THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ORS. v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. AND ORS

Citation: [2004] 1 S.C.R. 564

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: V.N. KHARE, R.C. LAHOTI, B.N. AGRAWAL, S.B. SINHA, AR. LAKSHMANAN

Case summary

THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ORS. v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. AND ORS.pdf

Judgment text

THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ORS. V. ~ KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. AND ORS. JANUARY 15, 2004 [V. N. KHARE, CJ. , R. C. LAHOTI, B. N. AGRAWAL, S. 8. SINHA AND DR. AR. LAKSHMANAN, JJ. ] ~ ' Constitution of India, 1950: Articles 245, 246, 248,253 and 265-Seventh Schedule, List II. Entries 49 and 50, List/, Entries 52 and 54-West Bengal Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1992 amending West Bengal Primary Education Act and West Bengal Rural Employment and Production Act-Levy of education cess and rural employment cess under the two Acts and the Cess Act, 1880 on coal bearing land and other mineral bearing lands-Levy ofcesses challenged as regards coal bearing land and brick-earth bearing land-Held, Per majority (Sinha, J.

dissenting), levy ofcesses is intra vires the Constitution-The cesses on coal bearing land and brick-earth bearing land, being tax on land, are covered by Entry 49 in List /I-Tax andfee not a subject dealt with by Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act,1957 and power to levy tax and fee is available to States so long as they do not interfere with Centre's power of regulation and control of mines and minerals-Doctrine of occupied field- Doctrine ofpith and substance-Doctrine ofpublic trust-West Bengal Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1992-West Bengal Primary Education Act, 1973, s. 78- West Bengal Rural Employment and Production Act, 1976, s. 4-Cess Act, 1880, ss. 5 and 6-Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act,1957.

Seventh Schedule,List II, Entries 5,23,49,50 and 66, List/, Entries 52 and 54-Uttar Pradesh Special Area Development Authorities Act,1986 and Shakti Nagar Special Area Development Authority (Cess on Mineral Rights) Rules, 1997 levying cess on mineral rights-Levy ofcess challenged by stone crushers-Held, Per majority (Sinha,J. dissenting), High Court rightly upheld levy ofthe cess as a tax covered by Entry 5 in list II-Besides, levy ofthe cess as a tax can also be upheld by reference to Entries 49 and 50 in list II- Although it is termed as "cess on mineral right", impact falls on the land delivering the mineral and thus levy ofthe cess falls within the scope ofEntry f-, "' 49 in List II-Levy ofthe cess can equally be upheld as a fee, by reference STATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD.

565 to Entry 66 in list II, for rendering such services as would improve infrastructure and general development ofthe area, benefits whereofwould be availed by stone crushers also-Uttar Pradesh Special Area Development Authorities Act, 1986-s. 35-Shakti Nagar Special Area Development Authority (Cess on Mineral Rights) Rules, 1997-rr. 2 and 3. Articles 245, 246, 248 and 253-Seventh Schedule, list II, Entry 49, and list I Entries 52 and 54 -West Bengal Taxation Laws (Second Amendment) Act, 1989 amending West Bengal Education Act and West Bengal Rural Employment and Production Act and levying cesses on tea estates-Held. - Per majority (Sinha,J. dissenting), the cess levied is on tea-bearing land, a well defined classification and as such is covered by Entry 49 in List II- Declaration under s.

2 of Tea Act in term~ of Ent1y 52, list I with regard to the Union taking control of the tea induslly does not amount to vesting the power to tax or levy fee in the Central Government by reference to tea or tea estates-Goodricke Group Ltd upheld-West Bengal Taxation Laws (Second Amendment) Act,1989-Tea Act, 1953. Article I4-Classification oflands for the purpose oftax-Held, different pieces of land identically situated but being subjected to different uses, or ~ having different potential can be classified s~parately.

Taxation: Measure oftax-Levy ofcess on coal bearing land, other mineral bearing lands and tea estates-Assessment ofcess by reference to produce dispatched from land-Held, Per majority (Sinha,J dissenting)-QuantifYing the tax by reference to annual value of the land on the basis of what it produces or is capable of producing is a well known mode-Merely because quantum of produce dispatched from the land is the factor taken into consideration for determining the value of the land, ii does not become a tax on the produce. Royalty-Nature of-Held, royalty is not a tax-It is paid to owner of land who may be a private person and may not necessari(v be a State-Lessor receives royalty as his income and for lessee royalty paid is an expenditure incurred-It is clarified that in India Cement it was not the finding of the Court that royalty is a tax. (Sinha, J, dissenting).

Cess-A cess may be a tax or fee and is generally used when the levy is for special administrative expense suggested by the name ofthe cess itself I r ).. ,.. _ Interpretation of Constitution: ,. _ Entries in Lists ofSeventh Schedule-Construing of-Explained. Interpretation ofStatutes: Taxing statutes-Interpretation of-Explained. Words and Phrases:· ~ 1 Expression 'Dispatches' as occurring in the statutes levying cess on minerals and tea es/ates-Meaning of The West Bengal Legislature, by enacting the West Bengal Taxation Laws(Amendment) Act, 1992 amended the provisions of the West Bengal Primary Education Act,1973 and the 'Yest Bengal Rural Employment and Production Act, 1976, and levied education cess and rural employment cess on coal bearing land and other mineral bearing land. The cesses were to be assessed with reference to dispatches of minerals produced from the land.

So far as levy of cesses on coal bearing land was concerned, the same "' was successfully challenged in writ petitions before the High Court, which held that the cess assessed and computed on the basis of value of coal produced from the coal bearing land, was directly related to the value of coal produced from the coal mines and, as such, the cess could not be said to be on land so as to be covered by Entry 49 in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India. The said judgment of the High Court in Kesoram Industries Ltd. (Textile Division) v. Coal India Ltd. , AIR (1993) Calcutta 78 was challenged by the State Government in CA No. 1532-33 of 1993. ~ As regards levy of cess on brick-earth bearing land, Writ Petition No. 247 of 1995 was filed before the Supreme Court on behalf of the persons engaged in brick manufacturing and.

owning brick fields, contending that brick-earth being a minor mineral was covered under Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 and by virtue of declaration made by s. 2 thereof, by reference to Entry 54 in List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, the field was covered by the 1957 .... Act; that the levy was on dispatch of minor mineral whereas the process of manufacturing bricks did not involve any dispatch of brick-earth as it ! STATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. 567 was captively consumed in the brick field itself and as such the cess was not leviable; and that the State Government was not empowered to levy any cess on either the extraction of brick-earth or on dispatch thereof. It was submitted that the same quantity of brick-earth was subjected by the Central Act to payment of royalty which was a tax and the same quantity was sought to be levied with cess which was incompetent so far as State Legislature was concerned. !

>- The State Government of Uttar Pradesh, in exercise of powers under Rules 2 and 3 of Shakti Nagar Special Area Development Authority (Cess on Mineral Rights) Rules, 1997 framed under s. 35 of the U. P. Special Area Development Authorities Act, 1986, sought to levy cess on mineral rights and took steps for recovery thereof by issuing notices to several stone crushers who were extracting stone as mineral. Such stone crushers filed writ petitions before the High Court, which upheld the levy of cess as being within the competence of State Legislature by reference to Entry 5 in List II of Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. (Ram Dhani Singh v. Collector, Sonbhadra and Ors. , AIR [20011 All. 5. Aggrieved, the stone crushers filed Civil Appeal No. 5027 of 2000.

Levy of cess on tea estates imposed by virtue of the West Bengal Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1981 by amending the provisions of West Bengal Primary Education Act, 1973 and the West Bengal Rural Employment and Production Act, 1976, was struck down in Buxa, Dooars Company ltd. v. State of Wes! Bengal, [198913 SCC 211; and as the State became liable to refund the cess already collected, the State Legislature brought the West Bengal Taxation (Second Amendment) Act, 1989 amending the West Bengal Primary Education Act and West Bengal Rural Employment and Production Act w. e. f. 1981 and levied cesses on tea estates at a given rate on the dispatch of green tea leaves produced in such. tea estates. By a validation clause, it was provided that cess collected for the period prior to the Amendment Act would be deemed to have been validly levied and collected thereunder. Constitutional validity of the Amendment Act, 1989 was upheld in Goodricke Group ltd. and Ors v.

State ofWest Bengal and Ors. , 119951 Supp. 1 SCC 707. But later, when a similar cess levied under the pari materia provisions of Orissa Rural Employment, Education and Production Act, 1982 was struck down in State ofOrissa v. Mahanadi Coal Fields Limited, [19951Supp. 2 SCC 686, Writ Petition No. 262 of 1997 was filed before the Supreme Court again challenging the [2004] I S. C. R. constitutional validity of the very same amendments which were upheld in Goodricke 's case, and thus Goodricke was sought to be overruled. Besides the above matters, some more writ petitions and civil appeals involving similar issues were filed and all such cases were clubbed together. The three-Judge Bench before which these cases came up for hearing, noticed some conflicting decisions of the Supreme Court on the issues involved and opined that the matter be referred to a Constitution Bench. Accordingly, these cases came to be heard by the present Constitution --1 • Bench.

Disposing of the matters, the Court, HELD: Per Lahoti, J. (for himself and for V. N. Khare, CJI, B. N. Agrawal and Dr. AR. Lakshmanan,JJ) 1. 1. It is well settled that it is for the Legislature to draft a piece of legislation by making the choicest selection of words so as to give expression to its intention. The ordinary rule of interpretation is that the words used by the Legislature shall be given such meaning as the Legislature has chosen to assign them by coining definitions contained in the interpretation clause and in absence thereof the words would be given such meaning as they are susceptible of in the ordinary parlance, may be by having recourse to dictionaries. However, still, the interpretation is the exclusive privilege of the Constitutional Courts and the Court embarking upon the ·task of interpretation would place such meaning on the words as would effectuate the purpose of legislation avoiding absurdity, unreasonableness, incongruity and conflict. 1678-H; 679-A-BI 1. 2.

As is with the words used, so is with the language employed in drafting a piece of legislation. That interpretation would be preferred ,.. which would avoid conflict between two fields of legislation and would rather import homogeneity. It follows, as a corollary of the abovesaid statement, that while interpreting tax laws the Courts would be guided by the gist of the legislation instead of by the apparent meaning of the words used and the language employed. The Courts shall have regard to the object and the scheme of the tax law under consideration and the purpose for which the cess is levied, collected and intended to be used. The Courts shall make endeavor to search where the impact of the cess falls. The subject matter of levy is not to be confused with the method and ~ \ STATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. 569 manner of assessment or realisation.

Legislation in the field of taxation --I and economic activities need special consideration and are to be viewed with larger flexibility in approach. 1679-B-D; 625-C] R. K. Garg v. Union ofIndia and Ors. , 119811 4 SCC 675, relied on S. R. Bommai and Ors. v. Union ofIndia, [19941 3 SCC 1, referred to. Morey v. Doud, (1957) 354 US 457, referred to. ) >- M. C. Seta/vad, Tagore law Lectures "Union and State relations under the Indian Constitution"(Eastern Law House, Calcutta, 1974); referred to. 1. 3 The Entries in List I and List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution must be so construed as to avoid any conflict. If there is no conflict, an occasion for deriving assistance from non-obstante clause "subject to" does not arise. If there is a conflict, the correct approach is to find an answer to three questions step by step as under: One - Is it still possible to effect reconciliation between two Entries so as to avoid conflict and overlapping?

Two - In which Entry the impugned legislation falls by finding out the pith and substance of the legislation? and Three - Having determined the field of legislation wherein the impugned legislation falls by applying the doctrine of pith and substance, can an incidental trenching upon another field of legislation be ignored? (672-B-E) M. P. V. Sundararamier and Co. v. The State ofAndhra Pradesh and Anr. , (1958) SCR 1422 and D. G. Gouse v. Kera/a, (1980) 2 SCC 410, relied on. Governor General in Council v. Province ofMadras; AIR (1945) PC 98 - referred to. HM. Seervai: Constitutional law of India (Fourth/Silver Jubilee Edition, Vol. 3), referred to. ,. >+ 2. 1. In the scheme of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule, there exists a clear distinction between the general subjects of legislation and heads of taxation. They are separately enumerated. (671-B-C) Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. and Ors. v. State ofUP. and Ors. , (1990( I SCC 109, relied on. 2. 2.

Article 265 mandates - no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law. The scheme of the Seventh Schedule reveals an exhaustive enumeration of legislative subjects, considerably enlarged over the predecessor Government of India Act. Entry 97 in List I confers residuary powers on Parliament. Article 248 of the Constitution, which . speaks of residuary powers of legislation, confers exclusive power on , P:irliament to make any law with respect to any matter not enumerated ( . • }. Jl the Concurrent List or the State List. At the same time, it provides that such residuary power shall include the power of making any law imposing a tax not mentioned in either of those Lists. It is, thus, clear that if any power to tax is clearly mentioned in List - II, the same would not be available to be exercised by Parliament based on the assumption of residuary power. (656-F-H; 657-A] Union ofIndia v. Harbhajan Singh Dhillon, (1971 ( 2 SCC 779 and Mis. Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd.

and Ors. v. State ofBihar and Ors. , (1983( 4 sec 45, relied on. H. M Seervai: Constitutional Law of India, Fourth/Silver Jubilee Edn. Vol. 3 para 22. 191, referred to. 2. 3. rt is well-settled that the power to tax cannot be inferred by implication; there must be a charging section specifically empowering the State to levy tax. There is nothing like an implied power to tax. The source of power which does not specifically speak of taxation cannot be so interpreted by expanding its width as to include therein the power to tax by implication or by necessary inference. Power to tax is not an incidental power. (655-F; 658-D; 659-E( Taxation, by Cooley (Vol. I, Fourth Edn. ); Constitutional Law ofIndia, H. M Seervai, Fourth/Silver Jubilee Edn. Vol. 3 para 22. 20, referred to. 2. 4. The judicial opinion of binding authority flowing from several pronouncements of this Court has settled these principles: (i) in interpreting a taxing statute, equitable considerations are entirely out of place.

Taxing statutes cannot be interpreted on any presumption or \ STATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. 571 assumption. A taxing statute has to be interpreted in the light of what is clearly expressed; it cannot imply anything which is not expressed; it cannot import provisions in the statute so as to supply any deficiency; (ii) before taxing any person it must be shown that he falls within the ambit of the charging section by clear words used in the Section; and (iii) if the words are ambiguous a11d open to two interpretations, the benefit of interpretation is given to the subject. 1659-B-D] "Principles of Statutory Interpretation, Justice G. P. Singh (Eighth I ).. Edition, 2001), referred to. 3. 1. Power of 'regulation and control' is separate and distinct from the power of taxation and so are the two fields for purposes of legislation.

Taxation may be capable of being comprised in the main subject of general legislative head by placing an extended construction, but that is not the rule for deciding the appropriate legislative field for taxation between List I and List II. As the fields of taxation are to be found clearly enumerated in Lists I and II, there can be no overlapping. There may be overlapping in fact but there would be no overlapping in law. The subject matter of two taxes by reference to the two Lists is different. Simply because the methodology or mechanism adopted for assessment and quantification is similar, the two taxes cannot be said to be overlapping. This is the distinction between the subject of a tax and the measure of tax. 1671-C-E) 3. 2. A power to regulate, develop or control would not include within its ken a power to levy tax or fee, except when it is only regulatory. Power to tax or levy for augmenting revenue shall continue to be exercisable by the Legislature in whom it vests i. e.

the State Legislature in spite of regulation or control having been assumed by another legislature i. e. the Union. 1661-E-FI Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. and Ors v. State ofU. P. and Ors. , (1990) 1 sec 109, referred to. Mis Laxminarayana Mining Co. , Bangalore and Anr. v. Taluk Development Board and Anr. , AIR (1972) Mysore 299, explained and disapproved. ~ State v. Tucker, 56 U. S. 516, referred to, Taxation, by Cooley (Vol. I, Fourth Edn. Paras 26-27), referred to. 3. 3. Entries 52, 53 and 54 in List I are not heads of taxation. They are general entries. Fields of taxation covered by Entries 49 and 50 in List II continue to remain with State Legislatures, in spite of Union having enacted laws by reference to Entries 52, 53, 54 in List I.

It is for the Union to legislate and impose limitations on the States' otherwise plenary power to levy taxes on mineral rights or taxes on lands (including mineral bearing lands) by reference to Entries 50 and 49 in List II and lay down the ~ ' limitations on State's power, if it chooses to do so, and also to define the extent and sweep ofsuch limitations. [671-G-H; 672-A-BI 3. 4. The heads of taxation are clearly enumerated in Entries 83 to 92B in List I and Entries 45 to 63 in List II. List III, the Concurrent List, does not provide for any head of taxation. Entry 96 in List I, Entry 66 in List II and Entry 47 in List Ill deal with fees. The residuary power of legislation in the field of taxation spelled out by Article 248 (2) and Entry 97 in List I can be applied only to such subjects as are not included in Entries 45 to 63 of List II. It follows that taxes on lands and buildings in Entry 49 of List II cannot be levied by the Union.

Taxes on mineral rights, a subject in Entry 50 of List II, can also not be levied by the Union though, as stated in Entry 50 itself, the Union may impose limitations on the power of the State and such limitations, if any, imposed by the Parliament by law relating to mineral development, to that extent, shall circumscribe the States' power to legislate. (674-B-D[ 3. 5. Power to tax mineral rights is with the States; the power to lay down limitations on exercise of such power, in the interest of regulation, development or control, as the case may be, is with the Union. This is the result achieved by homogeneous reading of Entry 50 in List II and Entries 52 and 54 in List I.

So long as a tax or fee on mineral rights remains in pith and substance a tax for augmenting the revenue resources of the State or fee for rendering services by the State and it does not impinge upon regulation of mines and mineral development or upon control of industry by the Central Government, it is not unconstitutional. A reasonable tax or fee levied by State Legislation cannot be construed as trenching upon Union's power and freedom to regulate and control mines and minerals. [674-D-F; 663-H; 664-A) .. ,_ 3. 6. Power to tax is not outside constitutional limitatidns. It is for Parliament to exercise power in the field made available to it by Entries ' ~ STATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. 573 52 and 54 in List I. It is also for Parliament to state by law the limitations - and the sweep thereof - which it may choose to impose on the field available to the State for taxation, by reference to Entry 50 in List II.

It may not be for Courts to venture into enquiry in just an individual case to find and hold what tax would hamper mineral development if Parliament has chosen to observe silence by not legislating or failed to say something explicit. (663-F-G( ,.. > 4. 1. In the field occupied by the Centre for regulation and control, power to levy tax and fee is available to the State, so long as it does not interfere with the regulation - the power assumed and occupied by the Union. (662-E-F( Baijnath Kadio v. The State of Bihar and Ors. , (1969( 3 SCC 838 and Western Coalfields ltd. v. Special Area Development Authority, Korba and Anr. , [1982( I SCC 125, referred to. Goodricke Group ltd and Ors. v. State ofWest Bengal and Ors. , (1995) Supp. I SCC 707, upheld. State ofHG1yana and Anr. v. Chanan Mal, 1197711 SCC 340 and H. R. S. Murthy v. The Collector ofChittoor and Anr. , (196416 SCR 666, relied on. 4. 2.

As Section 2 of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 itself provides and indicates, the assumption of control in public interest by the Central Government is on (i) the regulation of mines, (ii) the development of minerals, and (iii) to the extent 'hereinafter' provided. The scope and extent of declaration cannot and could not have been enlarged by the Court nor has it been done. The effect is that no State Legislature shall have power to enact any legislation touching (i) the regulation of mines, (ii) the development of minerals, and • .... (iii) to the extent provided by 1957 Act. Tax and fee is not a subject dealt with by 1957Act nor can a power to levy tax or fee be spelled out from sections 13, 18 and 25 therof. (653-D-E; 655-E) Synthetics and Chemicals ltd. and Ors v. State ofU. P. and Ors. , (1990( I SCC 109 and The Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd v. The State of - ).

Entry 23 in List II speaks of regulation of mines and mineral developments, subject to the provisions of List I with respect to regulation and development under the control of the Union. The Central Legislation has taken over regulation and development of mines and mineral development in public interest. By reference to Entry 50 in List II and Entry 54 iri List I, the Central legislation has not cast any limitations on the State Legislature's power to tax mineral rights, or land for the matter of that. Simply because incidence of tax is capable of being passed on to buyers or consumers by the mine owners with an escalating effect on the price of the coal, it cannot be inferred that the tax has an adverse effect on mineral development. The impugned cess is a tax on coal-bearing and mineral- .. bearing land. It can at the most be construed to be a tax on mineral rights. In either case, the impugned cess is covered by Entries 49 and 50 of List II. (675-8-FJ 8. 3.

Mahanadi Coalfields* was not correctly decided in as much as India Cement Ltd. and Orissa Cement Ltd. ** were applied to the levy of a cess to which they did not apply. In Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. it was not rightly opined that the cess was levied on minerals and mineral rights and not on land. Hence the conclusion reached therein that the State Legislature did not have the legislative competence and that the State legislation trenched upon a field already occupied by Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act 1957, a Central Legislation, is incorrect. [675-G-H; 676-A( Kesoram Industries Ltd (Textile Division) v. Coal India Ltd. , AIR (1993) Calcutta 78, reversed. *State ofOrissa v. Mahanadi Coal Fields Limited, (1995) Suppl. 2 SCC -4 686, overruled. **India Cement Ltd. and Ors. v. State ofTamil Nadu and Ors. , [1990) 1SCC12 and Orissa Cement Ltd v. State of0ris$a and Ors. , [1991) Supp. \ I. - }. ; ! - l sec 430 ' distinguished. t· Brick-Earth Matters 9. t.

Brick-earth is a minor mineral. The verdict in this judgment with regard to the impugned cess by reference to coal applies to brick-earth as well. The field as to taxation cannot be said to have been covered by Central Legislation, i. e. , the l 957 Act, by reference to Entry 54 in List I. 1676-F-GI , ... 9. 2. Quantification of levy by reference to quantity of brick-earth dispatched is a methodology adopted for the purpose . of finding out the quantity of brick-earth removed from the land. It has a definite and direct co-relation with the land. The gist and substance of what the Legislature is taking into account is the brick-earth actually removed. "Dispatched" has the effect of taking into account the brick-earth "removed" and not simply "moved" and left behind.

The average quantity of brick-earth utilized in making bricks, whether on the brick field itself or on a place nearby, does involve removal - and consequently, dispatch - of the brickearth from the place where it was to the place where it is captively consumed in making bricks. The fact that the methodology for working '4 out the royalty payable and the cess payable is the same, does not have any detrimental effect on the constitutional validity of the cess whether it be treated as one on the land - classified by reference to its production, i. e. , the brick-earth or as one on mineral rights in brick-earth. In either case it would be covered by Entries 49 or 50 in List II. 1676-G-H; 677-A-CI Minor Mineral Matters 10. t. The High Court has rightly held that as a tax the impugned levy of cess is clearly covered by Entry 5 of List II, and it is added, read with Entries 49 and 50 of List II. The High Court has upheld the validity of the U. P.

Special Area Development Authorities Act, 1986 by relating it to Entry 5 in List II which is 'local government'. Any local government exercising the power of governance over a local area shall have to administer, manage and develop the area lying within its territory which cannot be done without raising funds. 1681-C-D; 680-A-BI .. Ram Dhani Singh v. Collector, Sonbhadra and Ors. , AIR (2001) All 5, affirmed. I J. __ \ STATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. 581 10. 2. The constitutional validity of the enactment as a whole and the t rules framed thereunder is not put in issue. What is under challenge is only the levy of cess. There is nothing wrong in the State legislation levying cess by way of tax so as to generate its funds. Although it is termed as a 'cess on mineral right', the impact thereof falls on the land delivering the minerals. Thus, the levy of cess also falls within the scope of Entry 49 of List II.

Inasmuch as the levy on mineral rights does not contravene any of the limitations imposed by the Parliament by law relating to mineral development, it is also covered by Entry 50 of List II. 1681-D-FI 10. 3. The levy of the impugned cess can equally be upheld as a fee by reference to Entry 66 read with Entry 5 of List II. The imposition of cess envisaged through the SADA Act and the Rules was a step towards developing the special area wherein mining activities on the land are carried on. The impugned cess can, therefore, be justified as a fee for rendering such services as would improve the infrastructure and general development of the area the benefits whereof would be availed even by the stone crushers. It is not necessary that the services ren~ered from out of the fee collected should be directly in proportion with the amount of fee collected.

It is equally not necessary that the services rendered by the fee collected should remain confined to the persons from whom the fee has been collected. Availability of indirect benefit and a general nexus between the persons bearing the burden of levy of fee and the services rendered out of the fee collected is enough to uphold the validity of the fee charged. 1680-E-G; 683-D-EI 10. 4. The impugned levy does not have the effect of increasing the royalty. Simply because the royalty is levied by reference to the quantity of the minerals produced and the impugned cess too is quantified by taking into consideration the same quantity of the mineral produced, the latter does not become royalty. The former is the rent of the land on which the mine is situated or the price of the privilege of winning the minerals from the land parted by the Government in favour of the mining lessee.

The cess is a levy on mineral rights with impact on the land and quantified by reference to the quantum of minerals produced. The distinction, though fine, yet exists and is perceptible. 1683-E-Fl Tea Matters 11. 1. The impugned levy of cess on tea estates as levied by the West Bengal Taxation Laws (Second Amendment) Act, 1989 is intra vires the Constitution. Levy of the cess has already been upheld in Goodricke t ,, Groups Ltd. That case has correctly been decided and the law laid down therein is correct and supported by authority in abundance. India Cement and Orissa Cement were rightly distinguished. The logic and reasoning assigned and conclusions drawn by this Court in Goodricke on all the counts are upheld. (670-G-H; 671-A;_676-B-Fl Goodricke Group Ltd. and Ors. v. State ofWest Bengal and Ors. , (19951 Supp. I SCC 707, upheld. India Cement Ltd. and Ors. v. State ofTamil Nadu and Ors. , (199011 SCC 12; Orissa Cement Ltd. v. State o/Orissa and Ors. , 11991 (Supp.

I SCC 430 and Buxa Dooars Tea Company Ltd and Ors. v. State of West Bengal and Ors. , (1989( 3 SCC 211, distinguished . 11. 2. Section 2 of the Tea Act, 1953 contains a declaration that it is expedient in the public interest that the Union should take under its control the tea industry. The declaration is in terms of Entry 52 in List I. Union's assumption of control of tea as industry and as being expedient in the public interest, does not amount to vesting the power to tax or levy fee iii the Central Government by reference to tea or on tea estates. Section 25 of the Tea Act empowers the Central Government to levy and collect excise duty on t. ea produces, which on collection shall be credited to the Consolidated Fund of India. There is no other provision in the Tea Act empowering levy of any tax or fee on tea or tea bearing land. The impugned levy is of cesses on tea estates, i. e. the land forming part of tea estates as defined in the impugned Act.

The impugned cess is a tax on teabearing land, a well-defined classification and is covered by Entry 49 in List II. Simply because the method for quantifying the tax is by reference to the yield of the land determinable by taking into account the quantum of tea produced and dispatched, it does not become a cess on tea or a tax on production of tea or a tax on income of land. 1676-C-E) Per Sinha, J (Dissenting): I. I. The federalism under the Indian context points out to the supremacy of the Parliament, and the legislative entries contained in different Lists ofthe Seventh Schedule to the Constitution oflndia must be construed accordingly. Fields of legislation carved out under Chapter I of Part XI ofthe Constitution clearly spell out that in more important matters the Parliament will have greater control thereover. 1805-B; 712-AI I . -. /. , ' \ STATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. 583 Govt. ofA. P. v. Medwin Educational Society and Ors... JT (2003) 8 SC 567; State ofAndhra Pradesh v. K.

Purushotham Reddy, JT (2003) 3 SC 15 State of West Bengal v. Union of India, AIR (1963) SC 1241, Automobile Transport v. State ofRajasthan, AIR (1962) SC 1406, referred to. Ref. Under Article 143, AIR (1965) SC 745 ITC Ltd. v. Agricultural Produce Market Commillee and Ors. , 120021 9 SCC 232 and Gov. -Gen. in Council v. Madras, (1945) FCR 179, referred to. Florida Lime and Avocado Growers v. Charles Paul, 373 US 132; 10 Law. Ed. 2d 248; The State of South Australia and Another v. The Commonwealth and Anr. , (1942) 65 C. L. R. 373, referred to. Dicey, Law of the Constitution, 10th Ed. P. 164, referred to. 1. 2. The interpretation of the legislation will depend upon the legislative entries to which it relates and intent and purport of the makers of the Constitution, and no principle of interpretation can be introduced to the effect that the Court should lean towards a State. 1805-B-CI 1. 3.

Tilt in favour of the Centre is required to be construed having regard to the importance of the subject matter of Parliamentary legislation and the impact and practical inroad effect of the State Laws entrenching upon the legislative field occupied by the Parliament. Though the State Legislature has exclusive power with respect to the subjects specified in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, some of the Entries in List II specifically make the States power 'subject to' any law made by Parliament under the specified Entry in List I. Union and State Relations under the Indian Constitution by M. C. Setalvad - referred to. 1712-B, G-H] 2. 1. Article 248 of the Constitution confers power upon the Parliament to make any law with respect to any matter not enumerated in the Concurrent List or the State List.

Notwithstanding the fact that great care with which the various entries in the three lists have been framed, on some rare occasions it may be found that one or the other field is not covered by these entries. The makers of our Constitution have, in such a case, taken care by conferring power to legislate on such residuary subjects upon the Union Parliament, including taxation, by reason of Article 248 of the Constitution. Once it is found that the Parliament has exercised its superior power in terms of Article 248, question of levy of any tax on the product by a State would not arise. (714-F, 715-C-D; 729-F-G( Naga People's Movement of Human Rights v. Union of India, AIR t (1998) SC 431 and Attorney Generalfor India v. Amratlal Prajivandas, (1994( 5 sec 54, relied on. S. R. Chaudhuri v. State ofPunjab, (2001 ( 7 SCC 126; Union ofIndia v. Shri Harbhajan Singh Dhillon, (1971 ( 2 SCC 779; Synthetic and Chemicals ltd. v. State ofU. P. , AIR (1990) SC 1927 and State ofA. P. v. K.

Purushotham Reddy and Ors. , JT (2003) 3 SC IS. ... ( 2. 2. Once it is found that the State lacks legislative competence for imposition of tax on any of the subject, indisputably the Parliament alone will have legislative competence therefor. (715-F( Synthetics and Chemicals v. State of U. P. , (1991 ( SCC 109, referred to. M. P. Sundararamier and Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr. , (1958( SCR 1422, distinguished. 2. 3. There is nothing in the Constitution to debar the Parliament to legislate under Entry 54 read with Entry 97 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. However, recourse to the residuary power must be taken as a last resort i. e. only when all the entries in the three lists are absolutely exhausted, that is to say, if the subject matter is beyond comprehension of the entries contained in the aforementioned three lists. It is trite that when two interpretations are possible resort to the residuary power may not be taken recourse to.

(721-D-E( Union ofIndia v. Shri Harbhajan Singh Dhillon, (1971 ( 2 SCC 779 and p Union of India and Anr. v. Delhi High Court Bar Assn. and Ors. , (2002( 4 sec 275, relied on. His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalbvaru etc. v. State of Kera/a and Anr. , (1973( 4 SCC 225, referred to. 3. 1. Article 253 of the Constitution, which starts with a non-obstante clause and operates notwithstanding anything contained in Articles 245 and 246, provides that while giving effect to an international treaty, the Parliament assumes the role of the State Legislature and once the same is done the power of the State is denuded. India is a signatory to various international treaties and covenants and being a party to WTO and GATT, it is obligated to fulfil its trans-national obligations. If for the purpose of STATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD.

585 t giving effect to the international treaties, the Parliament, in exercise of its power under Article 253 of the Constitution, takes over the legislative field occupied by List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, no exception thereto can be taken. 1715-A-B; 720-AI Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalbvaru etc. v. State ofKera/a and Anr. , 1197314sec225; Vishaka and Ors. v. State ofRajasthan and Ors. , 11997] 6 SCC 241 and Maganbhai lshwarbhai Patel v. {Jnion ofIndia and Anr. , AIR ).. (1969) SC 783, relied on. Kapila Hingorani v. State ofBihar, (2003] 6 SCC I; Islamic Academy of Edn. and Anr. v. State of Karanataka and Ors. etc. , 12003] 6 SCC 325; Liverpool and London S. P. Assn. Ltd v. M. V. Sea Success I and Anr. , (2003) JO SCALE I; State ofPunjab and Anr. v. Modern Breweries and Anr. , (2003) 10 SCALE 202 and Reference by President ofIndia, AIR (1960) SC 845, referred to. 3. 2.

Tea and coal being subjects of great importance, the Parliament has taken over the complete control of the entire field in respect thereof and other minerals in terms of the Tea Act, 1953 and Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulations) Act, 1957 respectively. The Parliament by enacting Sections 25 both in the 1957 Act and the 1953 Act reserved the authority unto itself to impose any other tax falling in List I. The Parliament may also impose a tax which otherwise would not fall in any one of the taxing entries but may fall under the residuary entry being Entry 97 in List I. (805-C-D; 735-F-G] 3. 3. Power to regulate the trade and for that purpose imposition of tax is well-known in India. Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 is a regulatory statute. Imposition of tax by way of regulatory measures is permissible while enacting a regulatory statute. (739-B-C; 740-A] Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd and Ors. v~ State ofU. P. and Ors.

, (19901 1 SCC 109 and State ofPunjab and Anr. v. Mis. Devans Modern Brewaries ltd. and Anr. , (2003) 10 SCALE 202, relied on. ABL International Ltd and Anr. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation ofIndia limited and Ors. , JT (2003) 10 SC 300 and South Eastern Coalfields limited v. State ofM. P. and Ors. , (2003) 7 Supreme 539, referred to. 3. 4. The importance as regards fixation of price of coal and tea has a direct bearing with the regulation of mines and minerals development as also the tea industry. The Central Government has also reduced the custom duty on coal taking into the aforementioned consideration in view, as would appear from the Notification dated 8. 1. 2004 issued under the provisions of the Customs Act. As regards tea, under Section 30 of the Tea Act, the Central Government has the power to fix the market price.

Fixation of a uniform mar~et price by the Central Government would not be possible if it is held that a different rate of cess can be levied by different --1 States, which will have a direct impact on the sale price thereof. (731-A-B; 795-A-B; 799-E-FI State ofMP. v. Mahalaxmi Fabric Mills Ltd. , (19951Supp. 1SCC642 and Saurashtra Cement and Chemical Industries ltd. v. Union ofIndia, (20011 I SCC 91, relied on. The King v. Barger. , (1908) 6 CLR 41; Allorney-Genera/for Alberta v. Allorney General for Canada. , (1939) AC at pp. 130-132 and The State of South Australia and Anr. v. The Commonwealth and Anr. , (19421 65 C. L. R. 373, referred to. 3. 5.

Having regard to the purport and object of the 1953 Act and the 1957 Act and the declarations contained in Section 2 of the two Acts, as contemplated in Entries 52 and 54 of List I of the Seventh Schedule, the State must be held to be denuded of its power to levy any tax on coal or tea, particularly, having regard to the provisions of Sections IO, 13, 15, 25 and 30 of the Tea Act and Sections 9, 9A, 13, 18 and 25 of the 1957 Act. Field of taxation on tea and mineral is specifically covered by Section 25 of the two Acts. Even if the doctrine of pith and substance is applied, it may not be possible to hold that the State legislature has only incidentally encroached upon the legislative field occupied by the Parliament. (805-D-HI . State of U. P. and Ors. v. Varn Organic Chemicals ltd. and Ors. , AIR (2003) SC 4650 and State of Bihar and Ors. v. Industrial Corporation Pvt. ltd. and Ors. , (2003) 9 SCALE 169, relied on. Kera/a State electricity Board v. Indian Aluminium Co.

, 1197611 SCC 468; Harakchand Ratanchand Banthia and Ors. v. Union ofIndia and Ors. , (196912 SCC 166; D. C. and G. M Co Ltd. v. Union ofIndia, AIR (1983) SC STATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. 587 937; lshwtiri Khetan Sugar Mills (P) L1 · distinguished. P. Kannadasan and Ors. v. State of TN. and Ors. , 119961 5 SCC 670, referred to as already overruled. 3. 6. Once it is found that the entire field of mines and minerals as also tea, including the power to impose any tax is covered by the 1957 and 1953 Acts, the impugned tax by way of levy of cess on coal and tea must be held to be u/lra vires. 1738-G-HI Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti and Ors. v. Pilibhit Pantnagar Bee} Ltd. and Anr. , (2003) 10 SCALE 432, relied on. Slale ofRajaslhan v. Vatan Medical and General Store, (20011 4 SCC 642, held inapplicable. 4. 1. Tax on lands and buildings in terms of Entry 49 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution can be levied on land as a unit and not otherwise.

Applying the test laid down in several decisions of this Court, it is opined that the impugned cess is not a tax directly levied upon land as a unit by reason of the general ownership of the lands and buildings. 1806-E-F; 749-C-DI India Cement Ltd. and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. , 1199011 SCC 12; State of Orissa v. Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. , 119951Supp2 SCC 686; Orissa Cemenl Ltd. v. State of Orissa and Ors. , 119911Suppl. 1 SCC 430; Stale ofBihar and Ors. v. Indian Aluminium Company and Ors. , 119971 8 SCC 360; Central Coalfields Ltd v. The State ofBihar. , AIR (1991) Patna 27 and Krishna Mohan (P) Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation ofDelhi and Ors. , (20031 7 sec 151, relied on. Goodricke Group Ltd. v. State of W. B. , 119951 Supp. 1 SCC 707, disinguished. 0 4. 2. An impost on lands and buildings must be a tax directly imposed r on lands and buildings and must have a definite relation thereto.

The impugned levies, having regard to nature of impost cannot be said to be a tax on land as : (a) the impost is not directly on land; and (b) the levy does not concern itself with any aspects of land i. e. extent of land, nature, character, quality or location thereof. In the case of mineral, it is already embedded in the earth and there is no question of any yield in the sense that there would be an annual yield or annual income; in case of tea, it is .. _ also not concerned with the productive qualities of the land; and (c) the levy is not based on the land as a unit. 1745-A; 746-F-HI Sudhir Chandra Nawn v. Wealth Tax Officer. , 1196911SCR108, relied on. 4. 3. Entry 49 of List II, however, should be read in such a manner so that the surface land must have a direct nexus with the sub-soil right which is an inchoate right. Indisputably, sub-soil right would include mineral right. 1742-E-FI 4. 4.

Levy of tax on coal bearing lands and mineral bearing lands where mining operations are being carried out through the process of incline or digging pits is illegal, inasmuch as the underground mining right would be larger in area than the surface right and, thus, it is not possible to uphold the validity of such statute with reference to the extent of the surface right as mineral is being extracted from a larger underground area. Different rights may belong to different persons over the same surface land and similarly different rights may belong to different persons in respect of or over underground rights. The impugned provisions do not specify who would be liable to pay in relation to different rights and who would be considered to be the owner of the land and to what extent. The impugned statutes, having not made any provision of different method of levy, are ultra vires. 1806-A-Cj Amrendra Pratap Singh v. Tej Bahadur Prajapati and Ors. , JT (2003) 9 SC 201 and State ofA. P. etc.

v. National Thermal Power Corpn. ltd and Ors. etc. , 120021 5 SCC 203, referred to. As mineral bearing lands cannot be treated as an independent unit .. in respect of which tax can be invoked, the impugned Acts must be held to be unconstitutional. Besides, minerals extracted and brought to the surface would be treated as personal property and, thus, cannot be the STATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. 589 . ,_ subject-matter of tax on land. 1806-E; 781-AI Palmer v. Corwith 3 Chand (Wis) 297, referred to. Cooley Taxation Vol. 2 Fourth Edition, P. 558 and 564, referred to.. 4. 5. The definition of land and immovable property as contained in the Cess Act, 1880 play an important role insofar as in terms of Section 78 of the West Bengal Primary Education Act and Section 4 of the West Bengal Rural Employment and Production Act, 1976, cess would be levied on all immovable properties on which road and public work cesses are assessed.

Section 5 of the Cess Act, 1880 provides all immovable properties would be liable to road cess and public works cess. The immovable property which is, therefore, not liable to a road cess and public works cess, a fortiori, cannot be subjected to education cess or rural employment cess. 1775-C-DI Buxa Dooars Tea Company Ltd. and Ors. v. State of West Bengal and Ors.. 119891 3 SCC 211, relied on. 4. 6. In view of the definitions of 'land' and 'immovable property' contained in the Bengal Cess Act, 1880, as no road cess or public works cess can be imposed on standing crops or any kind of structures, houses, shops or other buildings which would include factories and workshops for processing tea, no levy by way of cess can be imposed by reason of the impugned Acts either on the mining leasehold or the tea estate containing standing crops as also houses and buildings. 1806-G-H; 807-AI Krishna Mohan (P) Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Ors. , 120031 7 sec 151, referred to.

- regulatory power. [740-D-E) 4. 10. Keeping in view the doctrine of public trust, while imposing a tax on land and in particular, mineral bearing land, the legislature must exercise its power consciously. It, while imposing tax on one subject cannot indirectly levy an impost on other subject. Entry SO of List II authorizes the State to tax mineral rights which has no correlation with the power to tax land. If both the entries are resorted simultaneously, the statutes 11>bear out the same. From the impugned Acts, it cannot be inferred that STATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. 591 the State intended to levy tax both on land and mineral right. (750-G-H; 751-C-EJ M. C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, 11997) I SCC 388; Perumatty Gram Panchayat Perumatty Vandithavalam P. O. , Chettur Taluk represented by its President Sri A. Krishnan v. State ofKera/a and Ors. , W. P. (C) No. 34292/ 2003 (G) decided by Kerala High Court, referred to. 5. 1.

Measure of a tax although may not be determinative of the nature thereof, the same will play an important role in determining the character thereof particularly keeping in view the purpose and object the Parliamentary Acts seek to achieve. In determining the legislative competence, the taxing event also plays an important role. (807-A-BJ State ofOrissa v. Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. , (1995) Supp. 2 SCC 686; Unit Trust of India and Anr. v. P. K. Unny and Ors. , (2001) 249 ITR 612; State ofOrissa v, Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. (1995) Supp. 2 SCC 686; Unit Trust ofIndia and Anr. v. P. K. Unny and Ors. , (2001) 249 ITR 612; Hoechst Pharmaceuticals ltd. v. State ofBihar and Ors. , (1983( 4 SCC 45; S. C. Nawn v. W. TO. , Calcutta, 11969) SCR 108 and Bhagwan Das Jain v. Union of India, (1981) 2 SCR 808 816, referred to. The London County Council and Ors. v. The Attorney General, 1901 Law Report, Appeal Cases 26; Solomon v. New South Wales Sports Club Ltd, 19 Co. L. Rep.

698 and Hylton, Plaintiffin Error v. The United States, US SCR l Law. Ed. Dallas 169, referred to. ; 5. 2. Measure of tax is an indicia for determining the character and nature of tax. Subject of a tax and the measure of a tax have some relationship to determine the question as regards character of legislation. For the purpose of measure of tax only permissible methods of valuation can ·be adopted. (785-A; 786-D-E( A distinction must be borne in mind as regards "use of land" and "activities on land". Use of land as a 'fair' or 'market• is permissible in terms of Entry 26 of List II. Imposition of tax, however, would be impermissible on 'activity on land' as it does not come within the purview of any of the entries contained in List II. A tax imposed on activities on •• land confined to extraction of mineral is clearly beyond the power of the State Legislature. (726-B-C; 798-B( D. G. Gose and Co. v. State of Kera/a. , 119801 2 SCC 410 and Ra/la Ram v.

Province of East Punjab, (1948) FCR 207, referred to. 5. 3. The impugned levy is entirely dependent upon the production of mineral extracted or production of tea leaves which vary from mine to mine or garden to garden or location to location and from year to year. The impugned statutes having not provided for computing the annual value of land in such different situations and, thus, the tax on land being not measurable as an independent unit of the land must be held to be not workable. (747-A, G-Hl 5. 4. The impugned levies are taxes on coal or other minerals raised in the mining areas and not a tax on land as contemplated under Entry 49 of List II. Irrespective of imposition of tax on the land as a unit, the impugned levies have only one consideration, i. e. , production of coal which would, thus fall outside the purview of Entry 49 of List JI. (748-E-FJ 5. 5.

Despite India Cement and Orissa Cement* as also various decisions of this Court, tax has not been imposed taking the land as a unit. An endeavour has been made to levy cess only by changing the measure thereof. The State has not taken recourse to measure for removing the deficiencies in the Acts pointed out by this Court. 1803-F-Gl *India Cement Ltd and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. , 119901 1 SCC 12 and Orissa Cement ltd v. State ofOrissa and Ors. , 119911 Supp. 1 sec 430, relied on. The Workmen of Mis. Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. ofIndia P. Ltd and Ors. v. The Management and Ors. , AIR (1973) SC 1227 and Dharam Duft and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. , (2003) 10 SCALE 141, referred to. 5. 6. A statute will not be valid unless the defects pointed out are removed. Such removal of the defects must be done keeping in view the principle of 'legislative competence'. Even the Parliament could not validate an Act which was enacted without proper legislative competence.

As the measure of tax levied led to the declaration of the law invalid being in pith and substance to be beyond the competence of the State Legislature by reason of the impugned Acts, the levy cannot be said to have been II>· revalidated. They were required to be reenacted but such reenactment must also be in tune with any or other entries made in List II. (795-D-El STATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. 593 6. 1. The principles of reading a judgment are well-known. What is binding in terms of Article 141 of the Constitution oflndia is the ratio ofthe judgment. The ratio decidendi ofa judgment is the reason assigned in support of the conclusion. If the reasons contained in a judgment do not appeal to a subsequent Bench, the matter may be referred to a larger Bench but so long the same is not done, the ratio can neither be watered down nor brushed aside. India Cement, Orissa Cement and other judgments of coordinate benches are binding.

Correctness or otherwise of the said judgments has not :.. been questioned. It would, therefore, not be proper for this Court to read . something in the judgment which does not appear therefrom or to exclude from consideration reasonings on the basis whereof the conclusions of the judgment had been reached. [741-B-OI 6. 2. This Court while inttrpreting binding judgments cannot in effect and substance overrule the same or read down the principle of law enunciated therein. Judicial discipline mandates that binding precedents be followed. Comments made by an author cannot be the basis for ignoring binding decisions of larger Benches. [805-A; 741-A) 7. 1.

The State being owner of the minerals and grant of mineral right being controlled by the Parliamentary statute, namely, the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957, which is a comprehensive Act and a self-contained Code providing for regulation of mines and mineral development including the power to levy tax, the State is denuded of its power to impose any tax on mineral right in terms of Entry 50 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. The terms and conditions including the right to receive royalty, the mode, manner and extent thereof; the limitations in relation thereto as well as enhancement in the quantum thereof are fixed by the statutory provisions, and, thus, the State would be denuded of its power to impose any further levy, impost or tax thereupon. [805-F-G; 703-C; 752-B-FI The Hingir-Rampur Coal Co. Ltd v. State of Orissa. , [1961 [ 2 SCR 537; State of Orissa v. MA. Tulloch and Co. , [19641 4 SCR 461; India Cement Ltd. and Ors. v.

State a/Tamil Nadu and Ors. , [1990[ 1 SCC 12 and Orissa Cement Ltd v. State of Orissa and Ors. , [19911 Supp. 1 SCC 430, relied on. State ofMP. v. Mahalaxmi Fabric Mills Ltd. , [1995) Supp. 1SCC642 and Laxminarayan Mining Co. v. Taluk Dev Board, AIR (1972) MYS 299, referred to. Bank ofNew South Wales v. Common Wealth, 76 CLR 1, referred to. Black's Law Dictionary, referred to. 7. 2. Entry 50 of List II is unique in the sense. that it is the only Entry in all the Entries in the three Lists (List I, II and III) (apart from Entry 37) in the Seventh Schedule where the taxing power of State Legislature has been subjected to "any limitation imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development". Entry 50 of List II is subject to law enacted by Parliament in terms of Entry 54 List I. Grant of mineral rights, undoubtedly, would come within the purview of regulation of mines and minerals development in terms of the 1957 Act.

When a mining lease is granted, consideration for parting with the mineral right would be a part of the terms and conditions thereof. The right to receive royalty is also a mineral right. The power to tax on mineral rights, therefore, would essentially be different from a right to tax on mineral actually extracted. State indisputably receives royalty as a consideration for grant of mining lease in terms of the 1957 Act. As by reason of this Parliamentary legislation in terms of Entry 54 of List I, States have been compensated for parting with the mineral rights, by necessary implication, States' power to levy tax on such rights would also stand denuded. (752-B, E-F; 753-B; 762-D-E] 7. 3. Once it is found that the entire field of legislation is occupied by the Parliament in view ofthe 1957 Act and the declarations contained therein, evidently Entry 50 of List II would not be attracted.

Under the three impugned Acts, taxes have been levied on minerals and not on mineral rights and, thus, the State Legislations cannot be supported in terms of Entry 50 of List II. The charging section is directly referable to production of coal. The claim, thus, would amount to a colourable exercise of power. (755-F; 760-E-G] Bharat Coking Coal v. State of Bihar, (19901 4 SCC 557; K. C. G. Narayan Deo v. State of Orissa, 11954) SCR 1 and Central Coalfields Ltd. and Ors. v. The State ofBihar and Ors. , AIR (1991) Patna 27, referred to. 7. 4. The levy even otherwise cannot be said to be referable to Entry 50 since - (a) it is a levy only on minerals extracted or produced from the coal mines; and (b) it is on quantity of minerals produced from the mining lease. (760-F] 7. 5. The taxing power of the State in terms of Entry 50, List II of the Seventh Schedule must also be viewed from the context that all the mineral STATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD.

595 f rights as also the right to receive royalty by reason of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 and U. P. Zamindari Abolition Act vested in the State. The State thus can not impose a tax on its own right. 1764-IB, Fl 8. 1. Royalty stricto sensu and in common parlance may not be a tax. But having regard to the definition of taxation contained in Clause (28) of Article 366 of the Constitution, there may not be any dispute that royalty being a statutory impost would come within the purview thereof. 1765-F-G; 766-AI ). Quarry Owners' Association v. State of Bihar, 120001 8 SCC 655, referred to. 8. 2. The Second Schedule appended to the 1957 Act states that the royalty would be payable at the rates specified on each tonne of coal. It is, therefore, a levy on the extraction or produce by weight. When the cess is levied on the royalty, the levy, which remains on extraction by weight, is enhanced or incremented. It is, thus, an incremental addition to the royalty.

Its nature and character is the same as that of royalty. The value of the coal or for that matter of green tea leav~s has a direct nexus with the weight thereof. Thus, there may not be any significant distinction in principle between the levy in India Cement's case and levy in the present one. 1766-C-El India Cement ltd and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. , 1199011 sec 12, relied on. lnderjeet Singh Sia/ and Another v. Karam Chand Thapar and Ors. , [19951 6 SCC 166; Ajit Singh v. Union of India and Ors. , [1995) Supp. 4 SCC 224; State of Tamil Nadu v. Hind Stone, 11981) 2 SCC 205 and D. K. Trivedi and Sons and Ors. v. State ofGujarat and Ors. , [1986) Supp. SCC 20, referred to. Coal Matters 9. 1. Coal was the only mineral which was subjected to nationalisaion in terms of Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972 and Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973. Even coal mining leases granted to the lessees stood terminated. by reason ofs.

4A ofMines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 in the year 1976. Fixation ofprice ofcoal by the Central ,,,. Government, regard being had to quality thereof, had all along been subjected to statutory orders. Requirement of maintenance of price of coal on an all India basis had all along been considered to be imperative in the economic >-· .. I and industrial development of the country. [684-G-H; 685-B-C[ 9. 2. Under the Nationalization Acts, except some collieries which belong to the companies engaged in the business of manufacture of steel, all other mines for all intent and purport belong to the public sector companies which are subsidiaries of Coal India Limited. It will be a matter of great concern if the price of coal becomes higher in the State of West Bengal than in other States. (803-E-Fl .. 9. 3.

The definition of mineral is wide a Coal washing plants or cokeoven plants are collieries or coal mines and 'washed coal', 'slurry', sludges and cokes of different grades would also come within the definition of 'coal'. Thus, the owners of the industries like coke-oven plants or coal washeries which may be set-up either within the precincts of a coal mine or outside the same, would be subject to payment of tax on their products although carrying out such operations is controlled and governed by Parliamentary regulatory statutes. Having regard to the definition ofa mine vis-a-vis that of"immovable property" and "land" contained in Cess Act, 1880, reconciliation of imposition of tax on 'coal' and 'tea' is not possible. [795-F-Hl 9. 4. Coal is also an essential commodity in terms of Essential Commodities Act, 1955, and its distribution, marketing as well as price is regulated and controlled by Colliery Control Order 1945 made under the Essential Commodities Act.

As the price of coal is to be determined by the Central Government or the Coal Controller under the Colliery Control Order 1945 which was continued under Essential Commodities Act, 1955 and thus being covered by Entry 33 List III ofthe Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, no tax on coal can be imposed which will have a direct nexus on the value thereof. The impugned Acts must be construed having regard to the other statutes operating in the field. [795-B-DI ,. BRICK-EARTH MATTERS 10. l. In view of the fact that royalty on minor mineral is required to be paid on dispatches, any imposition of tax at the point of dispatch must be held to be bad in law. Despatches of brick-earth from the Raiyati field for manufacture of brick having regard to the process of brick manufacturing would be clearly ultra vires as what is being dispatched is not brick-earth but bricks manufactured on the raiyati lands. Bricks so manufactured cannot be "· the subject matter of land tax.

A tax imposed on the finished product would be excise duty. [768-E-FI ~. STATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. 597 .. Bwca Dooars Tea Company ltd and Ors. v. State ofWest Bengal and Ors. , (1989( 3 sec 211, relied on. India Cement Ltd and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. , (1990( 1 sec 12, referred to. ' 10. 2. Once the quantification of tax is made by reference to quantity of brick-earth or brick dispatched, measure oftax would be based on total value > ofthe mineral dispatched or the material dispatched. The measure ofcess on brick-earth on the dispatches of bricks which is a finished product would not be on dispatches of minerals but on the materials produced from minor mineral and, thus, must be held to be bad in law being beyond the purview of Entry 49 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.

Brick-earth and other minor minerals also being subject to Parliamentary control and regulation in terms of the 1957 Act, the State is denuded of its power to impose any tax thereupon or a product therefrom. (768-G; 769-D-E( 10. 3. Furthermore, the very fact that the methodology of royalty or cess is the same is also a relevant factor for the purpose ofascertaining the nature .. of tax. Tax is, thus, being imposed on the activities on the land and not on the land itself. (769-C( MINOR MINERAL MATTERS: 11. 1. Section 3 of the U. P. Special Area Development Authorities Act, 1986 provides for imposition of cess on mineral rights. Such a cess has been imposed subject to limitations imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development. The SADA Act refers to mineral development which indtsputably is the subject matter of the 1957 Act.

Once the 1957 Act has been made, the power ofthe State to grant lease on the terms and conditions which being provided under the statutes, the State, over and above the amount by way ~f royalty, surface rent, dead rent, fees etc. , cannot realize any other sum. Such an impost would directly come in the way of mineral development. (769-E-G; 770:-E) The Hingir-Rampur Coal Co. Ltd. v. State ofOrissa. , (1961) 2 SCR 537; India Cement Ltd and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. , (1990) 1 SCC 12 and Central Coalfields ltd v. the State ofBihar, AIR (1991) Patna ~_. 27, relied on Western Coalfields ltd v. Special Area Development Authority, Korba and Anr. (19821 1 sec 125, overruled. Jindal Stripe ltd. And Another v. State ofHaryana and Ors. , (20031 8 SCC 60; Bhagatram Rajeev Kumar v. CST, 119951 Supp I SCC 673 and State ofBihar v. Bihar Chamber ofCommerce, 119961 9 SCC 136, referred to. ' 11. 2.

In terms of Entry 5 of the State List, the State cannot be held to have the legislative competence to levy tax on major mineral or minor mineral, as the case may be, as the field is covered by the 1957 Act and the rules framed thereunder and, thus, it cannot delegate the said power in favour of the statutory authority. 1770-B-Cl 11. 3. A local authority has no right over the mineral or the mineral right. The power to impose tax on mineral right or mine and mineral cannot be bestowed by the State upon a local authority by delegation of power or otherwise. The said power per se does not fall within the purview of Entry 5. The statutory authorities having regard to the provisions contained in Entry 5 may be delegated with the power to impose tax on land and buildings etc. which would have a direct nexus for which such authority has been constituted but not on 'mineral right' which is vested in the State.

Besides, even the State is denuded of its power to impose any tax on mineral right or mines and minerals having regard to the provisions of the 1957 Act. 1770-F-H; 771-A-BJ 11. 4. Conceptually fee and tax stand on different footings; whereas the . element of tax is based on the principle of compulsory exaction, the concept of fee relates to the principle ofquidpro quo. No material having been brought on record that any services invoking the principles ofquidpro quo are rendered to the owners of the mine, the impost cannot also be upheld on the ground that the same is a fee within the meaning of Entry 66, List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. (771-D; 772-C-DI 11. 5. Keeping in view the decisions of this Court, the SADA Act cannot be held to have been validly enacted in terms of Entry 50, List II.

Once levy on mineral right contravenes the limits imposed by the Parliament, the question of upholding its validity in terms of Entry 50 or for that matter in terms of Entry 49, would not arise. The cess levied under SADA Act will have a direct effect on royalty and ultimately the value of the mineral. Even otherwise, in terms of the provisions of Zamindari Abolition Act, the mineral right has vested in the State. Mineral right, therefore, cannot be subject matter of taxation as the State cannot impose a tax on itself. (771-F-H; 769-F-GI STATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. 599 Hingir-Rampur Coal Co. ltd. v. State of Orissa.. 119611 2 SCR 537 and Central Coalfields ltd. v. The State ofBihar, AIR 1991 Patna 27, relied on. Tea Matters: 12. 1. Sections lO and 30 of the Tea Act clearly show that not only the production of tea by way of manufacture in a factory but also cultivation thereof is under the Union control.

The fields of legislation relating to agriculture and imposition of tax on land, which belong to the State legislature, have been taken away by Entry 52 List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution read with Article 253 thereof. 1773-B-q Buxa Dooars Tea Company ltd. and Ors. v. State of West Bengal and Ors. , 119891 3 SCC 211, relied on. 12. 2. Tea industry is not only a controlled industry b~t also a declared one, and the Tea Act, having been enacted in terms of Entries 10 and 14 of List I as also A11icle 253, the State's power to make any law dealing with tea including levy of any tax on any types of tea which would include green tea leaves would completely be denuded, as a tax either in terms of Entries 14, 18 or 49 of List II would affect the said commodity.

The expression 'tea' should be give~,,a broad meaning and Entry 52 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution should be interpreted in relation to tea having regard to the purport and object it seeks to achieve. The definition oftea is "for the purposes of the Act" which would mean for all the purposes of the Act. 1807-B-C; 773-E-FI Maganbhai /shwarbhai Patel v. Union ofIndia and Anr. , AIR (1969) SC 783; State of Bihar v. Bihar Chamber ofCommerce, 119961 9 SCC 136 and H. L. Sud, Income Tax Officer, Companies Circle /(/), Bombay v. Tata Engineering and locomotive Co. ltd. , AIR 1969 SC 319, relied on. MK. Kochu Devassy v. State ofKerala etc.. 1197912 SCC 117, referred to. 12. 3. In the instant case, tax has been imposed not on the tea estate as a unit but on the activities on land inasmuch as growing of tea would be such activity which having regard to the provisio. ns of the Tea Act squarely falls within the purview of Entry 52, List I.

Imposition of cess calculated on value of coal, tea etc. is beyond the legislative competence of the State. 1796-C-D; 798-A) 12. 4. If a tea estate is taken to be a unit and green tea leaves are taken as the measure of tax on land comprising the tea estate, the levy of cess can never be uniform and will have no nexus with the land as the land used for factory, workshop and the houses for persons employed in the tea estate have no contribution to the production of tea leaves which have nexus only with the land where tea plants are grown which produce green tea leaves. Apart from this, in a tea estate, there are fallow land, nursery and other areas apart from the factory, workshop, and house where cultivation oftea bushes or plant are not possible. By use of the so-called measure of production of tea leaves, such lands would remain outside the levy of cess. Nexus between the levy and the measure of the levy is lost in the present case.

The impugned levy is a tax only on production oftea leaves and hence beyond the competence ofthe State. 1785-H; 786-A-B; 787-A-Bl District Council ofthe Jowai Autonomous Dist/. v. Dwet Singh Rymbi, 119861 4 sec 38, referred to. 12. 5. Measure of tax by way oflevy ofcess must also have a direct nexus with the point of taxation. In the instant case, tax is levied on green tea leaves which is produced out of an activity on land and which has no bearing with the tax on land as a unit. Thus, the point at which such tax is levied may also provide for a relevant factor for the purpose of judging the legislative competence of the State. [788-E-FI Diamond Sugar Mills Ltd. and Anr. v. The State of VIiar Pradesh and Anr. , 1196113 SCR 242, relied on. Goodyear India ltd v. State of Hmyana, AIR (1990) SC 781 119901 p 2 sec 71, referred to. 12. 6.

In "Goodricke Group" the Court assumed that 'green tea leaves' was not marketable and proceeded on the basis that 'green tea leaves' has no nexus with the control over production of tea. If it is held that 'green tea leaves' is a raw material for production of tea or use thereof is necessary for processing it, the same would be a marketable commodity. 1776-AI As 'green tea leaves' is marketable, the decision in Goodricke group having mainly been rendered on the premise that 'green tea leaves' was not marketable must be held to have passed sub-silentio and, thus, does not lay down correct legal position. 1806-F-GI STATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. [R. C. LAHOTI, J. ) 60\ Goodricke Group ltd and Ors. v. State ofWest Bengal and Ors. , 11995) Supp. I SCC 707, overruled. Kunnathat Thathunni Moopil Nair etc. v. St(Jle of Kgrala and Anr. , 11961 I 3 SCR 77, referred to. CIVIL APPELLATE. JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 1532-1533 of 1993. From the Judgment and Order dated 25. 11.

92 of the Calcutta High Court in A. No. Nil of 1992 Arising out of Matter No, 1224/91 and A. No. Nil of 1992. WITH C. A. Nos. 3518-3519, 5149-54/92, 2350/93, 7614/94, 298, 299, 297/ 2004, W. P. (C) Nos. 262, 515, 641, 642/97, 347, 360199,50, 553/2000, 207, 288, 3891200I, 81/2003, 247, 412/95, C. A. Nos, 5027, 6643-6650, 68941 2000, l 077 of 200I. Mukul Rohtagi, Additional Solicitor General, Rakesh Dwivedi, B. Sen, Bhaskar P Gupta, Dipankar P. Gupta, A. K. Ganguli, M. N, Krishnamani, R. Venkatarmani, Dr. Debi Pal, V. R. Reddy, K. K. Saha, Ms. Niranjana Singh, Dayan Krishnan, Dilip Sinha, J. R. Das, S. Misra, G. Biswal, Abhishek Chaudhary, Ms. Shruti Chaudhury, Ms. Sumita Goel, Suman J. Khaitan, D. Manda! , Gaurab K. Banerjee, Ms. Sangeeta Manda! , Kapil Chaudhary, Ms. Swati Sinha, lndranil Ghosh, Arvind Verma, Ms. Jayasree Singh, Ms. Vineeta Bharadwaj, Ms. Mamta Tiwari, Pramod Kumar, Arvind Kumar Gupta, G. S. Chatterjee, P. Venugopal, P. S. Sudheer, K. J. John, Rana Mukherjtte,.

Siddharth Gautam, Goodwil lndeevar, Bijan Kumar Ghosh, Sushi! Kumar Jain, Prakash Shrivastava Prateek Jalan, Ms. Ruby Singh Ahuja, Ms. Bina Gupta, S. Ravi Shankar, S. Jayasinha, Arun, Ms. Rekha Pandey, A. Mariarputham, Ms. Neera Gupta, D. S. Mehra, Bijan Kumar Ghosh, Anip Sachthey, Ajit Kumar Sinha, Raj Kumar Gupta, Sheo Kumar Gupta, A. N. Bardiyar, Ms. Anil Katiyar, T. C. Sharma, Ms. Neelam Sharma, Ajay Sharma, H. K. Puri, S. K. Puri, Ujjwal Banerjee, Ms. Anindita Gupta, U. A. Rana, Ms. Anuradha Priyadarshini, Shreekant N. Terdol, B. V. Balaram Das, Ajay K. Agrawal, Ms. Atka Agrawal, Gaurav Jain, Ms. Abha Jain for the appearing parties. The Judgments of the Court were delivered by • _.. R. C. LAHOTI, J. This batch of matters, s~me appeals by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution and some writ petitions filed in this Court, raise a few questions of constitutional significance centering around ).

Entries 52, 54 and 97 in List I and Entries 23, 49, 50 and 66 in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India as also the extent and purport of the residuary power of legislation vested in the Union of India. Cesses on coal bearing land, levied in exercise of the power conferred by State Legislation, have been struck down by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court. In exercise ofthe same power conferred by State legislation whereunder cesses were levied on coal bearing land, cesses have also been levied on tea plantation land which are the subject-matter of writ petitions filed in this ... . ,.. Court. The Bengal Brickfield Owners' Association have also come up to this Court by filing a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, laying challenge to the same cesses levied on the removal of brick earth. These three sets of matters arise from West Bengal. The High Court of Allahabad has upheld the constitutional validity of cess levied in the State of U. P.

on minor minerals which decisions are the subject-matter of civil appeals filed under Article 136 of the Constitution. For the sake of convenience, we would call these matters, respectively as (A) 'Coal Matters', (B) 'Tea Matters', (C) 'Brick Earth Matters', and (D) 'Minor Mineral Matters'. Inasmuch as the basic constitutional questions arising for decision in all these matters are the same, all the matters have been heard analogously. ~ .. We would first set out the facts in brief and so far as relevant for appreciating the issues arising for decision and thereafter deal with the same. (A) Col Matters A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court has, vide its judgment dated 25. 11. 92 reported as Kesoram Industries Ltd (Textiles Division) v. Coal India Ltd, AIR (1993) Calcutta 78, struck down certain levies by way of cess on coal as unconstitutional for want of legislative competence in the State Legislature.

Feeling aggrieved, the State of West Bengal has come up in appeal by special leave. The levies which are the subject matter of challenge are as under: The Cess Act, 1880 "S. 5 All immovable property to be liable to a road cess and public works cess. From and after the. commencement of this Act in any district or part of a district, all immovable property situate therein except as otherwise in (Section 2) provided, shall be liable to the payment of a road cess and a public works cess. " STATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. (R. C. LAHOTI, J. ] 603 "S. 6 Cesses how to be assessed The road cess and the public works cess [shall be assessed - (a) in respect of lands on the annua,I Y! \lue thereof, (b) in respect of all mines and quarries, on the annual dispatches therefrom, and, (c) in respect of tramways, railways and other immovable property, on the annual net profit thereof, ascertaineQ respectively as in this Act prescribed.

] and the rates at which such cesses respectively shall be levied for each year shall be determined for such ye11r in the manner in this Act prescribed: Provided that - (I) the rates of such road cess and public works cess shall not exceed six paise and twenty-five paise respectively on each rupee of such annual value, (2) the rates of each of such. roacl cess and public works cess shall not exceed- (i) fifty paise on each tonne of coal, minerals or sand of such annual dispatches, and (ii) six paise on each rupel,l of such annual net profits, Explanation. For the purposes of this proviso, one tonne of coke shall be counted as one and a quarter tonne of coal. " 2. West Bengal Primary Education Act, 1973 "78. Education cess. -{I) All immovable properties on which road and public works cesses are assessed, [or all such properties which are liable to such assessment] according to the provisions of the Cess Act, 1880, shall be liable to the payment of education cess.

(2) The rate of the education cess shall be determined by the state Government by notification and shall not exceed - (a) [in respect of lands, other than a tea estate] ten paise on each rupee of the annual value thereof; (aa) xxx xxx xxx (b) in respect of coal mines [five per centum of the value of coal] on the dispatches therefrom; (c) in respect of quarries and mines other than coal mines, [one rupee on each tonne of materials or minerals other than coal on the annual dispatches therefrom) ...

Explanation-For the purpose ofclause (b) the expression 'value of coal' shall mean- (i) in the case of dispatches of coal as a result of sale thereof, the prices charged by the owner of a coal mine for such coal, but excluding any sum separately charged as tax, cess, duty, fee or royalty for payment of such sum to Government to a local body, or any other sum as may be prescribed or (ii) in the case of dispatches other than those referred to in item (i), the prices chargeable by the owner of a coal mine for such ). coal if they were dispatched as a result of sale thereof, but ... excluding any sum separately chargeable as tax, cess, duty, fee or - royalty for payment of such sum to Government or a local body or any other sum as may be prescribed: Provided that if more than one price is chargeable for the same variety of coal, the maximum price chargeable for that variety of coal shall be taken as the basis of valuation for the purpose of this item. " 3.

West Bengal Rural Employment and Production Act, 1976. "S. 4. Rural employment cess. (I) On and from the commencement of this Act, all immovable properties on which road and public work cesses [are assessed or liable to be assessed) according to the provisions of the Cess Act, 1880, shall be liable to the payment of rural employment cess; Provided that on raiyat who is exempted from paying revenue in respect of his holding under clause (a) of sub-sec. (I) of S. 23B ofthe West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 shall be liable to pay rural employment cess. "' ~ I STATE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. (R. C. LAHOTI, J.

] 605 (2) The rural employment cess shall be levied annually - (a) [in respect of lands, other than a tea estate,] at the rate of six paise on each rupee of development value thereof; (aa) xxx xxx xxx (b) in respect of coal mines, at the rate of [thirty-five paise per centum] on each tonne of coal on the xxx dispatches therefrom; (c) in respect of mines other than coal mines and quarries, [at the rate of fifty paise on each tonne of materials other than coal on the annual dispatches therefrom] Exp/anation. -For the purpose of clause (b) the expression 'value of coal' shall mean.

- (i) in the case of dispatches of coal as a result of sale thereof, the prices charged by the owner of a coal mine for such coal but excluding any sum separately charged as tax, cess, duty, fee or royalty for payment of such sum to Government or a local body, or any other sum as may be prescribed, or -· (ii) in the case of dispatches, other than those referred to in item (i), the prices chargeable by the owner of a coal mine for such coal if they were dispatched as a result of sale thereof, but excluding any sum separately chargeable as tax, cess, duty, fee or royalty for payment of such sum to Government or a local body, or any other sum as may be prescribed: Provided that if more than one price is chargeable for the same variety of coal, the maximum price charg