UTTARANCHAL FOREST DEVELOPMENT CORPN. AND ANR. v. JABAR SINGH AND ORS

Citation: [2006] SUPP. 10 S.C.R. 852

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: AR. LAKSHMANAN, TARUN CHATTERJEE

Case summary

UTTARANCHAL FOREST DEVELOPMENT CORPN. AND ANR. v. JABAR SINGH AND ORS.pdf

Judgment text

- UTTARANCHAL FOREST DEVELOPMENT CORPN. AND ANR. v. JABAR SINGH AND ORS. DECEMBER 12, 2006 [DR. AR. LAKSHMANAN AND TARUN CHATTERJEE, JJ. ] Labour Laws: UP. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947: Sections 25-L and 25-N. Industrial establishment-Workmen-Retrenchment-Workmen were engaged by Forest Corporation on daily-wage basis for the measurement of wood, protection oftimber at the logging site and depots ofthe Corporation- As there was no work, the services of the said workmen were retrenched in accordance with S. 6-N-The Labour Court held that the retrenchment order was legal and valid-It further held that the provisions of S. 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act were not attracted as the Forest Corporation was not an industrial establishment as defined in S. 25-L of the Industrial Disputes Act-However, the High Court set aside the Labour Court's award holding •· that the Industrial Disputes (UP. ) Rules made S.

25-N applicable to industrial establishments in the State-Correctness of-Held: The work of the Forest Corporation consisted of "cutting oftrees by axe and changing the shape of the timber into logs by using hand-driven saw"-The process of cutting by axe and changing the shape by saw is a manufacturing process-Thus, the Corporation is an industrial establishment within the definition of Section 25-L-The . retrenchment notices, did not comply with either of the two requirements ofSection 25-N-Hence, workmen are entitled to be reinstated with full back-wages and continuity ofservice-Factories Act, 1948, S. 2(k) and 2(m)-lndustrial Disputes (UP. ) Rules, 1976-UP. Forest Corporation Act, 1974, Ss. 14 and 15.

Constitution of India, 1950: Article 226-Writ petition-Maintainability of-Alternative remedy-- Availing of-Writ petition filed without availing ofalternative remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act-Writ petition also filed after a delay of I 0 years-However, High Court allowed the writ petition-Correctness of- II 852 UTTARANCHAL FOREST DEVELOPMENT CORPN. v. JABAR SINGH 853 Held: High Court should have dismissed the writ petition on the grounds of /aches as well as non-availing of alternative remedy. Words & Phrases: "Manufacturing process"-Meaning of-In the context of Section 2(k) of the Factories Act, 1948. "Factory"-Meaning of-In the context ofSection 2(m) ofthe Factories Act, 1948. "Industrial establishment"-Meaning of-In the context of Section 25- L of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Civil Appeal No.

5728 of 2006 The predecessor-Corporation of the appellant had engaged the respondents-workmen as daily-wage workers for the purpose of measurement of wood, protection oftimber at the logging site and depots of the Corporation. As there was no work, the services of the respondents were retrenched in accordance with Section 6-N of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. An industrial dispute was raised before the Labour Court by the respondents alleging non-compliance with Section 25-N of the Act. The Labour Court held that the retrenchment order was legal and valid. It further ... held that the provisions of Section 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 were not attracted as the predecessor-Corporation ofthe appellant was not an industrial establishment as defined in Section 25-L of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the respondents holding that the Industrial Disputes (U. P.

) Rules, 1976 have made Section 25-N applicable in relation to industrial establishment in the State. Hence the appeal. Civil Appeal No. 5729 of 2006 Some of the retrenched respondents-workmen, in similar circumstances, filed writ petitions, after a delay of 10 years, directly before the High Court without first approaching the Labour Court but the High Court also allowed these writ petitions following its earlier decision. Hence the appeal. On behalf of the appellant, it was contended that the appellant- Corporation was neither a factory within the meaning of Section 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948 nor did it carry on manufacturing process with or: without the aid of power as defined in Section 2(k) of the Factories Act, 1948; and that the writ petitions filed directly in the High Court by some of the retrenched employees without availing of the alternative remedy were not maintainable. The following questions arose before the Court:- 1.

Whether the provisions of Section 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 are attracted or not? 2. Whether for non-compliance of the conditions contained in Section 25-N, retrenchment order as well as award are illegal and non est? 3. Whether the Forest Corporation is an industrial establishment within the definition of Section 25-L of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or not? Civil Appeal No. 5728 of 2006 Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. 1. Admittedly, the work ofthe respondents consisted of "cutting oftrees by axe and changing the shape ofthe timber into logs by using handdriven saw". The process of cutting by axe and changing the shape by saw squarely fall within the definition ofthe first part ofthe manufacturing process defined in Section 2(k) of the Factories Act, 1948 as cutting would be included in the processes of "making" and "breaking up" included in the said definition.

Further, the changing ofshape by saw would be included in the processes of "altering" and "adapting" of trees. Admittedly, trees and logs both fall within the meaning of "any article or substance", the second part of . the definition. Lastly, the conversion of trees into logs is admittedly for the purpose ofsale, disposal and use and, last but not the least, for transport, all of which fall within the third part of the definition. (877-G; 878-A-B) 1. 2. Thus, the appellant-Corporation is an industrial establishment within the definition ofSection 25-L ofthe Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and, therefore, Section 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 would be applicable to the establishment of the appellant-Corporation. (878-E, F) · Lal Mohammadv. Jndian Railway Construction Co. Ltd, (1999) l SCC UTTARANCHAL FORESTDEVELOPMENTCORPN. >. JABAR SINGH 596, relied on. Tega India Ltd v. CCE, [20041 2 SCC 727, S. G. Chemicals and Dyes Trading Employees' Union v. S. G.

Chemicals and Dyes Trading Ltd, [198612 SCC 624, Kores India Ltd. v. CCE, [2005) 1 SCC 385, Nagpur Electric Light and Power Co. Ltd v. Regional Director, Employees' State Insurance Corporation, [1967) 3 SCR 92, Workmen of Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking v. The Management ofDelhi Electric Supply Undertaking, AIR (1973) SC 365, Nathi Devi v. Radha Devi Gupta, [2005] 2 SCC 271, Indian Handicrafts Emporium v. Union ofIndia, [2003) 7 SCC 589, Bharat Singh v. Management ofNew Delhi Tuberculosis Centre, New Delhi, [1986] 2 SCC 614, Col. Sardar C. S. Angre v. State AIR (1965) Raj 65, Re: A. m. Chinniah AIR (1957) Mad 755, Ardeshir H. Bhiwandiwala v. State ofBombay, (1961), Employees State Insurance Corporation v. Mis Triplex Dry Cleaners, (1982) PLR Vol. LXXXIV 1982 and Sh. Bhag Singh v. ESIC, (1983) LIC 412, referred to. Black's Law Dictionary 6th Edn. p. 77, referred to. 2.

The appellant-Corporation, while issuing the retrenchment notices, did not comply with either of the two requirements of Section 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Thus, the retrenchment notices mentioned above being illegal, the workmen, being entitled to all the benefits, in the present case, all the concerned workmen are entitled to be reinstated with full backwages and continuity ofservice. [878-G; 879-C) 3. Section 25-N was brought into for the purpose ofgiving protection to workmen against retrenchment by making prior scrutiny by the Government as a condition precedent. [880-B) Workmen ofMeenakshi Mills Ltd. v. Meenakshi Mills Ltd. , [1992) 3 SCC 336, followed, 4. 'Premises' can consist ofopen area and need not be confined in its meaning to buildings alone. [880-EI Ardeshir H. Bhiwandiwala v. State of Bombay, (1961) 3 SCR 592, followed. Civil Appeal No. 5729 of 2006 Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.

It is not in dispute that the effective alternative remedy was not availed of by many of the workmen. The writ petitions challenging the order oftermination were filed, admittedly, after a delay of10 years. The High Court was not justified in entertaining the writ petition, on the ground that the petition has been filed after a delay of 10 years and that the writ petitions should have been dismissed by the High Court on the ground of laches. UP. State Spinning Corporation Co. Ltd. v. R. S. Pandey, (2005] 8 SCC 254 and Haryana State Coop. Land Development Bank v. Nee/am, (2005] 5 sec 91, relied on. 2. In the instant case, the workmen have not made out any exceptional circumstances to knock the door of the High Court straightaway without availing of the effective alternative remedy available under the Industrial Disputes Act.

But the dispute relates to enforcement of a right or obligation under the statute and a specific remedy is, therefore, provided under the statute and the High Court should not deviate from the general view and interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution except when a very strong case is made out for making a departure. The respondents have not made out any strong case for making a departure. The High Court was not justified in entertaining the writ petition. (883-E, F, G) 3. The writ petitioners (respondents herein) who have not invoked the jurisdiction of the Tribunal are not entitled to any relief in the writ petitions. They are not entitled for any benefits of reinstatement, back-wages and continuity ofservice. (883-H; 884-A) CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5728 of2006. From the Judgment and Order dated 21. 8. 2003 of the High Court of Uttaranchal at Nainital in W. P. No. 1376 (M/S) of2001. WITH C. A. Nos. 5729-5752/2006 and 5754-5761/2006. L. N.

Rao, Santosh Kumar, Devesh Singh, Shiva Kumar Sinha, Atishi Dipankar and Dr. Kailash Chand for the Appellants. Rachana Srivastava, A. A. G. , Dhruv Mehta, Harshvardhan Jha, Yashraj Deora, Mannoj Mehta, Shobha, Rachana Joshi Issar, Bharat Sangal, Kusum Singh, B. S. Gupta, Dr. 1. 8. Gaur, Vijayshree Pattnaik, Satyajit A. Desai, Anagha, UTTARANCHAL FOREST DEVELOPMENT CORPN. 1•. ! ABARSINGH [LAKSHMANAN, J. ] 857 S. Desai, Venkateswara Rao, Anumolu, Abhishek Atrey, Ashwani Bhardwaj, Rohan Thawani, Prashant Kumar, Pooja Dhar, Sanjeev Bhatnagar, Debasis Misra, Vidya Dhar Gaur, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Dinesh Kumar Garg and Shree Pal Singh for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DR. AR. LAKSHMANAN, J. Leave granted. A bunch of 38 appeals were filed by the State of Uttaranchal Forest Development Corporation against the judgment and order dated 21. 08. 2003 by the High Court ofUttaranchal in Writ Petition No. 1376 of2001.

The said writ petition was filed by the respondent-workmen against the award dated 24. 12. 1997 of the Labour Court, Dehradun in litigation case No. 117 of 2006 (with 29 other cases). DATES AND EVENTS: The U. P. Forest Corporation had engaged daily wages workers for the purpose of measurement of wood, protection of timber at the logging site and depots of the Corporation. The said engagement of workers was as per requirement. The U. P. Forest Corporation was the predecessor ofthe appellant Corporation. 12. 07. 1994 A writ petition No. 21 of 1993 (Van Nigam Karmachari Kalyan Sangh vs. State of U. P and others) was decided by the High Court of judicature at Allahabad vide judgment and order dated 12th July, 1994 wherein the High Court, inter alia, held as under:- "...

(iii) In case ofreduction of work or short fall in the work the Authorities of the Forest Corporation would make an endeavour to adjust them in alternative work available in the particular region in which they are working or in any other region where work is available before giving them seasonal leave tenninating their services. (iv) If that particular region or any other region such alternative work is not available on account of reduction in work or shortfall in work, the authorities of the Corporation may retrench the services of field staff but only in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 6-N of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. " The predecessor Corporation of the appellant made its best endeavor to accommodate the surplus daily rate workers but the alternative work was not available since the work of the Corporation had tapered down as felling of the trees had been banned in the Forest under the Policy of the Govt.

and in these circumstances the predecessor of appellant was compelled to reduce the work force of daily wage workers. As there was no work the service of the respondent workers were retrenched along with several others by the U. P. Forest Corporation in accordance with the provisions ofU. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The services ofthe respondent were retrenched by order dated 30. 05. 1995 and 31. 05. 1995 after giving one month's wage in lieu of notice and retrenchment compensation in compliance ofSection 6-N of the Industrial Act, 1947 and also such payments were received by the respondents without any protest. An industrial dispute was raised by the respondents and the Labour Court, Dehradun in the Award held that the retrenchment order was legal and valid as the provisions of Section 6-N of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act were fully complied with.

Further, it held that the provisions of Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act are not attracted as the Forest Corporation is not an industrial establishment as defined in Section 25L of Chapter-VB of the Industrial Disputes Act. · Aggrieved by the Award dated 24. 12. 1997, Jabar Singh and Others filed Writ Petition No. 8351of1999. The Writ Petition No. 1376 of200l along with other writ petitions was allowed by the High Court on 21. 08. 2003 with the direction that writ petitioners shall be put back on duty and shall be paid salary/wages. The question which fell for determination was whether the provisions of Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 are attracted or not and whether for non-compliance of the conditions contained in section 25N, retrenchment order as well as award are illegal and non est.

The High Court observed that the appropriate Government by framing the Rules known as the Industrial Disputes (Uttar Pradesh) Rules, 1976 have made Section 25N applicable in relation to Industrial establishment in the State ofU. P. In view of the above the question which was raised was whether the UTTARANCHALFORESTDEVELOPMENT CORPN. v. JABAR SINGH [LAKSHMANAN, J. ] 859 Forest Corporation is an Industrial establishment within the definition of Section 25L or not. FINDINGS: The High Court held that the Forest Corporation carries the activity of cutting, removal, disposal and sale of trees over the area allotted to the Corporation and, therefore, the area of the land over which such activities are carried on is "premises". Thus, the first requirement of the definition of factory is satisfied.

The High Court held that cutting of trees by axe and shaping the cut trees into logs is a manufacturing process under the definition of Section 2(k) of the Factories Act and therefore it is an industrial establishment within the meaning of Section 25-L of the Industrial Disputes Act. The High Court held that since the retrenchment was made without complying with the provisions of Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act, the retrenchment order was void and accordingly the said order ofretrenchment was quashed. The High Court further directed that the writ petitioner shall be put back on duty and shall be paid salary/wages. We heard Mr. L. Nageshwar Rao, learned senior counsel for the appellant and Mr. Dhruv Mehta for the respondents in SLP (C) Nos. 3553 of2004, 7548 of2004 and 15498 of2004 and Mr. Bharat Sangal for respondent Nos. 1-12 in SLP (C) Nos. 24584 of2003. Mr. L. Nageshwar Rao made the following submissions at the time of hearing on behalf of the appellant-Corporation.

He submitted·that: (I) the provisions of Factory Act do not apply to the appellant- Corporation inasmuch as it does not fall within the definition of factory as no manufacturing process is being carried on with or without the said power. At this stage, it is necessary to reproduce the definition of 'factory' and 'manufacturing process' as given in the Act: Section 2(m) of the Act defines 'Factory' as under:- "factory" means any premises including the precincts thereof- (~ (ii) whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months, and any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on.

Manufacturing process is defined under Section 2(k) of the Factories Act which reads as under:- (i) making, altering, repairing, ornamenting, finishing, packing, oiling, washing, cleaning, breaking up, demolishing or otherwise treating or adapting any article or substance with a view to its use, sale, transport, delivery or disposal, or ... (ii).... (iii).... (iv).... (v)..... (vi).... " (2) to constitute a manufacture, there must be a transformation. The mere labour bestowed on an article even if the labour is applied through machinery will not make it a manufacture, unless it has progressed so far that a transformation ensues, and the article becomes commercially known as another and different article from that as it had began its existence. (3) the Corporation carries on activity of cutting of trees and converting into logs with respect to the area allotted to it by the State Government and that the cutting of.

trees is not a manufacturing process because the log made by cutting of trees is still a raw material. (4) that the entire activity ofappellant ofcutting trees and converting into logs does not make any change so far as article is concerned. The article is neither treated nor adapted but on the contrary, the article is sold to customers in the same form in which it was received in the depots of the Corporation. The expression adapting means something to be done to the article so as to make it different from what it was before. Therefore,the words making, altering, packing, oiling etc, in the definition of manufacturing process should be read jointly with 'otherwise treating or adapting any article or substance with a view to its UTTARANCHAL FOREST DEVELOPMENT CORPN. 1•. JABAR SINGH [LAKSHMANAN, l. ] use, sale, transport, delivery or disposal. For the above-said proposition, Mr. Rao sought indulgence of this Court to rely upon the following judgments: I. Col. Sardar C. S. Angre v.

The State and Anr. , AIR (1965) Rajasthan 65. The question involved was as to whether the grading of the potatoes for storing in the cold storage or the process of drying of the potatoes amount to a manufacturing process or not. The said question was considered in the light of the expression "otherwise treating or adapting any article or substance with a view to its use, sale, transport, delivery or disposal" as contained in the definition of manufacturing process given in the Act. It was held as under:- "If the gradation or the sorting is with a view to bring into existence standardized goods of a particular category or variety saleable as such, I do not see any difficulty in treating grading or sorting as a manufacturing process. If, on the other hand, grading is only casual and is not done with a view to achieve the object indicated earlier, grading will not be a manufacturing process.

" Similarly, for the process of drying, it was held as under:- "The process of drying has also to be considered in relation to the adaptability of the article for sale or use. In the present case, the process of drying is adopted only to remove the moisture collected during the process of refrigeration and not with a view to adapt the potatoes for sale. In other words, it cannot be said that the process is necessary for making the potatoes saleable as such. The process of drying also in this view of the matter cannot be considered a manufacturing process. Then, it was held as under:- "The essential question to be considered is whether the cold storage is used primarily for the purposes of storage or is used for bringing into existence commodities which may be treated as commercially different from what they were at the time they entered the premises.

In the present case, the cold storage appears to be used only for storage purposes and there is nothing in the complaint to suggest that the refrigeration was with a view to the adaption of the potatoes to their sale. " Some observations made in Re: A. M Chinniah, AIR (1957) Madras 755 were brought to the notice ofthe learned single Judge ofthe Rajasthan High Court. The observation made by the Madras High Court is detailed below:- "To sum up, to constitute a manufacture there must be a transformation. Mere labour bestowed on an article even if the labour is applied through machinery, will not make it a manufacture, unless it has progressed so far that a transformation ensues and the articles become commercially known as an other and distinct article from that as which it begins its existence. " 2. Ardeshir H. Bhiwandiwala v. The State ofBombay, [1961] 3 SCR 592.

The main question for determination in this appeal is whether the Salt Works come within the definition of the word "factory" under clause (m) of Section 2 of the Act. The Salt Works extend over an area of about 250 acres. The only buildings on this land consist of temporary shelters constructed for the resident labour and for an office. At a few places, pucca platforms exist for fixing the water pump when required to pump water from the sea. The entire area of the Salt Works is open. On the seaside, it has bunds in order to prevent sea water flooding the salt pans. It was contended before this Court that the expression "premises" in the definition of the word "factory" means "buildings" and that "mere open land" is not covered by the word "premises" and as there are no buildings except temporary sheds on the Salt Works, the Salt Works cannot be said to be a "factory".

This Court held: "That the salt works was a factory within the definition given in the Act and that the appellant was rightly convicted for working it without a license. The word "premises" is a generic term meaning open land or land with buildings or buildings alone; the salt works came within the expression "premises" in the definition ofthe word "factory". The extraction of salt from seawater was not due to merely to natural forces but was due to human efforts aided by natural forces. The process of conversion of sea water into salt was a "manufacturing process" as defined in cl. (k) ofS. 2, inasmuch as salt was manufactured from seawater by a process of treatment and adaptation. By this process seawater, a non-commercial article, was converted into a different thing salt, a commercial article. " UTTARANCHAL FORESTDEVELOPMENT CORPN. v. JABAR SINGH [LAKSHMANAN, J ) 863 3. Another authority being relied upon by the Corporation is Employees State Insurance Corporation v.

Mis Triplex Dry Cleaners, (1982) PLR Vol. LXXXIV 1982. In this case, the question arose as to whether the activity of washing and cleaning in a dry-cleaners business is a 'manufacturing process' or not. Relying upon the judgments of Madras High court and Rajasthan High Court in re: A. M Chinniah, AIR (I 957) Mad. 775: (1957) Crl. L. J. 1418) and in Col. Sardar C. S. Angre v. State, AIR (1965) Raj 65: (1965) I Crl. L. J. 333, the test for 'manufacturing process' was applied that there must be a transformation. In other words, some new article or substance should come into being with a view that the same can be used, sold, transported, delivered or disposed off in order to call the process as 'manufacturing process'. It was held as under:- "The scheme of the Act seems to be that if washing and cleaning is one of the processes in a manufacturing concern, then the part of the premises where washing and cleaning is being done would be deemed to be 'manufacturing process'.

Similarly, where only washing and cleaning process is run with power in such a way for example that coarse cloth is turned into fine cloth with the result that a superior marketable commodity, article or substance is produced, which is independently known in the market that the commodity, article or substance as it was before the same was washed or cleaned, then the process of washing and cleaning would be termed 'manufacturing process'. Therefore, in either of the aforesaid two situations, the process of washing and cleaning would come within the definition of 'manufacturing process'. The dry-cleaning business does not fall in any of the two". 4. In Sh. Bhag Singh v. ESJC, (1983) LIC 412, it was held as under: "A reading of the definition of manufacturing process contained in S. 2(k) of that Act would show that pumping of oil is one of the manufacturing process.

Whether selling of petrol or diesel at a petrol pump can be called a process of pumping of oil would again be question to be looked into. A perusal of the definition shows that the process of pumping oil, water, sewage or any other substance has also been defined to be a manufacturing process but to my mind this would not include dealership of petrol or diesel. It is true that some pumping process is involved because petrol and diesel is stored by the petrol dealers in huge tanks but the underlying object of the definition seems to be the pumping ofoil from refineries or water from underground the earth and so on. Essentially, the business carried on by a petrol pump dealer is to sell petrol or diesel as the case may be and not pumping the oil. I am, therefore, of the firm view that selling of petrol or diesel by a petrol dealer will not be a 'manufacturing process'.

" It is submitted that the Corporation is not a factory within the definition of Factories Act as the forest corporation does not work in any premises or place surrounded by a boundary and that the Corporation undertakes the work of cutting of trees earmarked at different places in the forest, which cannot be said to be factory. 5. Tega India Ltd v. Commissioner, Central Excise, Calcutta II, [2004] 2sec121 The appellants Tega India limited carried on the business of fixing rubber linings of pipes, tanks and other such articles supplied by their customers. After fixing the lining, they returned the articles. They were issued a showcause notice claiming that they were manufacturing dutiable goods and that they were not declaring the correct value. Accepting their reply, the notice was dropped but the Collector (Appeals) allowed the Revenue's Appeal and CEGAT upheld that decision. The appellants then filed the appeal before this Court.

This Court held as under: "Case-law shows that circulars issued by the Central Board of Excise and Customs are binding. The law also is that if a tariff item makes no difference between coated and uncoated goods then the mere process of coating would not amount to manufacture of some new commodity. Merely because some extra process is carried on the product would not by itself mean that a new item has come into existence. " 6. S. G. Chemicals and Dyes Trading Employees' Union v. S. G. Chemicals and Dyes Trading limited and Anr. , (1986] 2 SCC 624. This Court held: 12. The first thing to notice about Clause (m) of Section 2 of the Factories Act is that it defines a "Factory" as meaning "any premises including the precincts thereof' and it does not define it as meaning "any one premises including the precincts thereof'. Under this UTTARANCHAL FOREST DEVELOPMENT CORPN. v. JABAR SINGH [LAKSHMANAN, J.

] 865 definition, therefore, it is not required that the industrial establishment must be situate in any one premises only. The second thing to notice about Clause (m) is that the premises must be such as in any part thereof a manufacturing process is being carried on. The expression "manufacturing process" is defined in Clause (k) of Section 2 of the Factories Act.

The said Clause (k) is as follows : (k) 'manufacturing process' means any process for- (i) making, altering, repairing, ornamenting, finishing, packing, oiling, washing, cleaning, breaking up, demolishing, or otherewise treating or adapting any article or substance with a view to its use, sale, transport, delivery or disposal, or (ii) pumping oil, water, sewage or any other substance, or ; (iii) generating, transforming or transmitting power, or (iv) composing types for printing, printing by letter press, lithography, photogravure or other similar process or book binding; or (v) constructing, reconstructing, repairing, refitting, finishing or breaking up ships or vessels ; or (vi) preserving or storing any article in cold storage. Thus, the different processes set out in Sub-clause (i) of Clause (k) of Section 2 must be with a view to the use, sale, transport, delivery or disposal of the article or substances manufactured. " 7. Kores India Ltd. , Chennai v.

Commissioner of Cen·tral Excise, Chennai, [2005] l sec 385 This Court held in para 12 as under: 12. 'Manufacture' is a transformation ofan article, which is commercially different from the one, which is converted. The essence of manufacture is the change of one object to another for the purpose of making it marketable. The essential point thus is that in manufacture something is brought into existence, which is different from that, which originally existed in the sense that the thing produced is by itself a commercially different commodity whereas in the case of processing it is not necessary to produce a commercially different article. .. 8. In Nagpur Electric Light and Power Co. Ltd. v. The Regional Director, Employees' State Insurance Corporation, [1967] 3 SCR 92 AIR (1967) SC 1364 This Court, in the above case, had to consider whether certain employees of the Nagpur Electric Light and Power Company were employees within the meaning of Section 2(g) of the ESI Act, 1948. Bachawat J.

delivering the judgment of the Court observed:- "... The premises constituting a factory may be a building or open land or both. (see Ardeshir H. Bhiwandiwala v. State of Bombay, AIR 1962 SC 29). Inside the same compound wall there may be two or more premises, the premises used in connection with manufacturing processes may constitute ;i factory and the other premises within the same compound wall may be used for purposes unconnected with any manufacturing process and may form no part of the factory. " Dealing with the reasoning of the High Court that the whole area over which the process of transmission was carried on including the sub"station where electricity was stored and supplied to the consumers by further transmission lines would be a factory, it was said:- "We ·cannot accept this line of reasoning. It seems to us a startling proposition that every inch of the wide area over which the transmission lines are spread is a factory within the meaning ofSection 2(12).

A factory must occupy a fixed site..... " 9. In Workmen ofDelhi Electric Supply Undertaking v. The Management ofDelhi Electric Supply Undertaking, AIR ( 1973) SC 365, this Court held: "18. Section 2(12) referre 7. Often the workman is retrenched when he is advanced in age and his energies \. are declining and it becomes difficult for him to compete in the employment market with younger people in securing employment. Retrenchment compensation payable under Section 25-F may be of some assistance but it cannot go far to help him tide over the hardship especially when the proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court get prolonged. The plight of the retrenched workman hllfo totl)e considered in the light of the prevailing conditions of unempl~yment and under employment in the country. " It is thus clear that Section 25-N was brought in for the purpose of giving protection to workmen against retrenchment by making prior scrutiny by the Government as a condition precedent. J\:fr.

Mehta further submitted that the Corporation falls within the definition of 'Industrial Establishment' as defined in Section 25-L (a) of the ... Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It is submitted that 'Industrial Establishment' for the purpose of Chapter V-B means a factory as defined in Clause (m) of Section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948. It is submitted that the petitioner Corporation fully satisfies the requirement ofthe definition of the 'factory' as defined under section 2(m) inasmuch as the area over which the respondent workmen carry on their activity would fall within the term 'premises' as understood and explained by a Constitution Bench of this Court in the decision reported in the case ofArdeshir H. Bhiwandiwala v. State ofBombay, (1961] 3 SCR 592. The Constitution Bench clearly held in the aforementioned decision that 'premises' can consist of open area and need not be confined in its meaning to buildings alone. Mr.

Mehta also made submission on the definition of 'manufacturing process' under Section 2(k) of the Factories Act, 1948. The appellant has urged that in order to satisfy the definition of 'factory' under Section 2(m) of the Factories Act, there must be a 'manufacturing process' and the activity which was carried on by the workmen does not fall within the definition of 'manufacturing process' as defined in Section 2(k) ofthe Factories Act, 1948. The above submission, in our opinion, is untenable in law and cannot be sustained for more than one reason. However, before dealing with the definition of 'manufacturing process' as defined in section 2(k), it is necessary to briefly refer to the functions and powers of the corporation as mentioned in Sections 14 and 15 of the U. P. Forest Corporation Act, 1974. It is submitted that the functions and powers of the Corporations is inter alia to undertake removal UTTARANCHAL FOREST DEVELOPMENT CORPN. 1·. ! ABAR SINGH [LAKSHMANAN. l.

] 88} and disposal of trees and exploitation of forests and resources. (Sectionl4 (1) (b)). The Corporation has also the power to set up workshop or factories for processing raw materials. (Section 15 (2) (a)). The High Court after referring to the aforementioned statutory provisions in the impugned judgment observed as under: - "... From the perusal ofthe functions and power including the power to undertake projects at the instance of others shows that the Corporation is totally a commercial corporation, which undertakes removal and disposal ofthe trees and exploitation offorest resources entrusted to it by the State Government... The corporation has power to setup workshop or a factory for processing forest raw material... " That in so far as the question of manufacturing process is concerned, it is submitted that the activity in quesHon fully satisfies the ingredients of the ·-definition of 'manufacturing process' as defined in Section 2(k) ofthe Factories Act, 1948.

The relevant discussion of the High Court in so far as the activity in question is concerned is set out in the impugned judgment and for ready reference the same is given hereinbelow. "... The trees which are allotted to the forest corporation in the area of the region are rooted in the earth being things attached to the earth are removable property by the definition ofimmovable property given in General Clauses Act, while timber/logs are waod cut up and sawn as held by the apex court in State of Orissa v. Titaghur Paper Mills Company Ltd reported in 1985 1uppl. SCC 280 in para 90... " "Cutting of trees by axe and shaping the cut trees into logs which is sold by the Forest Corporation is a manufacturing process as process of making, altering or shaping of an article is carried on inasmuch as the trees after being cut are converted and altered into logs for sale as timber.

Cutting of trees and converting them into logs by employing the implements through the mechanical process with aid of workmen without aid ofpower is manufacturing process in which the logs and timber are a producrproduced after cutting ofthe trees which are immovable property by axe and shaping them into logs by use ofsaws by workmen into logs, which become articles or moveable substance and is sold by Forest Corporation... " 1t was submitted that the aforesaid activity would fully comply with definition of 'manufacturing process' as defined under section 2(k) of the Factories Act, 1948. It was submitted that the activity in question in the present case could easily be said to be making or altering an Article with a view to its use, sale, transport, delivery or disposal. The word 'alter' in Black's law dictionary (6th Edition at pg. 77) is defined as under:- "Alter.

To make a change in; to modify; to vary in some degree; to change some of tile elements or ingredients or details without substituting an entirely n. ew thing or destroying the identity of the thing affected. To change partially. To change in one or more respects, but without destruction of existence or identity of the thing changed; to increase or diminish. See Alteration; Amend; Change. " It was submitted that the test laid dow~ by this Court in Ardeshir's case is whether what is made shall be a different thing from that out of which it is made. In this connection it is necessary to set out the relevant paras from the Constitution Bench decision as under:- "The observation in Grove v. Lloyds British Testing Company ltd. (1931) A. C. 466 at 467), support the view that the conservation of sea water into salt amounts to adapting it for sale.

It is stated there:- "I think 'adapting for sale' points clearly to something being done to the article in question which in some way, makes it in itself a little different from what it was before. " xx xx xx ... In the present case, we are considering the definition ofthe expression "manufacturing process" and no dictionary meaning of the word "manufacture" for the purpose of other Acts can be of any guide. It may, however, be noted that even according to the meaning given to the word "manufacture", the conversion of brine into salt would amount to manufacture of salt as "the essence of making or of manufacturing is what is made shall be different thing from that out of which it is made" vide McNicol and Anr. v. Pinch (1906) 2 K. B. 352 at 361)" With regard to the non-maintainability of the writ pet1t1on and the contention that the writ petition by respondents were barred by ! aches, Mr.

Mehta submitted that the availability of alternative remedy is only a rule UTTARANCHAL FORESTDEVELOPMENT CORPN. v. JABARSINGH{LAKSHMANAN. J. J of prudence and in a case like the present one where there were no disputed questions of fact, he submitted the High Court was justified in entertaining the writ petition. Mr. Bharat Sangal also made his submissions that this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India is entitled to mould the relief to be given to the workmen in the present case in view of the fact that Section 25N 7 statutorily provides all benefits to the workmen in case of illegal retrenchment, the workmen concerned in the present cases would be entitled to the said benefit without any modification or mould the relief by this Court. He, therefore, submitted that the civil appeals filed by the Corporation deserves to be dismissed in favour of the respondent-workmen. We are unable to countenance the above submission of Mr. Mehta and Mr.

Sangal insofar as it relates to the non-maintainability of the writ_ petition and the delay and laches. It is not in dispute that the effective alternative remedy was not availed by many of the workmen as detailed in paragraphs supra. The tennination order was made in the year 1995 and the writ petitions were admittedly filed in the year 2005 after a delay of 10 years. The High Court, in our opinion, was not justified in entertaining the writ petition on the ground that the petition has been filed after a delay of IO years and that the writ petitions should have been dismissed by the High Court on the ground oflaches. We have already referred to the decision ofthis Court in V. P. State Spinning Co. Ltd. v. R. S. Pandey and Anr, (supra). This Court speaking through Arijit Pasyat, J.

has held in categorical tenns that writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution should not be entertained when the statutory remedy is available under the Act unless exceptional circumstances are made out. In the instant case, the workmen have not made out any exceptional circumstances to knock . the door of the High Court straightaway without availing the effective alternative remedy available under the Industrial Disputes Act. But the dispute relates to enforcement ofa right or obligation under the statute and a specific remedy is, therefore, provided under the statute the High Court should not deviate from the general view and interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution except when a very strong case is made out for making a departure. There are several decisions to the same effect. The respondents have not· made out any strong case for maki~g a departure. Accordingly, the conclusion is inevitable that the High Court was not justified in entertaining the writ petition.

We are, therefore, of the opinion that the writ petitioners (respondents herein) who have not invoked the jurisdiction of the Tribunal are not entitled to any relief in the writ petitions. They are not entitled for any benefits of reinstatement, back-wages and continuity of service. On the other hand, the respondents in civil appeals arising out of special leave petitions as detailed infra who approached the Tribunal and the High Court are entitled for the relief ofreinstatement, back-wages and continuity ofservice in view ofour finding that the appellant-Corporation is an Industrial Establishment and that provisions of Section 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act are attracted. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents in the other civil appeals have adopted the arguments of Mr. Dhruv Mehta and Mr. Bharat Sangal.

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the provisions of Section 25- N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 are attracted_ and non-compliance of the said section makes retrenchment order illegal and non est. We also hold that the appellant-Corporation is an industrial establishment within the definition of Section 25L of Chapter V-B ofthe Industrial Disputes Act. We, therefore, allow the civil appeal Nos. 5730, 5740, 5741, 5742, 5744, E: 5745,5746,5749,5750,5752,5754,5755,5756,5758,5759,5760,5761,57570f 2006 arising out ofSLP (C) Nos. 3399/2004, 8552/2004, 855312004, 10712/2004, 13425/2004, 13446/2004, 13813/2004, 14327/2004, 15498/2004, 21790/2004, 21791/ 2004, 5297/2005, 24706/2005, 25258/2005, 25001/2005, 25075/2005, 26042/2005, 25203/2005, and dismiss the civil appeal Nos. 5728, 5729, 5731, 5732, 5733, 5734, 5735, 5736, 5737, 5738, 5739, 5747, 5748, 5751 of 2006 filed by the appellant Corporation arising out ofSpecial Leave Petition (Civil) Nos.

24584/ 2003, 3189/2003, 3553/2004, 3738/2004, 3740/2004, 3793/2004, 3795/2004, 4361/. 2004, 4386/2004, 4391/2004, 7548/2004, 15433/2004, 15434/2004 and 21789/2004. No costs. V. S. S. Appeals disposed of.