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THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH v. N. VENUGOPAL AND OTHERS

Citation: [1964] 3 S.C.R. 742; 1963 INSC 144

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR , K.N. WANCHOO, K.C. DAS GUPTA

Judgment date:

Case summary

1963 INSC 144. Supreme Court of India judgment dated 1963-05-09. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH v. N. VENUGOPAL AND OTHERS. Read the judgment and case details...

Judgment text

3 S. C. R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 743 742 SUPRE:ME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL. - THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH ""' '· v. N. VENUGOPAL AND OTHERS (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO and K. C. DAs GUPTA JJ. ) Oriminal Law-Limitation-Prosecution of Police O. tfi-ur1-Poliu Officer torturing suspecta during investigation- Whellleracl• done under the provi. ians of law-Madras Police Standing Ordera, Or. No. 145-lj ha,, Ille force of law-Whether mandatory-Madras District Police Act, 1859 (Mad. 24 of 1869), •• 68. During the course of the investigation of a case of house· breaking and theft information was received that R had received tbe stolen article. The appellants, who were a Sub-Inspector of Police, a Head Constable and a Constable, respectively, took R into custody onJanuary 6, 1957. Less than three days later R was found lying dead with a number of injuries on the body.

The appellants were prosecuted for having caused injuries to R, acting in concert for the purpose of extorting from him Information which might lead to the detection of an offence and restoration of stolen property, and also for having his body thrown at the place where it was ultimately found with the intention of screening themselves from punishment. The appellants pleaded inter alia (I) that the prosecution was barred by limitation by reason of the provisions of s. 53 of the Madras District Police Act, 1859, and (2) that the trial of the appellants was vitiated by the fact that the completion of the investigation of their case was done by an Inspector of Police and this contravened the Madras Police Standing Orders under which investigation in cases against the police for torture and causing death had to be conducted by a person of the rank , of Assistant or Deputy Superintendent of Police or by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate.

Held that the prosecution of the appellants was not barred by limitation under s. 53 of the Madras District Police Act, 1859 .. No provision of law authorised police officers to beat 'a pe.. - wltb a view to induce him to make statement; and though in the present case the act of beating was alleged to bave been done when the appellants were engaged in investi· gation, there could be no reasonable connection between Sl4t10J '"""' Pr-those acts and the process of investigation. The acts complained y, of could not be said to have been done or intended to be done N. Y1nu1. ;al under any provision of the Madras District Police Act or the Code of Criminal Procedure or any other law conferring powers on the police, and, consequently, s. 53 of the Madras District Police Act had no application to the present case, Virupappa Veerappa Kadampur v. The Slate of MgBore, [1963] Supp. 2 S. C. R. 6, followed. ' HeUJ, further, that the provisions of the Madras Police Standing Order No.

145 were nothing more than administra• tive instructions by the Government of Madras and did not have the force of law; that, in any case, the requirement of the Standing Order was merely directory and not mandatory, and non-compliance did not make the investigation of the case illegal; and that even assuming that the Standing Order had the force of Jaw, the trial of the appellants would not be rende-red invalid unless it was shown that miscarriage of justice had been caused on account of the illegal investigation. H. N. Riahbud anti ln clearly establishes their guilt for this offence that it is unnecessary to seek any further support for it. For the reasons mentioned above, we have come to the conclusion that the decision .. if the High Court that there was any doubt about the truth of the proseci1tion case that these respondents beat up Arige Ramanna does not bear scrutiny and is wholly unjustified.

The interests of justice demand that the High Court's decision on this question should not be allowed to stand. Accord! n~ly, we set aside the order of High Court acqu1ttmg the responde11ts altogether in respect of injuries caused lo Arige Ramanna, and convict them all of an offedce mider s. 330 of the Indi. n Penal Code. On behalf of the State Mr. Chari does . not press the appeal against the acquittal of the respondents on the other charge<, viz , ss. 343, 348 and s. 201 read with s. l09 of the ludia! l Penal Code, .. The learned Session Judge. awarded a sentence of five years' rigorous imprisonment for the offence Sl•I• of An'hro Pr11. J•sli under s. 331 of the Indian Penal Code. Though we v. have altered the conviction to one under s. 330 of N. V11nuto/uzl the Indian Penal Code, we do not think we shall be D"' Gupta J. justified in reducing the sentence.

A serious view cannot but be taken of such a barbarous method of dealing with persons suspected of a crime as was committed by these respondents in this case. It is necessary that deterrent sentences should be inflicted for such an offence when established. Accordingly, we convict the respondents under s. 330 of the Indian Penal Code and we sentence each of them to five years' rigorous imprisonment: The appeal is thus allowed in part and is dismissed as regards the acquittal of the respondents on other charges. The accused to surrender to their bail. A ppe,al allowed in part . •

Source: Supreme Court eSCR. Dataset: Dattam Labs, CC BY 4.0. Text extracted automatically; compare with the source PDF for layout and accuracy.