THOTA SESHARATHAMMA AND ANR. v. THOTA MANIKYAMMA (DEAD) BY LRS. AND ORS

Citation: [1991] 3 S.C.R. 717

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: N.M. KASLIWAL, K. RAMASWAMY

Case summary

the suit properties f' after the lifetime of the defendant and challenged the right of the defendant to execute any will in respect of the suit properties....

Judgment text

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KASLIWAL, J. In the above appeal and Special Leave Petitions questipn has been raised about the ambit and scope of Sec. 14(1) and 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). Before adverting to the legal question, it would be proper to narrate in short the facts of each case. Civil Appeal No. 630 of1981 Thota Madhav Rao, the plaintiff filed ·a suit against Thota Manikyamma on the allegation that the plaintiff's father Yellamanda and the defendant's husband Late Venkata Subbayya·were brothers. As the defendant and her husband had no issue they brought up the plaintiff as their foster son from the age of eight years and thereafter the plaintiff continued to live with them and was brought up treating him as their own son. Venkata Subb~yya died on 14. 1. 1932 and before his death he executed a will beq ,,cathing the suit properties'. in favour of his wife Smt.

Thota Manikyamma for her life with a vested remainder in favour of the plaintiff. Both the parties lived together with perfect understanding but after some time there was misunderstanding and the defendant assumed hostile attitude towards the plaintiff and began to claim the suit property as her absolute property. the defendant also executed a registered will on 26. 10. 69 bequeathing the suit properties in favour of one Ramisetti Koteswar Rao. T\te plaintiff ·j .. in these circumstances claimed absolute right in. the suit properties f' after the lifetime of the defendant and challenged the right of the defendant to execute any will in respect of the suit properties. The defendant took the plea that her husband died issueless and intestate and did not execute any will at any time. Neither she nor her husband brought up the plaintiff as their foster son nor did they educate him.

The defendant had brought up Ramisetti Koteswar Rao, who is her nephew, from his childhood and performed his marriage. On account of love and affection for him and his children, the defendant executed a registered will on 26. 10. 69 bequeathing all her properties in his favour.. The Trial Court held the will dated 14. 1. 1932 proved and decreed the plaintiff's suit. The First Appellate Court upheld the Judgment and decree of the Trial Court. The defendant preferred a second appeal in the High Court. During the pendency of the Second Appeal in the SESHARATHAMMA v. MANIKYAMMA [KASLIWAL. J. J 725 High Court the plaintiff died and his legal representatives were brought on record. The High Court by Judgment dated 24. 8. 1979 allowed the second appeal and dismissed the suit with costs throughout. The legal representatives of the plaintiff have come to this Court by --t grant of special leave.

The question \nvolved is whether the life interest in the property acquired by Thota Manikyamma under the will executed by her husband and continued to be in her possession became her absolute property under' Sec. 14(1) of the Act. Special Leave Petition (C) No. 438 of 1979 One Meenammal is the wife of Ovi Reddiar. Married life between Ovi Reddiar and his wife was not happy and cordial. Ovi Red- ~· diar executed a registered will exhibit A-4 dated 21. 3. 1921 bequeathing all his properties including the suit properties in favour of his mother and sister for their lifetime and thereafter in favour ,,f Ramalinga Reddiar and Dhanush Koti Reddiar, the two sons of his sister and their issues. In the said will reference was made rer;arding the conduct of Meenammal in deserting him and in any event if she changed her mind and agreed to live under the protection of the.

legatees she was allowed to enjoy the income from item I of the suit properties and that she should construct a house in item referred to in ",the will and to live there during her lifetime and after her death the said Item I and the house site with the house shall go to the above mentioned Ramalinga Reddiar and Dhanush Koti Reddiar. Ovi Reddiar died in 1922 and thereafter the legatees under the will entered into possession of all the properties. Smt. Meenammal put obstruction to the legatees in getting possession. l There was some criminal litigation between Smt. Meenammal and the legatees under Sec. 145 Cr. P. C. which resulted in favour of the legatees (exhibit A-1). Smt. Meenammal then filed a suit in 1923 praying for a declaration that the will made by her husband was not valid and as such be cancelled and for possession and mesne profits and in the alternative she claimed for maintenance both past and future. In the said suit the parties entered into .

a compromise and a compromise .... _ decree was passed on 5. 3. 1924, vide (exhibit A-1). Under the terms of said compromise the execution of the will was accepted and the same was made subject to the terms of the compromise decree. Under the compromise decree it was agreed that Smt. Meenammal would enjoy items 1 & 2 of the properties mentioned in the will and also 50 cents of land during her lifetime. She would also have an enjoyment of the 726 5\;PRf. ME COURT REPORTS [1991] 3 S. C. R. house site during he, 1;. i. mc without any right of alienation. Dhanush Koti died unmarriecl i11 ·1. 1. 1 but during his lifttime he sold his interest in the properties in faHM. of Ramalinga Reddiar. Ramalinga Reddiar . died in 1962. On his dGatll the petitioners before this Court being the sons and daughters of Ramalinga Reddiar daimed to have become • {.... entitled for all the properties of Ramalinga Reddiar including the rights in the suit property. Smt.

Meenammal during her lifetime executed a settlement deed in favour of the respondents before this Court giving absolute rights in the suit oroputies. The petitioners before this Court filed a suit against Smt. Meenammal and the respondents for declaration that the settlement deed (exhibit A-10) executed hy Smt. Meenammal will not enure beyond the lifetime of Smt. Meenammal. Smt. Meenammal contested the suit and took the plea .... that the limited interest given to her under the compromise decree had 'i become enlarged into absolute right by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act. The Trial Court decreed the suit and it was affirmed in first appeal. Smt. Meenammal having died, the respondents in this COurt preferred a second appeal in the High Court of Judicature at Madros. The High Court allowed the Second Appeal and dismissed. the suit filed by the petitioners. The petitioners in these circumstances have filed the ' S. L. P. under Article 136 of the Constitution ofindia. S. L. P. (C) No.

2113 of 1980 The suit properties as well as some other properties originally belonged to one Ramalinga Udayar. He had two wives, namely, Alamolu and Saraswati. the first wife Alamolu was living awa~ from her husband. Ramalinga dtd not have any issue from both the wives. Ramalinga being attached with one Siva Subramania the petitioner before us executed a will on 2. 7. 1945 bequeathing his properties in favour of his second wife Saraswati for her lifetime and thereafter, absolutely in favour of Siva Subramania. A provision was also made for the payment of Rs. 68 and a direction to make available 18 kalams of paddy in favour of Alamolu for her lifetime. In order to ensure the payment of the maintenance and delivery of paddy a charge was also created over the properties to go ultimately in favour of Siva Subramania Udayar. As Siva Subramania Udayar was a minor at that time the second wife Smt. Saraswati was appointed as his guardian. Ramalinga died on 8. 7.

45 and subsequently his first wife Alamolu was awarded 50 kalams of paddy and a sum o! Rs. 250 in cash per annum by way of maintenance. On appeal the High Court modified the decree of the Trial Court and enhanced the maintenance to Rs. 480 per annum SESHARATHAMMA v. MANIKYAMMA IKASLIWAL, J. ) 727 and directed Siva Subramania the legatee under the will to give one building for the residence of Alamolu. Thereafter in 1951 Alamolu sought the recovery of possession of one of the buildings and the Executing Court allotted to her the eastern house backyard and the shops. The second wife Saraswati preferred an appeal to the High Court against the above order of the executing court. A compromise was entered into between the parties in the High Court. According to the terms of compromise Alamolu was permitted to occupy the eastern house together with the two shops but the backyard portion was not given.

Alamolu, however remained in possession of that portion as well, where some coconut trees were standing. Lateron Saraswati was removed from the guardianship of Siva Subramania Udayar, and natural father was appointed as his guardian. Alamolu died on 2. 2. 1966. The respondents before us are brother's grandsons of Alamolu. Alamolu settled the suit properties in favour of one Chandrashekhar Udayar claiming title to the same in pursuance to a compromise in A. A. 0. 567 of 1950. Ramayya Mudaliar another respondent before us initially took on lease the properties from Chandrashekhar and lateron purchased the eastern half of the building and backyard portion. Siva Subramania Udayar challenged these transactions on the grounds that Alal)lolu was given a right of residence only in the building and the same lasted till her lifetime and such • right could never be enlarged into an absolute right.

The settlement deed made by her in favour of Chandrashekhar Udayar and the sale made by Chandrashekhar in favour of Ramaiah were invalid and no title could be conveyed by Alamolu in their favour. Siva Subramania Udayar as such filed a suit for recovery of possession of the suit properties with mesne profits. The Trial Court held that Alamolu was not the absolute owner of the suit properties as contemplated under Section 14(2) of the Act. The suit as such was decreed in favour of the plaintiff Siva Subramania Udayar. Learned Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the appeal. On a Letters Patent Appeal the Division Bench of the High Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit. The plaintiff Siva Subramania Udayar has filed the S. L. P. under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. The controversy raised in these cases is almost settled by a number of decisions of this Court.

However, Learned counsel for the appellant in the appeal as well as Learned counsel for the petitioners in the Special Leave Petitions have raised an argument, placing reliance, on Mst. Karmi v. Amru and Ors. , [1972] 4 SCC 86 that the life estate given to a widow under the will of her husband cannot become an absolute estate under the provisions of the Hindu succession Act, as such we consider it proper to deal with this case in the light of other cases decided by this Court. Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 reads as under: 14"(1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, 8 shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. Explanation--In this sub-section, "property" includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person.

Whether'a relative or not, before, at or after. her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purcbase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act. (2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order or a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property". The contention raised is that if a female Hindu acquires any property under a will which gives her a restricted estate in such property then provisions of sub-section (2) will override, the provisions of sub- J . ~ section (1) of Section 14 of,the Act which makes a female Hindu as full owner. In Badri Persiuzd v. Smt. Kan. so Devi, [1970] 2 SCR 95 a Bench of three Judges considered the questio!

1 in detail. In the above case a Hindu having self acquired properties, died in 1947 leaving five sons and a widow. On a dispute between the parties an Arbitrator was appointed in 1950. The Arbitrator gave an award and a decree was passed in terms of award. Under the award the widow was given widow's estate. It was held that the widow inherited the property under Section 3 (1) of the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937 and was in possession of it within the meaning of the word possession in Section 14(1) of the Act and when by an award her share was separated by metes and bounds, she also acquired the property within SESHARATHAMMA v. MANIKYAMMA [KASLIWAL, J. [ 729 the meaning of that section. It was held that she had become full owner of the property in her possession under Section 14(i) on the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, even though previously she . . :twas a limited owner.

It was clearly held in the above case that Section 14(2) of the Act is in the nature of a proviso or an exception to Section 14(1) and comes into operation only if acqu,isiti! >n in any of the methods indicated therein is made for the first time without there being any pre-existing right in . the female Hindu to the property. The Bench consisted of Hon. J. C. Shah, V. Ramaswamy andA. N. Grover, JJ. "" .. ( The case of Mst. Karmi v·. Amru and Others, (supra) . on which reliance has now been placed by Learned Counsel for the appellant and petitioners was also decided by a Bench of three Judges Hon. J. C. Shah, K. S. Hegde and A. N. Grover, JJ. It may be noted that two Hon'ble Judges, namely, J. C. Shah and A. N. Grover were common to both the cases. In Mst. Karmi v. Amru an4 Others,. one Jaimal died in 1938 leaving his wife Nihali. His son Ditta pre-deceased him. Appel- #. ! ant in the above case was the daughter of Ditta and the respondents were collaterals of Jaimal.

Jaimal first executed a will dated 18. 12. 1935 ..... , and by a subsequent will dated 13. 11. 1937 revoked the first will. By the second will a life estate was given to Nihali and thereafter the property was made to devolve on Bhagtu and Armu collaterals. On the death of Jaimal in· 1938, properties were mutuated in the uame of Nihali. Nihali died in 1960/61. The appellant Mst. Karmi claimed right on the basis of a will dated 25. 4. 1958 executed by Nihali in h. er favour. It was held that the life estate given to a widow under the will of her __\ husband cannot become an absolute estate under the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act. Thereafter, the appellant cann~t claim title to the properties on the basis of the will executed by the Widow Nihali in her favour. It is a short Judgment without adverting to any provisions of Sections 14(1) or 14(2) of . the Act.

The Judgment neither makes any mention of any argument raised in this regard nor there is any mention of the earlier decision in Badri Pershad v. Smt. Kanso Devi, (supra}. The decision in Mst. Karmi & Anr. cannot be considered as an authority on the ambit and scope of Sections 14( I} and (2) of the Act. '-'- The controversy regarding sub-Section (1) and (2) of Section 14 of the Act again came up for consideration in V. Tu/samma & Ors. v. V. Sesha Reddy (dead) by Lrs. , [1977] 3 SCR 261. This case was also. decided by a Bench of three Judges. In this case the controversy now raised before us was considered in detail. All the earlier cases were considered including Badri Prasad v. Smt. Kanso Devi, (supra) and the ratio of this case was followed and approved in V. Tulsamma'; case. Hon'ble Bhagwati, J. who wrote the leading judgment dealt with the question in detail and after applying the mind to the controversy decided the same in a well considered manner. V.

Tulsamma'; case again was discussed in extenso and followed in Bai Vajia (dead) b)\ L. Rs. v. Thakorbhai Chelabhai & Ors. , (1979] 3 SCR 291, by a Bench of three Judges. The same view has been consistently adopted in long series of cases of this Court and to mention a few of them are Jagannathan Pillai v. Kunjithapadam Pillai & Ors. , [1987] 2 SCC 572; Copa/ Singh & Anr. v. Dill Ram (dead) by L. Rs. & Ors. , (1988] 1SCC47; Gu/want Kaur and Others v. Mohinder Singh and Others, (1987] 3 SCC 674 andlaswant. Kaurv. Major Harpal Singh, (1989] 3 SCC 572. A mention of all the above cases shows that this Court in a long series of cases has taken a consistent view that Sec. 14(2) of the Act is in the nature of a proviso or an exception to Sec. 14 and comes into operation only if acquisition in any of the methods indicated therein is made for the first time without there being any pre-existing right in the female Hindu to the property. If the case falls under the provisions of Sec.

14(1) of the A~t then the female Hindu shall be held to be full owner of the property and sub-section (2) of Section 14 will only apply where the property is acquired without there being any pre-existing right of the female Hindu in such property. Thus we aftirm and reiterate that sub-section (2) of Sec. 14 will be construed more in the nature of a proviso or an exception to sub-s. (1) of Sec. 1:, of the Act. This view lends support to the object of the section which was to remove the disability on women imposed by law and to achieve a social purpose by bringing about change in the social and economic position of women in Hindu society. In the result we find no force in all the above cases and the same are dismissed with cost. K. RAMASWAMY, J. I have had the advantage to read the draft judgment of my learned brother. I fully agree with the reasoning and conclusions. The repeated attempts to reopen the ratio in 4 Tulasamma's case, in particular, from its proponent i. e.

Sri Krishna Murthy Iyar made me to tread the route through which I reached the same result thus: Sir Main Henry in his "Earlier History of Institutions" at p. 339 stated that, "the degree in which personal immunity and proprietary SESHARATHAMMA 11. MANIKYAMMA [RAMASWAMY, J. ] 731 capacity of women are recognised in a particular state or community is a test of the degree of the advance of its civilisation . It is, therefore, clear that the esteem in which woman is held, the status occupied by her in society and the treatment meted out to her are regarded as index to the degree of civilisation and culture attained in a country. Manu in his Smriti, Chapter III Verses 55 to 57 stated that where women ar honoured and adorned there Gods are pleased, but where women are not honoured no sacred fire yields rewards.

What is the status held by women in the H indu society is a matter of history reflected from Vedic culture, Smrities, the Shastric law, the statutory privision and ultimately converged and recognised in the supreme law of the land, i. e. egalitarian socialist Indian Constitution. E. S. Shivaswamy Iyer in his "Revolution of Hindu Women," 1935 · Edn. p. 64 stated that the ideals of the society as to womanhood includes not merely the relations of husband and wife or mother and children or the other intimate relationship of family life, but also the notions we find about her capacity, her character, her claim to equality, independence and freedom for developing, her rights to personal ownership and control of property, to the choice of her vocation and other rights as well as duties as member of the society. Status and rights of Hindu woman fluctuated and swung like a pendulum with ups and downs from period to period starting from 4000 B. C. uptodate.

How, ever esteem for women remained constantly high in the society . In Vedic society woman enjoyed equal status economically, socially and culturally with men, vide p. 335, 339 and 409 of The Position of Woman in Hindu Civilization, 1955 Edn. by Altakar. He stated that initiation to education upanayanam was performed in Vedic period to the girls as well as boys. Women studied the Vedas, even composed Vedic rhymes. They participated in public life freely. Vishvavara, ,.. p Apala, Lopamudra and Shashayasi are only few examples in the initial Vedic period. Thereafter Ghosha, Maitrai and Gargi occupied price of place for equality in intellectual excellence and equal status with men. Selfishness and male chauvanism made woman to gradually degrade and were given no voice even in the settlement of their marriages or so on. She was denied participation in public affairs. Though Yajnaval- G .

kya was a proponent to her economic status but ultimately Manu Smriti took firm hold and in Chapter IX Verse 18, Manu stated that woman had no right to study the Vedas. Thereby, denied the right to education, fundamental human right to acquire knowledge and cultural and intellectual excellence. In Chapter IX Verse 149, he · stated that woman must not seek separation from father, husband or J. I . son and bondaged her for ever. In Chapter IX Verse 45, the husband was declared to be one· with the wife that the wife can seek no divorce but allowed immunity to a male· to discard an unwanted wife. All through the ages till Hindu Marriage Act was made a male was allowed polyandry. In Chapter IX Verse 416, he stated that a wife, a son and a slave are declared to have no property and if they happened to acquire it would belong to male under whom she is in protection. Thus she was denuded or her right to property or incentive to decent and. independent living and made her.

a dependent only to rare children and bear the burdens·. When she becomes a widow, she was declared to have only maintenance and if in po-ssession of her husband's property or coparcenery, to be a widow's estate with reversionery right to the heirs of last male holder. Fidality was a condition precedent to receive maintenance. In Chapter IX Verse 299, he prescribed corporeal punishment to a wife who commits faults, should be beaten. with a rope or a- split bamboo. If she was murdered it was declared to be an Up:ipattaka that is a minor offence vide Chapter XI Verse 67. I did not adhere to literal translation but attempted to portray their sweep and deep incursion on social order. Thus laid firm fouridation to deny a Hindu female of equality of status, opportunity and dignity of person with no independent right to property and made her a subservient,' socially, educationally and cillturally. Widows were murdered by inhuman Sati and now by bride burnings.

- Gautam Budha gave her equality of staius and opportunity. Efforts of social reformers like Raja Ram Mohan Rai, Kandukuri Veeresalingam and a host of other enlightened made the British Rulers gradually to make statute law, given her right to separate residence and maintenance and a right over property o( her husband or joint _1 family for mainteriance and a charge by a decree of court. Mahatma Gandhiji, the father of the nation, in Young India on October 17, 1929 had written thus: "I am uncompromising in the matters of women's rights: In my opinion she should live 'under no legal disability, no suffenng by men, we should treat the daughters and sons on the footing of. perfect equality": Shri Ravindra Nath Tagore, _the Noble laureate in his speech in 1913 reprinted in "To the Women" at page 18 stated "that women is the champion of man, gifted with equal mental capacity. She has a right to participate in any minutest activity of men and she has equal.

right of freedom and liberty with him". The Constitution of India accords socio-economic and political · justice, equality of status and of opportunity a·ssuring the dignity of ! fl person with stated freedoms. Article 14 gu~rantees__equality. In, other . SESHARATHAMMA v. MANJKYAMMA [RAMASWAMY, J. I 733 words frowns upon discrimination on any ground. Article 15(1) abolishes discrimination and removed disability, liability or restriction on grounds of sex and ensures equality of status. Article 29(2) gives equal right to education. Jn the earliest decision this Court upheld it in ·State of Madras v. Srimathi Champakam Dorairajan, (1951] SCR 525. Article 16(1) accords equality of opportunity in public service for an appointment or employment to an office or post under the State and prohibits gender discrimination. Marriage as a disability for appointment to Indian foreign service was declared unconstitutional in C. S. Muthammav. Union ofIndia & Ors. , (1980] 1SCR668.

Pregnancy as disqualification to continue in public employment was held to be an affront to equality of status, dignity of person and equal opportunity ·-{ violating Articles 14 and 16(1) in Air India v. Nergesh Meerza & Ors. , [1982] 1 SCR 438. It abhors or is loathe to civility. These are few classic illustrations. Article 15(3) treats women as a class, mitigates the rigour of absolute equality enshrined in Art. 14 and its species Art. 15(1) & 16(1) and enjoins the State to make any special provision to remedy past injustice and to advance their status, socio-econmic and political. Article 21 assures protection of life which includes right to livelihood.

Article 38(1) obligates the State to promote the welfare of the people by securing social order in which socio-economic and political justice shall inform all the institutions of the national life, Subarticle (2) thereof further enjoins the State to minimise the inequalities in income and to eliminate inequalities in status by providing facilities and opportunities to all individuals. Women should have adequate means of livelihood on par with men, Art. 39(a); should have equal pay for equal work, Art. 39(d); health and strength of working women are not abused. Economic necessity· is not a sanctuary to abuse her person or she should not be forced to an unwited avocation, Art. 39(e); State shall provide just and human conditions ot work and maternity relief [Art. 421. Article 46 mandates the State to promote . with special care the economic and educational conditions of the weaker sections of the people.

It also enjoins to protect them from social in justice and all forms of exploitation. To enliven and alongate this constitutional goal to render socioeconomic justice, to relieve Hindu 'female from degradation, disabi- Iities, disadvantages and restrictions under which Hindu females have been languishing over centuries and to integrate them in national and international life, Bharat Ratna Dr. Baba Saheb Ambedkar, the first Law Minister and founding father of the Constitution drafted Hindu Code Bill. The Hindu, Marriage Act, Adoption and Maintenance Act; Minority and Guardianship Act and Succession Act 1956, for short "the Act' became a part of this package. They ensue equal status and socio-economic justice to Hindu female. In a socialist democracy governed by rule of law, law as a social engineering should bring about transformation in the social structure.

Whenever a socio-economic legislation or the rule or instruments touching the implementation of welfare measures arise for consideration, this historical evidence furnishes as the foundation and all other relevant material would be kept at the back of the court's mind. Section 14(1) of the Act declares that any property, movable or immovable, possessed by a female Hindu shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner irrespective of the time when the acquisition was made, i. e. , whether it was before or after the Act. }- Undoubtedly as contended by Sri Krishna Murty Iyer, a Hindu male has freedom of testamentary disposition of his property or by contract and s. 14(1) stand an impediment in . his way. Freedom of contract would yield place to public policy envisaged above. Its effect must be tested on the envil of socio-economic justice, equality of status and to oversee whether it would subserve the constitutional animation or frustrates. Art.

15(3) relieves from the rigo. ur of Art. 15{1) and charges the State to make special provision to accord to women socioeconomic equality. The court would, therefore, endeavour to find whether terms of the disposition or clauses in the instruments, will etc. _enumerated in s. 14 would permeate the aforestated constitutional conscience to relieve the Hindu female from the Shastric bondage of limited estate. Both sub-sections (1) and (2) of s. 14 attract the conferment of restricted estate had by a Hindu female under an instrument, i. e. gift, will, decree or order of a Civil Court or an award. Section 14 and the impugned document must be read harmoniously as an integral scheme. The disability attached to Hindu female by Shastric Law was removed by statutory provisons in Hindu Succession Act. Section 14{1) thereof was thought to be a tool to remove disabilities or restrictions imposed by Customary or Shastric Law on Hindu women. s.

14(1) declares in unequivocal terms that the property whether movable or immovable held by a Hindu female acquired either before or after the Act shall be her absolute property, abolishing the limited · estate known to Shastric law. Hindu women as a class are declared as class I heirs entitling to intestate succession to a Hindu Male. This Court in Pratap Singh v. Union of India, [1985] Suppl. 2 SCR 773 held that s. 14 of the Act does not discriminate on grounds of sex and is intra vires of Art. 15{3). The preferential treatment accorded, thereby, was held to be not violative of Arts. 14 and 15(1). Sub-section (2) of s. 14 of the Act attempts to denude the object of sub-section (1) and SESHARATHAMMA v. MANIKYAMMA [RAMASWAMY, J. ] 735 emasculates its efficacy. It should, therefore, be read as an exception or a proviso to sub-section (1) of s. 14.

The interpretation of the proviso or an exception should not be to allow to eat away the vital veins of full ownership accorded by sub-section (1) of s. 14 when this Court upheld the validity of s. 14(1) on the envil of Art. 15(3) what should be the message thus intended to convey? It would mean that the court would endeavour to give full effect to legislative and constitutional vision of socio-economic equality to female citizen by granting full ownership of property to a Hindu female. As a fact Art. 15(3) as a fore runner t yment of the property devised under the will in lieu of main- ·-< tenance as a limited owner for her life. Even if so mentioned, it would be a reflection or restatement of the law existing as in 1932 when the will was executed. The respondent, admittedly, ~ing a widow of the testator who~ unde r Shastric law , was obJ\gated to provide maintenance to his wife, and it being personal obligation, the property bequeathed was in lieu of maintenance for her life.

She was in enjoyment of the property and the beneficial interest therein stood vested in ~ her. As per existing law as in i932 the widow as a legatee was entitled to 'Yidow's estate and she remained in possession on the date of the ,.. , Act came into force and was in enjoyment of the income derived therefrom for her life. No one had a right to interdict it: The restrictive covenant, therefore , does not stand an impediment to s. 14(1) to have full play to extinguish the same and enlarge the limited estate of widow into an absolute ownership. The restrictions contained in the will, though falls both under sub-sec. (2) as well as sub-sec. (1), of s. 14, the right to maintenance being a pre-existing right over property "red ad rem" s. 14(1) would apply. The testamentary succession with a restrictive conditions in the will was obliterated. She became an absolute owner on or after June 17, 1956.

Accordingly I have no hesitation to hold that, though the will created a restrictive covenant, s. 14(2) does not apply. Section 14( 1) enlarged the widow's limited estate held by Manikyamma into an absolute ownership as full owner with a right to disposition by testamentary inst~ment or otherwise. As regards the claim in S. L. P. No. 2113 of 1980 is concerned, admittedly the decree . ,. was granted with restrictive covenant to remain in possession of portion of the house and enjoyment for life and by operation of th ratio in Tulasiamma's case the restrictive covenant has enlarged into absolute estate. The appeal and special leave petitions are accordingly dismissed with costs. V. P. R. Appeal and Petitions dismissed.