THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL v. MRS. BELA BANERJEE AND OTHERS
Citation: [1954] 1 S.C.R. 558; 1953 INSC 85
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: M. PATANJALI SASTRI , MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, GHULAM HASAN, B. JAGANNADHADAS
Judgment date:
Case summary
1953 INSC 85. Supreme Court of India judgment dated 1953-12-11. THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL v. MRS. BELA BANERJEE AND OTHERS. Read the judgment and case...
Judgment text
1953 The Union of India v. Madan Gopal Kabra. Palaf! fali Sastri C. J. 1953 55S SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1954} disappeared except, of course, in regard to matters m which such distinction has been preserved by the Constitution itself, e. g. , by article 238 and article 371. It follows that the amendment of section 2 clause (14-A) of the Indian Act, by the Finance Act, 1950, so as to authorise the levy of tax on income accruing in the territory of Rajasthan in the year 1949-50 is within the competence of Parliament and therefore valid. We accordingly allow the appeal, and set aside the judgment of the High Court. We make no order as to costs. Appeal allowed. Agent for the appellant : G. H. Rajadhyaksha. Agent for the. respondent : Rajinder Narain. THE ST A TE OF 'WEST BENGAL v. MRS. BELA BANERJEE AND OTHERS. rPATANJALI sAsTRI c. J. , MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, S. R. DAs, GHULAM HASAN and JAGANNADHAD. \S JJ. J ? 'he rv est Ren gal Land Dcvelopn1ent and Planning Act, 194!!
(West Bengal Act XX/ of 1948)-Provisions of s. 8-(i) Decla- ration under s. 6-Conclusive evidence-I~and-Subject 1natter of decla1·ation needed for a public purposc-(ii) Con1pensation of land acquired under the Act not to exceed nzarket value of land as on Dece1nber 31, 1946-ultra Yires the Constitution and void-Contti· tution of India, ai·t. 31(2). T'he \\Test Bengal Land l)evelop1nent and Planning Act, 1948, passc the President for his certification, it was a law to which the provisions of clause ( 6) did not apply and, therefore, as ·an existing law, the impugned Act was not affected by clause (2) of that article. The argu- ment is manifestly unsound. Article 31(6) is intended to save a State law enacted within 18 months before the commencement of the Constitution provided the same was certified by tht President while, article 31 (5) saves all existing laws passed more than 18 months before the commencement of the Cof)stitntion.
Reading the two clanses together, the intention is clear that an existing law passed within 18 months before January 26, 1950, is not to be saved unless it was submitted to the President within three months from such date for his certification and was certified by him. The argument, if accepted, would reduce article 31(6) to ameaningless redundancy. The only serious controversy in the appeal centred round the constitutionality of the "condition" in proviso (b) to section 8 limiting the compensation payable so as not to exceed the market value of the lorn! on December 31, 1946. The Attorney-General, while conceding that the word "compensation'' taken by itself must mean a full and fair money equivalent, urged that, in the context of article 31 (2) read with entry No.
42 of List III of the Seventh Schedule, the term was not used in any rigid sense importing equiva- lence in value but had reference to what the legisla- ture might think was a proper indemnity for the loss sustained by the owner. Article 31(2) provides : No property, movable or immovable, including any interest in, or in any company owmg, any- commercial or industrial undertaking, shall be taken possession of or acquired for public purposes under any law authorising the taking of such possession or such acquisition, unless the law provides for • • ,. S. C. R. · SUPREME COURT REPORTS 563 compensation for the property taken possession of or acquired and either fixes the amount of the compen- sation, or specifies the principles on which, and the manner in which, the compensation is to be deter- mined and given.
and entry 42 of List III reads thus : Principles on which compensation for property ac- quired or requisitioned for the purposes of the Union or of a State or for any other public purpose is to be determined, and the form and the manner in which such compensation is to be given. It is argued that the term "compensation" m mtry 42 could not mean full cash equivalent, for then, the power conferred on the legislature to lay down the principles on which compensation is to be determined and the form and the manner in which such compen- sation is to be given would be rendered nugatory. On the other hand, the entry showed that the compensa- tion to be "given" was only "such co111pensation" as was determined on the principles laid down by the law enacted in exercise of the power, and, as the conclud- ing words used in article 31(2) are substantially the same as in the entry, the Constitution, it was claimed, left scope for legislative discretion m determining the measure of the indemnity.
We are unable to agree with this view. While it is true that the legislature is given the discretionary power of laying down the principles which · should govern the determination of the amount to be given to the owner for the property appropriated, such princi- ples must ensure tl\at what is determined as payable must be compensation, that is, a just equivalent of what the owner has been deprived of. Within the limits of this basic requirement of full indemnification of the expropriated owner, the Constitution allows free play to the legislative judgment as to what princi- ples should guide the determination of the amount payable. Whether such principles take into account all the elements which make up the true value of the · property appropriated and exclude matters which are 1953 The State O H'est Bengal v. Bela Banerjee· and Others- Patanjali Sastrf- C. J. 1953 The State of ·Wesl Bengal v. Bela BanerJe1 and OtherJ. Palanjali Sastri C. J.
564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1954] to be neglected, is a justiciable issue to be adjudicated by the court. This, indeed, was not disputed. Reference was made to certain Australian cases where the opinion was expressed that the terms of compulsory acquisition of property were matters of legislative policy and judgment. The decisions largely turned on the absence of any· constitutional prohibi- tion in regard to deprivation of private property with- out compensation as in the Fifth Amendment of the American Constitution and on the use of the words "just terms" instead of "compensation" in section 51 (xxxi) of the Commonwealth Constitution which con- ferred power on the Parliament to make laws with respect to "the acquisition of property on just terms from any State or person ...... " (cf. Grace Brothers Pty. Ltd. v. The Commonwealth(')). Those decisions, therefore, are of no assistance to the appellant here.
Turning now to the provisions relating to compensa- tion under the impugned Act, it will be seen that the latter part of the proviso to section 8 limits the amount of compensation so as not to exceed the market value of the land on December 31, 1946, no matter when the land is acquired. Considering that the impugned Act is a permanent enactment and lands may be acquired under it many years after it came in- to force, the fixing of the market value on December 31, 1946, as the ceiling on compensation, without refer- ence to the value of the land at the time of the ac- qumt10n is arbitrary and cannot be regarded as due compliance in letter and spirit with the requirement of article 31 (2).
The fixing of an anterior date for the ascertainment of value may not, in certain circums- tances, be a ·violation of the constitutional requirement as, far instance, when the proposed scheme of acquisi- tion becomes known before it is launched and prices rise sharply in anticipation of the benefits to be derived under it, but the fixing of an anterior date, which might have no relation to the value of the land when it is acquired, may be, many years later, cannot but be regarded as arbitrary. The learned Judges (1) 72 C. L. R. 269. .. S. C. R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 565 below· observe that it is common knowledge that since the end of the war land, particularly around Calcutta, has increased enormously in value and might still further increase very considerably in value ·when the pace of industrialisation increases. Any principle for determining compensation which denies to the owner this increment in value cannot result in the .
ascertain- ment of the true equivalent of the land appropriated. We accordingly hold that the latter part of proviso (b) to section 8 of the impugned Act which fixes the market value on December 31, 1946, as the maximum compensation for lands acquired under it offends against the provisions of article 31 (2) and is unconstitutional and void. The appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed. Agent for the appellant : P. K. Bose. Agent for respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 : S. C. Banerjee. Agent for the intervener: C. H. Rajadhyaks? a. WARYAM SINGH AND ANOTHER v. AMARNATH AND ANOTHER. [MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J. , B. K. MuKHERJF. A, S. R. DAs, VIVIAN BosE and GHULAM HASAN JJ. J Constitution of India, art,·. 227 and 241-High Court-Whe- ther conferred power of judicial superintendence-Rent Controller and District fudge-Whether Tribunals within the meaning of art. 227-East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act (III of 1949) as extended to Himachal Pradesh, s.
13(2)(i), Proviso- Non-payment of arrears of rent on first hearing of application for ejectment-Legal effect thereof. The Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Himachal Pradesh exercises jurisdiction in relation to the \Vhole of the territories of Himachal Pradesh. The Rent Control and the District Judge exercising juris· diction under the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act, 1949, are certainly tribunals if not courts within the meaning of art. 227 of the Constitution and they' function within the territories of 1953 TM State of· West Bengal and Othtrs. Patanjali Sastrf C. J. 1954 Jan. 19·.
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