UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. v. M-S DHARAMENDRA TEXTILE PROCESSORS AND ORS

Citation: [2008] 14 S.C.R. 13

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: ARIJIT PASAYAT, P. SATHASIVAM, AFTAB ALAM

Case summary

UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. v. M-S DHARAMENDRA TEXTILE PROCESSORS AND ORS.pdf

Judgment text

[2008] 14 S. C. R. 13 --\ UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. II. M/S DHARAMENDRA TEXTILE PROCESSORS AND ORS. (Civil Appeal Nos. 10289-10303 of 2003) B' 1 SEPTEMBER 29, 2008 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, P. SATHASIVAM AND AFTAB ALAM, JJ] CENTRAL Exc1sE Acr, 1944: s. 11AC- penalty for short levy or non levy of excise duty - Nature of - HELD: Penalty under the provision is for breach of civil obligation . and is mandatory - Mens rea is not an essential element for imposing the penalty - The adjudicatory authority has no discretion to levy duty less than what is le-' gaily and statutorily /eviable - Interpretation ofStatutes - Gentral Excise Rules, 1944, rr. 96ZO and 96ZQ. Interpretation of-Statutes - Principles of casus omissus, and reading the statute as a whole - Explained.

Maxims: (i) Casus omissus et oblivioni datus dispositioni communis juris relinquitur, and 3 metric tonnes installed in his factory so desires, he may, from the first day of September, 1997 to the 31st day of March, 1998 or any other financial year, as the case may I-be, pay a sum of rupees five lakhs per month _in two equal l installments, the first installment latest by the 15thday of ~. each month, and the second installment latest by the last ).

_ __; day of each month, and the amounts so paid shall be deemed to be full and final discharge of his duty liability for the period from the 1st day of September, 1997 to the 31st day of March, 1998, or any other financial year, as the case may be, subject to the condition that the manufacturer shall not avail of the benefit, if any, under sub-section (4) of the section 3A of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (1 of 1944) : Provided that for the month of September, 1997 the Commissioner may allow a manufacturer to pay the sum of rupees five lakhs by the 30th day of September, 1997: Provided further that if the capacity of the furnaces installed in a factory is more than or less than 3 metric tonnes, or there is any change in the total capacity, the manufacturer shall pay the amount, calculated pro rata: provided also that where a manufacturer fails to pay the whole of the amount payable for any month by the 15th day or the last day of such month, as the case may be, he shall be liable to,- (i) pay the outstanding amount of duty along with interest thereon at the rate of eighteen per cent per annum, calculated for the period from the 16th day of such month or the 1st day of next month, as the case may be, till the date of actual payment of the outstanding amount; and (ii) a penalty equal to such outstanding amount of duty or five thousand rupees, whichever is greater.

... Provided that if the manufacturer fails to pay the total amount of the duty payable for each of the months from September, 1997 to March, 1998 by the 30th day of April, 1998, he shall also be liable to pay a penalty equal to the outstanding amount of duty as on 30th day of April, 1998 or five thousand rupees, whichever is greater. Explanation - For removal of doubts it is hereby clarified that sub-rule (3) does not apply to an induction furnace unit which ordinarily produces castings or stainless steel products but may also incidentally produce non-alloy steel ingots and billets.

(4) In case a manufacturer wishes to avail of discharging his duty liability in terms of sub-rule (3), he shall inform the Commissioner of Cenfral Excise, with a copy to the Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise or Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise, in the following proforma: "We (name of the factory), located at (address) hereby wish to avail of the scheme described in sub-rule (3) of rule 9620, for full and final discharge of our duty liability for the manufacture of ingots and billets of non-aJloy steel ur:ider~ection3A of the' Central Excise Act, 1944(Iof1944). Dated Sd Name and Designation (With stamp) RULE 96ZQ. Procedure to be followed by an Independent processor of textile fabrics (1) An independent processor of textile fabrics falling under heading Nos. 52. 07,52. 08,52. 09,54. 06,54. 07, 55. 11,55. 12,55. 13 or 55. 14, or processed textile· fabrics of cotton or man-made fibers, falling under heading Nos. or sub-heading Nos. 58. 01, 58. 02, 5806. 10,. 5806. 40. 6001.

12, 6001. 22, 6001. 92, 6002. 20, 6002. 30, 6002. 43 or 6002:93, of the First Schedule to Centr'al Excise Tariff Act, 1'985 (5 of 1986), shall debit an amount of duty of Rs:2. 0 lakhs per chamber per month, Rs. 2. 51akhs per chamber per month, Rs. 3. 0 lakhs per chamber per month or Rs. 3. 5 lakhs per chamber per month, as the case may be, on the annual capacity of production as determined under the Hot-air Stenter Independent Textile Processors Annual Capacity Determination Rules, 1998. · . (2) The amount ofduty payable under sub-rule (1) shall be debited by the independent processor in . the account current maintained by him sub-rule (1) of rule 173G of the Central Excise Rules, 1944. . -\ (3) Fifty per cent. of the amount of duty payable for a calendar month under sub-rule (1) shall be paid by the 15th of the month and the remaining amount shall be paid by the end _of that month.

Provided that the amount of duty payable for the period from 15th December, 1998 to 31st December, 1998 shall be deposited on or before the 31st day of December, 1998. (4) The independent processor shall continue to maintain records, and file returns, pertaining to production, clearance, manufacturing, storage, delivery or disposal of 1' goods, including the materials received for or consumed in the manufacture of excisable goods or other goods, the goods and materials in stock with him and the duty paid by him, as prescribed under the Central Excise Rules, 1944 and the notifications issued there under.

(5) If an independent processor fails to pay the amount 0£ duty or any part thereof by the date specified in sub-rule (3), he shall be liable to, - "" (i) pay the outstanding amount of duty along with interest at the rate of twenty-four percent per annum calculated for the outstanding period on the outstanding amount; and (ii) a penalty equal to an amount of duty outstanding from \ him at the end of such month or rupees five thousand, whichever is greater. (6) If an independent processor, removes the processed textile fabrics referred to in sub-rule (1) without complying with any of the requirements contained in sub-rule (4), then, all such goods shall be liable to confiscation and the -'( independent processor shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding rupees ten thousand.

(7) Where an independent processor does not produce or manufacture the processed textile fabrics specified in /sub-rule (1) during any continuous period of not less than fifteen days and wishes to claim abatement under sub- ,.... section (3) of section 3A of the Act, the abatement shall be allowed by an order passed by the Joint Commissioner of Central Excise of such amount as may be specified in such order, subject to fulfillment of the following conditions, namely:. , t- (a) abatement shall be applicable only on the complete closure of the hot air stenter containing the chambers and not in case of closure of anyone or more chambers contained in such stenter; (aa) the independent processor shall not clear any non- .

,, stentered fabrics during t~e period for which abatement is ' claimed, and any clearance by him of non-stentered fabrics during such period shall be liable to confiscation; \'- (b) the independent processor shall inform, in writing, about such closure to the Deputy Commissioner of Central ~ Excise or the Assistant Com- missioner of Central Exdse, as the case may be, with a copy to the Superintendent of Central Excise, at least three days prior to the date of such closure, giving the following details, namely: - ""~~ (i) the name of the manufacturer of the stenter; ; (ii) the date of purchase of the stenter; f (iii) the number of chambers as determined under the Hot-air Stenter Independent Textile Processors Annual Capacity Determination Rules, 2000; (iv) the serial number or identification no.

of the stenter; (v) reason for closure of the stenter; (vi) approximate number of days for which the stenter shall rremain closed; (vii) date and time from which the closure is intended; (c) the stenter or stenters shall be sealed in such manner as 'l ( quasi-criminal. The penalty leviable under this chapter or i under these sections is penalty in cases of default or failure of statutory obligation or in other words breach of civil obligation. In the provisions and scheme of penalty under Chapter VI-A of the SEBI Act, there is no element of any criminal offence or punishment as contemplated under criminal proceedings. Therefore, there is no question of -I proof of intention or any mens rea by the appellants and it is not an essential element for imposing penalty under the SEBI Act and the Regulations. xxx xxx xxx ;- 33. This Court in a catena of decisions has held that mens rea is not an essential element for imposing penalty for breach of civil obligations: .

(a) Director of Enforcement v. MCTM Corpn. (P) Ltd. : (SCC pp. 478 & 480-81, paras 8 & 12-13) "8. It is thus the breach of a 'civil obligation' which attracts \,. 'penalty' under Section 23(1 )(a), FERA, 1947 and a finding I · that the delinquent has contravened the provisions of r Section 10, FERA, 1947 that would immediately attract the levy of 'penalty' under Section 23, irrespective of the fact whether the contravention was made by the defaulter with any 'guilty intention' or not.

Therefore, unlike in a criminal case, where it is essential for the 'prosecution' to establish that the 'accused' had the necessary guilty intention or in other words the requisite 'mens rea' to commit the alleged offence with which he is charged before ~ recording his conviction, the obligation on the part of the Directorate of Enforcement, in cases of contravention of the provisions of Section 10 of FERA, would be discharged where it is shown that the 'blameworthy conduct' of the delinquent had been established by wilful contravention by him of the provisions of Section 10, FERA, 1947. It is \the delinquency of the defaulter itself which establishes his 'blameworthy' conduct, attracting the provisions of Section 23(1 )(a) of FERA, 1947 without any further proof ( of the existence of 'mens rea'.

Even after an adjudication by the authorities and levy of penalty under Section 23(1 )(a) of FERA, 1947, the defaulter can still be tried and punished for the commission of an offence under the penal law..... xx xx xx 12. In Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 85, at p. 580' para 1023, it is stated thus: 'A penalty imposed for a tax delinquency is a civil obligation, remedial and coercive in its nature, and is far different --\ \ ...! , from the penalty for a crime or a fine or forfeiture provided as punishment for the violation of criminal or penal laws. ' 13. We are in agreement with the aforesaid view and in our opinion, what applies to 'tax delinquency' equally holds good for the 'blameworthy' conduct for contravention of the provisions of FERA, 1947.

We, therefore, hold that ' -r mens rea (as is understood in criminal law) is not an essential ingredient for holding a delinquent liable to pay penalty under Section 23(1 )(a) of FERA, 1947 for contravention of the provisions of Section 10 of FERA, 1947 and that penalty is attracted under Section 23(1 )(a) as soon as contravention of the statutory obligation -I contemplqted by Section 10(1 )(a) is established. The High Court apparently fell in error in treating the 'blameworthy conduct' under the Act as equivalent to the commission of a 'criminal offence', overlooking the position that the -1 'blameworthy conduct' in the adjudicatory proceedings is established by proof only of the breach of a civil obligation · under the Act, for which the defaulter is obliged to make amends by payment of the penalty imposed under Section 23(1 )(a) of the Act irrespective of the fact whether he committed the breach with or without any guilty intention. " (b) J. K Industries Ltd. v.

Chief Inspector of Factories and Boilers: (SCC p. 692, ·para 42) ~ I "42. The offences under the Act are not a part of general penal law but arise from the breach of a duty provided in a special beneficial social defence legislation, which creates absolute or strict liability without proof of any mens rea. The offences are strict statutory offences for which establishment of mens rea is not an essential ingredient. The omission or commission of the statutory breach is "! itself the offence. Similar type of offences based on the principle of strict liability, which means liability without fault or mens rea, exist in many statutes relating to economic crimes as well as in laws concerning the industry, food .. l ' adulteration, prevention of pollution, etc. in India and abroad. 'Absolute offences' are not criminal offences in any real sense but acts which are prohibited in the interest of welfare of the public and the prohibition is backed by sanction of penalty. " c) R. S. Joshi v.

Ajit_ Mills Ltd. : (SCC p. 110, para 19) "Even here we may reject the notion that a penalty or a punishment cannot be cast in the form of an absolute or no-fault liability but must be preceded by mens rea. The classical view that 'no mens rea, no crime' has long ago been eroded and several laws in India and abroad, especially regarding economic crimes and departmental penalties, have created severe punishments even where the; offences h;:ive been defined to exclude. mens rea. Therefore, the contention that Section 37(1) fastens a · heavy liability regardless of fault has no force in depriving the forfeiture of the character of penalty. " . (d) Gujarat Travancore Agency v. CIT: (SCC p. 5 5 , para 4) "It is sufficient for us to refer to Section 271 (1)(a), which provides that a penalty may be imposed if the Income Tax Officer is satisfied that any person has without reasonable cause failed to furnish the return of total income, and to ~ .

, r Section 276-C which provides that if a person wilfully fails to furnish in due time the return of income required under r Section 139(1 ), he shall be punishabie with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year or ~ with fine. It is clear that in the former case what is intended t is a civil obligation while in the latter what is imposed is a criminal sentence. There can be no dispute that having regard to the provisions of Section 276-C, which speaks ... ' of wilful failure on the part of the defaulter and taking into consideration the nature of the penalty, which is punitive, no sentence can be imposed under that provision unless the element of mens rea is established. In most cases of \ criminal liability, the intention of the legislature is that the penalty should serve as a deterrent.

The creation of an offence by statute proceeds on the assumption that society suffers injury by the act or omission of the defaulter and that a deterrent must be imposed to discourage the · repetition of the offence. In the case of a proceeding under Section 271 (1 )(a), however, it seems that the intention of ) the legislature is to emphasise the fact of loss of revenue and to provide a remedy for such loss, although no doubt an element of coercion· is present in the penalty. In this connection the terms in which the penalty falls to be measured is significant. Unless there is something in the language of the statute indicating the need to establish the element of mens rea it is generally sufficient to prove that a default in complying with the statute has occurred. In our opinion, there is nothing in Section 271 (1 )(a) which ' requires that mens rea must be proved before penalty can i be levied under that provision Swedish Match AB v. SEBI: (SCC p.

671, para 113) "The provisions of Section 15-H of the Act mandate that a penalty of rupees twenty-five crores may be imposed. The Board does not have any discretion in the matter and, thus, the adjudication proceeding is a mere formality. Imposition of penalty upon the appellant would, thus, t:>e forgone conclusion. Only in the criminal proceedings ·~ initiated against the appellants, existence of mens rea on · the part of the appellants will come up for considerat,ion. " (f) SEBI v. Cabot International Capital Corpn: (Comp Cas pp. 862 & 864-65, paras 47, 52 & 54) j "47. Thus, the following extracted principles are summarised: (;. :- -f (A) Mens rea is an essential or sine qua non for criminal offence. (8) A straitjacket formula of mens rea cannot be blindly followed in each and every case. The scheme of a particular statute may be diluted in a given case. (C) If, from the scheme, object and words used in the statute, it appears that the proceedings for imposition of ...

the penalty are adjudicatory in nature, in contradistinction 8 to ·criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings, the determination is of the breach of the civil obligation by the offender. The word 'penalty' by itselfwill not be determinative -,, i to conclude the nature of proceedings being criminal or I quasi-criminal. The relevant considerations being the nature of the functions being discharged by the authority and the determination of the liability of the contravener and the delinquency. (0) Mens rea is not essential element for imposing penalty for breach of civil obligations or liabilities. (There can be two distinct liabilities, civil and criminal under the same Act. xx xx xx 52. The SEBI Act and the Regulations, are intended to regulate the securities market and the related aspects, \ the imposition of penalty, in the given facts and circumstances of the case, cannot be tested on the ground of 'no mens rea, no penalty'. For breaches of provisions .

of the S,EBI Act and Regulations, according to us, which are ci. vil in nature, mens rea is not essential. On particular . facts and c,ircumstances of the case, proper exercise of juqicial discretion is a must, but not on foundation that me. ns rea is essential to impose penalty in,each and every 'brel;lch of provisions of the SEBI Act. * * * 54. However, we are not in agreement with the Appellate Authority in respect of the reasoning given in regard to the necessity of mens rea being essential for imposing the UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. M/S OHARAMENDRA 45 penalty. According to us, mens rea is not essential for imposing civil penalties under the SEBI Act and Regulations. " (emphasis in original) 11. The decision in Bharat Heavy Electricals's case (supra) cannot be of any assistance to the assessee because the same proceeded on the basis of concession.

Even otherwise, it was not open to the Bench to read, into a statute which was ) specific and clear, something which is not specifically provided for in the statute. 12. The stand of learned counsel for the assessee is that the absence of specific reference to mens rea is a case of casus omissus. If the contention of learned counsel for the assessee is accepted that the use of the expression "assessee shall be liable" proves the existence of discretion, it would lead to a very absurd result. In fact in the same provision there is an ex- 0 I pression used i. e. "liability to pay duty". It can by no stretch of . -; imagination be said that the adjudicating authority has even a discretion to levy duty less than what is legally and statutorily leviable. Most of cases relied upon by learned counsel for the assessee had their foundation on Bharat Heavy Electrica/'s case (supra). As noted above, the same is based on concession and in any event did not indicate the correct position in law.

13. It is a well-settled principle in law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision or a stipulated condition which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent. Similar is the position for conditions stipulated in advertisements. 14. Words and phrases are symbols that stimulate mental references to referents. The object of interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of the legislature enacting it. (See Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Price Waterhouse 1977 6 SCC 312). The intention of the legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has. /not been said. As a consequence, a construction which requires for its support, addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaning. less has to be avoided.

As observed in Crawford v. ·spooner (1846) 6'MOO PC1, the courts cannot aid the legislature's defective . phrasing of an Act, they cannot add or mend, and by construction make up deficiencies which are left there. (See State of Gujarat v. Dilipbhai Nathjibhai Patel 1998 (3) SCC 234). It is contrary to all rules of construction to read words into anAct unless it is absolutely necessary to do so. [See Stock v. Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd 1978 (1) ALL ER 948. ] Rules of interpretation do not permit the courts to do so, unless the provision as it stands is meaningless or of doubtful meaning. The courts are not entitled to read:words into an Act of Parliam~nt unless clear reason for it is to be found within the four corners of th~ Act itself. (Per Lord Loreburn, LC. in Vickers Sons'? 0 15. The question is not what may be supposed and has been intended but what has been said.

"Statute~· should be construed not as theorems of Euclid", Judge Learned Hand said, "but words must be construed with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them". (See Lenigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage 218 FR 547) The view was reiterated in Union of lndiq v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama (1990) 1 sec 277 (SCC p. 284, para 16). 16: In D. R. Venkatachalamv. Dy. TransportCommr. (1977) 2 SCC 273, it was observed that the c9urts must avoid the danger of a priori determination of the meaning of a provision based on their own preconceived notions of ideological structure or scheme into which the provision to be interpreted is somewhat fitted: They are not entitled to usurp legislative function under the disguise of interpretation. 17. While interpreting a provision the court only interprets the law and cannot legislate it.

If a provision of law is misused and subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary. (See - -\ CST v. Popular Trading Co. (2000) 5 SCC 511) The legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process. 18. Two principles of construction - one relating to casus omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute as a whole, appear to be well settled.

Under the first principle a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the court except in the case ) of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself but at the same time a casus om is- •' sus should not be readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts of a statute or section must be construed together and every clause of a section should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute. This would be more so if literal construetion of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been intended by the legislatu re. "An intention to produce an unreasonable result", said Danckwerts, L. J. in Artemiou v. Procopiou (1965) 3 ALL ER 539 (All ER p. 544 I) "is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction available".

Where to apply words literally would "defeat the obvious intention of the legislation and produce a wholly unreasonable result", we must "do some violence to the words" and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational construction. [Per Lord Reid in Luke v. /RC (1963) AC 557 where at AC p. 577 he also observed: (All ER \ p. 664 I) ''This is not a new problem, though our standard of drafting is such. 19. It is then true that: "When the words of a law extend not to an inconvenience rarely happening, but due to those which often happen, it is good reason not to strain the words further than they reach, by saying it is casus omissus, and that the law intended quae frequentius accidunt. " "But", on the other hand, "it is no reason, when the words of a law do enough extend to an inconvenience seldom happening, that they should not extend to it as well as if it happened more frequently, r- 1 because it happens but seldom". (See Fenton v. Hampton (1858) 11 Moo PC "47). 20.

A casus omissus ought not to be created by interpretation, save in some case of strong necessity. Where, however, \--- / a casus omissus does really occur, either through the inadvert- \, ence of the legislature, or on the principle quad enim semel aut bis existit praetereunt legislatores, the rule is that the particular case, thus ·left unprovided for, must be disposed of according to the law as it existed before such statute. - casus omissus et oblivioni datus dispositioni communis juris relinquitur; "a casus omissus", observed Buller, J. in Jones v. Smart 1785 (1) TR 44:99 ER 963 (ER p. 967) "can in no case be supplied by a court of law, for that would be to make laws". The principles were examined in detail in Maulavi Hussein Haji Abraham Umarji v: State of Gujarat (2004 (6) SCC 672). 21.

The golden rule for construing all written instruments has been thus stated: 'The grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to unless that would lead to some absurdity or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid that y I absurdity and inconsistency, but no further. " (See Grey v. Pearson. ) 22. The latter part of this "golden rule" must, however, be applied with much caution. "If', remarked Jervis, C. J. , "the precise words used are plain and unambiguous, in our judgment, we are bound to construe them in their ordinary sense, even though it do lead, in our view of the case, to an absurdity or manifest injustice. Words may be modified or varied, where their import is doubtful or -\ obscure.

But we assume the functions of legislators when we depart from the ordinary meaning of the precise words used, merely, because we see, or fancy we see, an 'i1 absurdity or manifest injustice from an adherence to their literal meaning". (See Abley v. Dale, ER p. 525) 23. The above position was highlighted in Sangeeta Singh v. Union of India and Ors. (2005 (7) SCC 484). ) 24. It is of significance to not~ that the conceptual and contextual difference between Section 271 (1) (c) and Section 276C of the IT Act was lost sight of in Dilip Shroff's case (supra). 25. The Explanations appended to Section 272(1)(c) of the IT Act entirely indicates the element of strict liability on the assessee for concealment or for giving inaccurate particulars while filing return. The judgment in Dilp N. Shroof's case (supra) has not considered the effect and relevance of Section 276C of the l. T. Act.

Object behind enactment of Section 271(1)(e) read with Explanations indicate that the said section has been enacted to provide for a remedy for loss of revenue. The penalty under that provision is a civil liability. Wilful concealment is not an essential ingredient for attracting civil liability as is the case in the matter of prosecution under Section 276C of the l. T. Act. 26. In Union Budget of 1996-97, Section 11AC of the Act was introduced. It has made the position clear that there is no ~ scope for any discretion. In para 136 of the Union Budget reference has been made to the provision stating that the levy of penalty is a mandatory penalty. In the Notes on Clauses also the similar indication has been given. 27. Above being the position, the plea that the Rules 96ZQ and 9620 have a concept of discretion inbuilt cannot be sus- -i tained.

Dilip Shroff's case (supra) was not correctly decided but Chairman, SEBl's case (supra) has analysed the legal position in the correct perspectives. The reference is answered. The mater shall now be placed before the Division Bench to / - A deal with the matter in the light of what has been stated above, only so far as' the cases where challenge to vires of Rule 9670(5). In all other cases the orders of the High Court or the r Tribunal, as the case may be, are quashed and the matter remitted to it for disposal in the light of present judgments. Ap- 8 peals except Civil Appeal Nos. 3388 of 2006, 3397 of 2003, 3398-99 of 2003, 4096 of 2004, 4316 of 2007, 4317 of 2007, 5277 of 2006, 675 of 2007, 1420 of 2007 and appeal relating to SLP (C ) No. 21751 of 2007 are allowed and the excepted appeals shall now be placed before the Division Bench for disc posal. R. P. Appeals disposed of. _. ,__ y .