. (1) (1922) ILR 45 Mad. 518 (FB) (3) (1949) 17 ITR 445 (2) (1930) LR 57 IA 228 (4) (1947) 15 ITr..

98 There was no evidence on the record to show that the th f h · · h 1 f grow o t e trees m question was t e resu t o any actual cultivation by the assessee at all. The various mar trees which he sold were of spontaneous growth, not having grown as a result of actual cultivation. The Court held that in order to come within the definition of "agricultural income", the income had not only to be derived from land which was used for "agricultural purposes" but such income had also to be derived by the process of "agriculture". The Court observed that being trees of spontaneous growth, to the production of which the assessee had made no contribution by way of cultivation, no question could arise either of the land on which they grew being "used for agricultural purposes" or of the trees themselves and the income they produced being the result of "agriculture".

The Court accordingly held that the income from the sale of forest trees of spontaneous growth, growing on land naturally and without the intervention of human agency, was not agricultural income within the meaning of s. 2(1) (a) of the Income Tax Act even if such land was subject to a local rate assessed and collected by officers of the Crown as such and such income was not exempt from income-tax under s. 4(3) (viii) of the Act. . A decision of the Nagpur High Court in Beohm· Singh Raghubir Singh v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, U. P. & C. P. and Berar (') (delivered on September 4, 1946, but reported in 1948) may be noted here. There also the income in question was derived by the assessee from the sale of forest produce such as timber, tendu leaves, mohua flowers, harranuts, etc. , derived from a forest which was not a cultivated one but was of spontaneous growth. The question was whether such income was agricultural income and as such exempt from taxation under s.

4(3) (viii) of the Indian Income-tax Act. The Court considered the dictionary meanings of the term "agriculture" which included forestry within its compass but observed that the essence of agriculture even when it was extended to include "forestry", was the application of human skill and The labour; without that it could neither be an art nor a · d h d' h h d science an t at was accor mg to t em t e eter-mining factor in such class of cases. The Court then R referred to the various decisions referred to above and cited with approval the following passage from the Judgment of the Federal Court in Meghraj v. Allah Rakhia (1). "Their Lordships confirmed a decision of the Punjab Chief Court to the effect that land used as a tea garden was used for "agricultural purposes".

In the judgment of the Chief Court (which was generally approved by their Lordships) it was observed that the term "agricultural land" is used in the Act of 1905 in its widest sense to denote all land which is tilled" ....... . The Chief Court had held that land covered by a natural forest was not agricultural land, and this view also would seem to have been confirmed by the Judicial Committee," and they further proceeded to observe : "We have underlined the word 'tilled" because, in our opinion, that brings out the distinction which we have sought to draw between an agricultural and a non-agricultural purpose. The decisions referred to are Kaju Mal v. Saligram and Kajumal v. Saligram (2)''. The Court came to the conclusion that it was essential that the income should be derived from some activity which necessitated the employment of human skill and labour and which was not merely a product of man's neglect or inaction except for the gathering in of the spoils.

Not only must the assessee labour to reap the harvest, but he must also labour to produce it and they accordingly held that the income in question was not agricultural income and was not exempt from taxation under s. 4(3)(viii) of the Indian Income-tax Act. We now come to the decision of the Privy Council 111 Raja Mustafa Ali Khan v. Commissioner of (1) [1948] 161. T. R. 433. (1) [1942] F. C. R. 5:1· 62. (2) [1919] P. R. Nn. 19 p. 237 and (192:J) l. L. R. 5 Lah. 50. Income-tax, U. P. , Ajmer and Ajmer-Merwara ('). It will be recalled that the Oudh Chief Court had in Raja Mustafa Ali Khan v. Commissioner of Income Tax, U. P. & C. P. (2) decided that income from the sale of forest trees growing on land nautrally and without the • • fh 'fl Id mtervent1on o uman agency even 1 t 1e an was assessed to land revenue was not agricultural income within the meaning of section 2(1)(a) of the Indian Income-tax Act.

The appellant took an appeal to the Privy Council against this decision and the main question for consideration before their Lordships was whether the land was used for agricultural purposes and the income derived therefrom was agricultural income. Their f. ,ordships of the Privy Council observed that the income in question- "was derived from the sale of trees described as forest trees growing on land naturally and the case has throughout proceeded upon the footing that there was nothing to show that the assessee was carrying on any regular operations in forestry and that the jungle from which trees had been cut and sold was a spontaneous growth. Upon those facts the question is whether such income is (within section 2(1)(a) of the Act) rent or revenue ...... or alternatively .... whether such income was, within section 2(1)(b), income derived from such land by agriculture. It appears to their Lordships that, whether exemption is sought under section 2(l)(a) or section 2{l)(b).

the primary condition must be satisfied that the land in question is used for agricultural purposes; the expression "such land" in (b) refers back to the land mentioned in (a) and must have the same quality. Jt is not then necessary to consider any other difficulty which may stand in the way of the assessee. His case fails if he does not prove that the land is "used for agricultural purposes". Upon this point their Lordships concur in the views which have been expressed not only in the Chief Court of Oudh but in the High Court of Madras (see Yuvarajah of Pirhapuram v. (2) (1~~5] 13 l. T. R. ! )! <. Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras('), and the High 1957 Court of Allahabad (see Benoy Ratan Banerji v. Com- The c;;;;,issioner 0 missioner of Income Tax, U. P. , C. P & Berar (2) and {1. nco7-tax, 1 elsewhere in India. The question seems not yet to c! 1cut~~a' have been decided whether land can be said to be used R . Bev.

JG 010 0 for agricultural purposes within the section, if it has sah':! Ro";' ' been planted with trees and cultivated in the regular course of arboriculture, and upon this question their Bhagwari J. Lordships express no opinion. It is sufficient for the purpose of the present appeal to say (1) that in their opinion no assi'ltance is to be got from the meaning ascribed to the word "agriculture" in other statutes and (2) that, though it must always be difficult to draw the line, yet, unless there is some measure of cultivation of the land, some expenditure of skill and labour upon it, it cannot be said to be used for agricultural purposes within the meaning of the Indian Income-tax Act. In the present case their Lordships agree with the High Court in thinking that there is no evidence which would justify the conclusion that this condition is satisfied.

" It may be noted that the Privy Council also proceeded upon the footing that there was nothing to show that the assessee was carrying on any regular operations in forestry and these observations are patient of argument that if any regular operations in forestry had been carried on the land they might have made a difference to the result. Their Lordships also did not express any opinion on the question whether land can be said to be used for agricultural purposes within the section if it has been planted with trees and cultivated in the regular course of arboriculture. They were, however, definite in their opinion that unless there is some measure of cultivation of the land, some expenditure of skill and labour upon it, the land cannot be said to be used for agricultural purposes within the meaning of the Act. Agricultural operations are thus defined by them to be operations where there was some measure of cultivation of the land, some expenditure of skill and labour upon it.

If these conditions were satisfied in regard to any particular land, then (1) [ 1946) 14 I. T. R. 92, 99. (2) [ 1946) 15 I. T. R. 98. such. land can be said to be used for agricultural purposes and the income derived therefrom constitute agricultural income within the meaning of s. 2(1) (a) of the Act. The term "agriculture" for the purposes of the Indian Income Tax Act was thus in effect defin-d b h · L d h' f ) · e y t e! f or s 1ps to mean some measure o cu t1-vation of the land and some expenditure of skill and labour upon it and unless the operations, whether they be agricultural operations or forestry operations con-formed with those definitions, they could not be styled agricultural operations so as to constitute land on which they were performed land used for agricultural purposes. One should have thought that this decision of the Privy Council would put an end to all controversies with regard to the connotation of the term "agriculture" and "agricultural purposes".

That was, however, not to be. The words used by

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