VASU DEV SINGH AND ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS

Citation: [2006] SUPP. 8 S.C.R. 535

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: S.B. SINHA, P.P. NAOLEKAR

Case summary

VASU DEV SINGH AND ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.pdf

Judgment text

VASU DEV SINGH AND ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. NOVEMBER 7, 2006 [S. B. SINHA AND P. P. NAOLEKAR, JJ. ] East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949-Section 3-Notification under, by Administrator-Directing that provisions ofAct not applicable to buildings and rented land whose monthly rental exceeded Rs.

1500-Validity of-Held: Delegation of essential legislative function is impermissible- Administrator has no jurisdiction to issue a Notification which would have a permanent impact-It cannot change the basic features of the law or act contrary to the legislative policy-It could exercise power under section 3 only in terms of legislative policy-Administrator cannot repeal provisions of the main Act-Change of legislative policy with the aid of the National f> Housing Policy was not within the domain ofthe Administrator-It was the sole prerogative ofthe legislature-Thus, Notification violative oflegislative policy-East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Extension to Chandigarh) Act, 1974-Constitution of India, 1950-Artic/es 245 and 246. Administrative law: Conditional legislation and delegated legislation-Distinction · between-Explained Delegated legislation-Judicial review, scope of-Held: Is permissible though the scope is limited.

Legislation: Legislative policy-Ascertainment of-Held: Can be gatheredfi·om the preamble ofa statute, statement ofobject and reasons and the provisions therein. Prior to coming into force of Punjab Re-organisation Act, 1966, Union Territory of Chandigarh was part ofState of Punjab. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 was enacted to restrict the increase of rent of certain premises situated within the limits of urban areas and eviction of tenants therefrom. Provisions of 1949 Act were extended to Union Territory of I Chandigarh by Notification. Appellants-tenants in the premises within Union Territory of Chandigarh were protected in terms of 1949 Act. High Court struck down the Notification since Chandigarh was not declared an urban area. In 1972, Chandigarh was declared an urban area. Thereafter, East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Extension to Chandigarh) Act, 1974 was enacted in terms whereof provisions of 1949 Act were extended to Union Territory of Chandigarh.

The Administrator of Chandigarh in exercise of his power conferred upon him under section 3 of 1949 Act, issued Notification dated 07. 11. 2002 directing that the provisions of the Act would not apply to the buildings and rented land whose monthly rental exceeded Rs. 1500/-. Appellant filed writ petition challenging the vires of Section 3 of 1949 as also vali~ity of the Notification. Administrator filed additional affidavit before the High Court assigning reasons for issuing the said notification. Reference was made to the National Housing Policy adopted by the Central Government, Model Rent Law suggested by Government of India as also various correspondences entered into by and between Central Government and the Union Territory culminating in issuance of the said Notification. High Court dismissed the writ petitions holding that the Notification was not ultra vires the provisions of the 1949 Act. Hence the present appeals. Allowing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1.

The order ofHigh Court that the Notification dated 07. 11. 2002 issued by Administrator of Chandigarh in exercise of his power conferred upon him under section 3 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 directing that the provisions of the Act would not apply to the buildings and rented land whose monthly rental exceeded Rs. 1500/-, was not ultravires the provisions of the 1949 Act, cannot be sustained. (546-E-FJ 2. 1. The distinction between conditional legislation and delegated legislation is clear and unambiguous. In a conditional legislation the delegatee has to apply the law to an area or to determine the time and manner ofcarrying it into effect or at such time, as it decides or to understand the rule of legislation, it would be a conditional legislation. The legislature in such a case makes the law, which is complete in all respects but the same is not brought into operation immediately.

The enforcement ofthe law would depend upon the fulfilment ofa condition and what is delegated to the executive is the authority to determine by exercising its own judgment as to whether such conditions have been fulfilled and/or the time has come when such legislation should be brought in force. Therefore, the taking effect of a legislation, is VASUDEVSINGHv. U. 0. 1. 537 made dependent upon the determination of such fact or condition by the executive organ of the Government. Delegated legislation, however, involves delegation of rule making power of legislation and authorises an executive authority to bring in force such an area by reason thereof. The discretion conferred on the executive by way ofdelegated legislation is much wider. Such power to make rules or regulations, however, must be exercised within the four corners ofthe Act. Thus, delegated legislation is a device which has been .

J3 fashioned by the legislature to be exercised in the manner laid down in the legislation itself. (553-B-F] 2. 2. It cannot be said that the impugned Notification is in effect and substance a conditional legislation and not a delegated legislation. By reason ofsection 3 of the 1949 Act, Administrator, however, has been empowered to issue a notification whereby and whereunder, an exemption is granted for application of the Act itself. (553-F-G] Hamdard Dawakhana (Wakj) Lal Kuan, Delhi & Anr. v. Union ofIndia & Ors. , (1960) 2 SCR 671; MP. High Court Bar Association v. Union ofIndia & Ors. , (2004) 11 SCC 766; State ofTamil Nadu, represented by Secretary, Housing Deptt. , Madras v. K. Sabanayagam & Anr. , [1998] 1 SCC 318 and Orient Paper andIndustries Ltd & Anr. v. State ofOrissa & Ors. , (1991) Supp. 1 sec 81, relied on. 3.

While considering the validity of dele~ated legislation, the scope of judicial review is limited but the scope and effect thereof have to be considered having regard to the nature and object thereof. The nature of delegated legislation can be broadly classified as the rule-making power; and grant of exemption from the operation ofa statute. In the latter category, the scope of judicial review would be wider as the statutory authority while exercising its statutory power must show that the same had not only been done within the four corners thereof but otherwise fulfills the criteria laid down therefor. Therefore, the law which is laid down is that if by a Notification, the Act itself stands effaced; the Notification may be struck down. But that may not be the only factor. [554-E-G; 557-A-B] P. J. Irani v. State ofMadras and Anr. , (1962) 2 SCR 169, relied on. Clariant International ltd. and Anr. v. Securities & Exchange Board of India, (2004) 8 SCC 524; State of Rajasthan and Ors. v.

Basant Nahata, (2005) 12 sec 77: AIR (2005) SC 3401; B. K. Industries and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. , [1993) Supp. 3 sec 621; Hindustan lever and Ors. v. ·H. Hindustan Lever Mazdoor Sabha and Ors. , [1994] Supp. 1 SCC l; Nedurimilli Janardhana Reddy v. Progressive Democratic Student Union and Ors. , [1994] 6 SCC 506; Agricultural Market Committee v. Shalimar Chemical Works Ltd, [1997] 5 SCC 516; Additional District Magistrate (Rev. ) Delhi Admn. etc. v. Siri Ram etc. , [2000] 5 SCC 451; ITW Signode India Ltd v. Collector of Central Excise, (2004] 3 SCC 48; Secretary, Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilizers, Government of India v. Cipla Ltd and Ors. , [2003) 7 SCC l; Maharashtra State BoardofSecondary and Higher Secondary Education and Anr. etc. v. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth and Ors. , [1984) 4 SCC 27; Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd and Ors. etc. v. Union ofIndia and Ors. etc. , (1985] 1 SCC 641; Khoday Distilleries Ltd and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors.

, [1996) 10 SCC 304; Dai-ichi Karkaria Ltd v. Union of India and Ors. , [2000) 4 SCC 57 and Bombay Dyeing and Mfg. Co. Ltd (3) v. Bombay Environmental Action Group and Ors. , [2006] 3 SCC 434; Kera/a Samsthana Chetu Thozhilali Union v. State ofKera/a and Ors. , (2006[ 4 SCC 327, referred to. Principles ofStatutory Interpretation by G. P. Singh, Tenth Edition p 916 and Craies on Statute Law, 7th Edition, referred to. 4. 1. The legal history can be taken into consideration for construction ofa statute. Chandigarh, admittedly, is a new town. It was meant to be used as Union Territory in terms of the provisions of the Punjab Resettlement Act. It enjoys a unique feature which no other town in India does, namely, capital of two States as also being an Union Territory in itself.

Although it is a capital of two States, the essential functions of a legislative authority as also power of administrations are in the hands of the Central Government in terms of Article 239 ofthe Constitution oflndia. It is the Parliament alone which would legislate on its behalf. The Central Government extended the beneficial legislation of rent control in the Union Territory. [581-A-C) Dr. Harkishan Singh v. Union ofIndia and Ors. , AIR (1975) P&H 160: (1975) PLR 163, referred to. . . 4. 2. The 1949 Act was conceived as a measure to overcome shortage of rental accommodation in the wake of Second World War and the influx of refugees following partition. The Union of India also accepts that the object of the State Act to provide for control and regulation of the rental housing market, determination offair rent, protection oftenants against indiscriminate eviction at the hands oflandlords and the rights of the landlords for recovery of tenanted premises in specific cases.

(589-B-D) VASU DEV SINGHv. U. O. I. 539 4. 3. The reasons for which the impugned notification was issued was stated to be that the social objective of the Rent Control Act had not been realised and it had various other adverse effects including simulation of investment in rental housing especially from the lower and middle income groups. A model Rent Control legislation was circulated in the year 1992 wherein proposal was made to give exemption to residential non-residential B, premises carrying more than specified rental of Rs. 1500/- per month. The Government of India had been advocating urban section reforms and had introduced an urban reforms incentive scheme whereunder funds are to be provided by it and to urban sector reforms such reform was to be carried out for removing the rental laws. Therefore, wnat was contemplated, was amendment ofthe existing legislation by the legislature so as to achieve partial repeal of the Act.

The National Housing Policy or the Central Government did not and could not recommend that what can be done only by the legislature, can be achieved through the route of Notification issued by the Administration under section 3 of the Act. 1589-D-H; 590-AJ 4. 4. The legislature itself, provided for speedy relief to a section of landlords. The provisions have been enacted for the purpose of protection of tenants of certain sections. (588-H, 589-A) 4. 5. The words "certain premises", for the purpose ofascertaining the legislative policy must be construed having regard to the definition of "building" only. The words "certain premises", having regard to their applicability in the urban areas, would also mean that the premises situated in the urban area and not in rural area. 1589-A-B] 5. 1. Legislative Policy ofa State can be gathered from the Preamble of the Statute, the Statement of Objects and Reasons and the core provisions contained therein. In construing.

a statute, preamble may not have a role to play unless the meaning thereof is obscure or if plain meaning is to be given, the same would lead to an absurdity, but, the preamble being a part of the statute can be read along with other portions ofthe Act to give clear meaning to the provisions and to decide whether they are clear or ambiguous, the preamble in itselfis not an enacting provision as other relevant enacting words have to be found elsewhere in the Act, and the utility ofthe preamble diminishes if the statutory provisions are themselves capable of being given a literal meaning. Once, however the words used in statute have a plain meaning, the courts should not busy themselves to find out the supposed intention or the poliey underlying statute. 1582-H; 583-A-B-F-GJ Union ofIndia v. Elphinstone Spg. and Wvg. Co. Ltd. and Ors. , [200l) 4 SCC 139 and Sardar Gurmej Singh v. Sardar Partap Singh Kairon, [1960] 1 SCR 909, relied on. State ofRajasthan and Ors. v.

Basant Nahata, (2005] 12 SCC 77: AIR (2005) SC 3401; Vasantlal Maganbhai Sanjanwala v. State ofBombay and Ors. , (1961) 1 SCR341 andLachmiNarainandOrs. v. Union ofIndia& Ors. , (1976) 2 sec 953, referred to. 5. 2. The Rent Act was a beneficent legislation which sought to protect a category of the tenants occupying rented buildings specified therein not _only from--eghancement of rent, but also from unreasonable eviction. Furthermore, the Act provides for protection ofthe tenants from unreasonable harassment at the hands of the landlords. (582-A-B] 5. 3. Section 3 although is a part of the Act, but the same cannot be said to contain an in-built policy so as to empower the Administrator to do all such things which can be done by the legislature itself. By taking recourse to the preamble, it cannot be said that the power to exclude the tenanted premises can be exercised without taking into consideration the legislative policy and the object of the Act.

It may be true that by reason ofSection 3 of the Act, no arbitrary power as such has been conferred in view of the fact that the Act applies only to certain classes of lands and buildings but the same would not mean that the Administrator is free to take any action in any manner he likes. The action of the Administrator is indisputably subject to judicial review. [594-F-H; 595-A) 6. 1.

The executive government can exercise its power ofexemption where such exemption had been granted only for a limited period; in respect of new buildings, government buildings, buildings belonging to the local-self government and other public sector undertakings; areas belonging to the Cantonment Board which was outside the purview of the applicability of the original Act being governed by separate Act, like Cantonment Acts; where the same would come within the purview of the delegated legislation; where the tenants or tenanted premises form a distinct and separate class; where having regard to the constitutional scheme that any State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution would not treat its tenants in an unfair and arbitrary manner despite the rent control laws being not applicable in their case as they would be treated to be forming a separate class. (585-D-H] 6. 2.

The Administrator will have no jurisdiction to issue a notification _ which would have a permanent impact. The Administrator cannot change the VASU DEV SINGH v. U. 0. 1. 541 basic features of the law or Act contrary to the legislative policy. A delegate must act within the four corners of the Act, the guidelines wherefor must be provided for in the Act itself. The legislature, on the other hand, can not only repeal the statute, it can change the basic features of the law. The only limitation on the part of the legislature is that ordinarily it cannot take away a vested right. 1586-A-B) B, 6. 3. With regard to the validity of the impugned Notification one of the grounds for invalidating the notification would be if irrelevant factors have been taken into consideration. Agother test which can be applied is as to whether the notification is otherwise ma/afide in the sense that the same has been used for unauthorised purpose. 1586-D-E] P. J. Irani v. State ofMadras and Anr.

, (1962) 2 SCR 169, relied on. 6. 4. A statute can be amended, partially repealed or wholly repealed by the legislature only. The philosophy underlying a statute or the legislative policy, with the passage oftime, may be altered but therefor only the legislature has the requisite power and not the executive. The delegated legislation must be exercised within the parameters ofessential legislative policy. The question -I must be considered from another angle. Delegation of essential legislative function is impermissible. It is essential for the legislature to declare its legislative policy which can be gathered from the express words used in the · statute or by necessary implication, having regard to the attending circumstances. The legislature cannot delegate its power to repeal the law or modify its essential features. 1587-B-E] (). 5. The Administrator is said to have taken into consideration the National Housing Policy circulated in the year 1992.

Such a bahmcing procedure was recommended to be done by way of legislation and not by executive action. The National Housing Policy recommended for step by step repeal of the Act and substituted the same by a new permanent Act By reason thereof the fact that most of the States had enacted temporary Acts which had been extended from time to time, was, thus, taken into consideration. Only because some exemption notifications had been issued under the Punjab Act by itself may not be a ground to follow the same blindly inasmuch as the Punjab Act applies to the entire State. There may not be any town in the said State which may be as important as Chandigarh and where the rental of the tenanted premises would be as high as in the said town. The Administrator himself has described the status of Chandigarh. Despite the same, he equated Chandigarh with other towns ofthe State of Punjab. (586-E-H) 6. 6.

The Administrator in issuing the notification has missed the relevance of the distinction between the National Housing Policy and the legislative policy. The power ofexemption could be exercised having regard to the legislative intent and policy whereas the National Housing Policy could be given effect to by the legislature in modifying, varying or altogether doing away with the existing legislative policy and laying down a new policy therefor. Change of legislative policy with the aid of the National Housing Policy was not within the domain ofthe Administrator. It was the sole prerogaiive ofthe legislature. (587-A-B] 6. 7. Section 3 of the Act is constitutionally valid. However, it provides for an enabling provision. The Central Government, by reason of the said provision, has been empowered to direct that all or any of the said provisions would not apply to any of the buildings or rented buildings or any class of buildings or any rented lands. (587-E-F] 6. 8.

The classification as regards the premises occupied and possessed by the State, the Local Self Government or other public sectors, however, stand on a different footing. It is now beyond any controversy that this Court treated the houses stated to be belonging to the State or public sector undertaking absolutely on a different footing on the pre-supposition that they would n. ot unreasonably enhance the rental of the premises and they would conduct themselves in such a manner so as to make a tenant feel that they would not be subjected to unreasonable eviction. [590-E-F) Baburao Shantaram More v. Bombay Housing Board and Anr. , (1954) SCR 572: AIR (1954) SC 153 and Mis. Dwarkadas Marfatia and Sons v. Board ofTrustees ofthe Port ofBombay, (1989) 3 SCC 293, referred to. Jamshed Hormusji Wadia v. Board ofTrustees, Port ofMumbai and Anr. , (2004) 3 SCC 214 and Municipal Corpn. , Chandigarh and Ors. v. Shantikunj Investment (P) Ltd. and Ors. , (2006) 4 SCC 109, relied on. 6. 9.

Even the criterion underlying the policy is required to be changed by way of modification or variation in the standard of rent, object whereof . ·should have been achieved only by making suitable amendments in the Act itself. The Administrator could not have tinkered with the provisions of the Act. What should have been the criterion for fixing the quantum of rent so as to render the classification constitutional and valid in law although would not VASU DEV SINGH v. U. 0. 1. 543 ordinarily fall for consideration of the court, but the question as to whether hy reason of fixation ofsuch a rent which would render the Act inapplicable to a large section of the tenants would come within the scope ofjudicial review. The criterion which was required to be considered was not as to what rent building could have fetched in 1978 but what would have been a fair criterion i,ts regards the quantum of rent when the notification was issued.

For that purpose, no data has been collected nor has any study been made. As to how the said criterion had been fixed is not known. Except stating that the rent of Rs. 1500/- to Rs. 3500/- was made the criterion in terms of the National Housing Policy, the Administrator did not assign any other reason. [591-H; 592-A-B-D-E] 6. 10. The Administrator while issuing the impugned notification misdirected himself in law insofar as he failed to take into consideration that he could not have exercised any jurisdiction in terms thereof as the National Housing Policy, inter alia, contains the guidelines for the State legislatures for enactment of law and the same was not meant to be taken recourse to by the Executive Government ofthe State. While exercising his jurisdiction under Section 3 of the Act, the Administrator was required to apply his own mind to the relevant facts.

Application of mind on the part of the Administrator was also necessary having regard to the rate of inflation and other factors including the prevalent rental in the neighbouring areas of the States of Punjab and Haryana. It was necessary to collect relevant data. Rental of Rs. 1500/- could not have elhi; practically everybody would be taken out of the protection of the Rent Control Act. Repelling the said contention, this Court opined that the objects of the amending Act were quite different from the objects of the Parent Act as the object ofthe Amending Act was not merely to protect the weaker sections of the society, i. e. , the tenants but also the landlords. It was noticed that prior to enactment of the said amendment, various representations were made by the landlords' association. It was thought by the legislature that the Rent Act had brought halt to the housing building activity for letting out.

Keeping in view the acute shortage of accommodation causing hardship to the rich and the poor alike, the Act was held to have been enacted to strike a balance between the interests of the landlords and those of the tenants and for giving a boost to house building activity and pursuant thereto the legislature in its wisdom decided to restrict the prote::tion of the Rent Act not only to those premises in respect whereof rent payaLle was upto Rs. 3500/- per month but also decided not to extend the statutory protection to the premises constructed on or after the date of coming into operation of the. Act for a period of ten years. It was categorically held that as the Legislature could repeal the Rent 1: Act altogether, it could do so also step by step. The said amendment was VASU DEV SINGH v. U. 0. 1. [S. B. SINHA, J. ] 579 .... found to be one of the steps for repealing the Act opining .

: "In our view, it is for the legislature to decide what should be the cutoff point for the purpose of classification and the legislature of necessity must have a lot of latitude in this regard. It is well settled that the safeguard provided by Article 14 of the Constitution can only be invoked, if the classification is made on the grounds which are · totally irrelevant to the object of the statute. But, if there is some nexus between the objects sought to be achieved and the classification, the legislature is presumed to have acted in proper exercise of its constitutional power. The classification in practice may result in some hardship. But, a statutory discrimination cannot be set aside, if there are facts on the basis of which this statutory discrimination can be justified. " As regards the nexus for the ceiling limit of Rs. 3500/-, the Court observed that the exemption, with the passage of time, may not have any · nexus with the objects sought to be achieved by the statute.

But, it was for the legislature to decide which particular section of people requires protection at any given point of time. The persons who, as of then, were paying less than Rs. 42,000/- per year were considered to be belonging to weaker section. The wisdom of the legislature was again emphasized in paragraph 52 thereof holding: "We are unable to uphold this contention for a number of reasons. Prior to the enactment of the Rent Control Act by the various State Legislatures, the legal relationship between the landlord and tc ant was governed by the provisions ofthe Transfer of Property Act. Delhi Rent Control Act provided protection to the tenants from drastic enhancement of rent by the landlord as well as eviction, except on certain specific grounds. The legislature by the Amendment Act No. 57 of 1988 has partially repealed the Delhi Rent Control Act. This is a case of express repeal.

By Amending Act the legislature has withdrawn the protection hitherto enjoyed by the tenants who were paying Rs. 3500 or above as monthly rent. If the tenants were sought to be evicted prior to the amendment of the Act, they could have taken advantage of the provisions of the Act to resist such eviction b,y the landlord. But this was nothing more than a right to :ke advantage of the enactment. The tenant enjoyed statutory protection as long as the statute remained in force and was applicable to him. - If the statute ceases to be operative, the tenant cannot claim to continue to have the old statutory protection. It was observed by Tindal, C. J. , in the case of Kay v. Goodwin, 130 ER 1403 : (ER p.

1405) "The effect of repealing a statute is to obliterate it as completely from the records ofthe parliament as if it had never been passed; and, it must be considered as a law that never existed, except for the purpose of those actions which were commenced, prosecuted, and concluded whilst it was an existing law. "" The Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 was amended by reason of Section 31 ofthe Amending Act exempting buildings fetching a rental ofmore than Rs. 3500/- from the ambitthereof. The question as regards validity ofthe said provision came up for consideration before this Court in C. N. Rudramurthy v. K. Barkathulla Khan & Ors. , [1998] 8 SCC 275, wherein D. C. Bhatia (supra) was followed. We need not, therefore, deal with the ratio in the said decision separately. The legislature of Jammu and Kashmir amended Section 3(iii). The classification of tenants on the basis of income made therein was upheld by this Court in Delhi Cloth & General Mills etc. v. S. Paramjit Singh & Anr.

etc. , [l990) 4 sec 723 in the following terms: "... It is the tenant that the legislature intends to protect and not the landlord or his building. The test adopted by the legislature for this purpose is with reference to the tenant's net income, whether accruing inside or outside the State, as on the date of the landlord's application for eviction as well as on the date of the decree for eviction. The legislative obje~t is, therefore, to protect tenants who are economically weaker in comparison to those affluent tenants falling outside the specified limit ofincome, and at the same time to encourage construction of new buildings which. will result in better availability of accommodation, employment opportunity and economic prosperity. This is a reasonable classification which does not suffer from the vice of being too vague or broad. Classification based on income is well known to law. Such classification has a reasonable relation to the twin legislative objects mentioned above.

We see nothing unreasonable or irrational or unworkable or vague or unfair or unjust in the classification adopted by the impugned provision. " Having noticed the notifications and the precedents operating in the VASU DEV SINGH v. U. 0. 1. [S. B. SINHA, J. ] 581 field, we may notice the distinguishing features of this case. Statutory scheme : It is trite that legal history can be taken into consideration for construction of a statute. Chandigarh, admittedly, is a new town. It was. meant to be used as a union territory in terms of the provisions of the Punjab, Resettlement Act. It enjoys a unique feature which no other town in India does, namely, capital of two States as also being an Union Territory in itse\f. Although it is a capital of two States, the essential functions of a legislative authority as also power of administrations are in the hands of the Central Government in terms of Article 239 of the Constitution of India.

It is the Parliament alone which would legislate on its behalf. The Central Government extended the beneficial legislation of rent control in the Union Territory. It was declared an urban area only in November, 1972. In view ofthe Full Bench Decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Dr. Harkishan Singh v. · Union ofIndia & Ors. , AIR (1975) P&H 160: 1975 PLR 163), the Parliament enacted the 1974 Act in terms whereof the provisions of 1949 Act were extended to the Union Territory of Chandigarh. The 1949 Act is a preconstitutional legislation. The 1974 Act was enacted immediately after partition of India. The State of Punjab during pre-partition days was known as State of East Punjab. It consisted of areas both urban and rural. The main purpose at· the time of enactment of the said Act might have been restricted to two areas, i. e.

, (l) rent ofcertain premises situated within the limits of urban areas (2) eviction of tenants therefrom, whereas the main enactment applied to the entire State of Punjab. The extension of 1949 Act, evidently would apply to the Union Territory of Chandigarh. Sub-section (2) of Section 1 of the 1949 Act made a distinction between the urban area and cantonment area. It was not to apply to the cantonment area and prcsumably for that reason the p preamble uses the words "certain premises". The definition of building in the Act provides for a broad meaning. It includes out houses, go-downs, furniture, except a room in a hotel, hostel or boarding house. The types of premises to which the said Ad would apply, thus may be found out from the definition of 'building' itself. Unlike similar legislations enacted by other State Governments, the Act is not a temporary Act. It is indisputably in force for a period of more than 57 years.

Legifi/ative policy : Legislative Policy of a State can be gathered from the Preamble, the Statement of Objects and Reasons and the core provisions contained therein. It is, however, not much in dispute that the Rent Act was a beneficent legislation wbich sought to protect a category of the tenants occupying rented buildings specified therein not only from enhancement of rent, but also from unreasonable eviction. The Act furthermore provides for protecti_on of the tenants from unreasonable harassment at the hands of the landiords. The Transfer of Property Act governed the field relating to eviction of all kinds of tenants. For eviction of a monthly tenant 15 days' notice ending with the tenancy month, a5 envisaged under Section I06 thereof was sufficient· to bring an action for a landlord to evict his tenant.

The tenant, inter alia, could raise a defence of defect in the said notice in case eviction is sought for or applicability of other provisions thereof as also non-compliance of the other requirements contained therein. The Transfer ofProperty Act does not contain any provision empowering any court to regulate enhancemerit of rent. No provision existed therein also for protection of tenants from harassment at the hands of the landlords, as for example, disconnecting the electrical and water connection from the tenanted premises. The Rent Control Act, on the other hand, was enacted to protect the tenant, inter alia, in relation to the matters noticed hereinbefore. We may briefly notice the core provisions of the 1949 Act. Section 3 of the Act empowers the Administrator to issue an exemption notification. Sections 4, 5 and 6 deal with determination of fair rent. Section I0 prohibits the landlord from disconnecting electrical energy, etc.

Sectionl3 enumerates the grounds upon which the landlord seeks eviction of a tenant. The legislative policy of the State was, therefore, required to be deciphered from the said provisions. Different Rent Control Acts enacted by different States use different preambles. Some Acts provide for control of rents, eviction and rents, letting houses, the lease of vacant premises to Government and some Acts seek to control only enhancement of rent or fixation ofrent, unreasonable eviction of tenants. It is permissible to read the preamble of a statute to ascertain the legislative policy. We are not oblivious that in construing· a statute, preamble may not have a role to play unless the meaning thereof is obscure or if plain meaning . VASU DEV SINGH v. U. 0. L [S. B. SINHA, J.

] 583 is to be given, the same would lead to an absurdity, but, (1) the preamble being a part of the statute can be read along with other portions of the Act to give clear meaning to the provisions and to decide whether they are clear or ambiguous, (2) the preamble in itself is not an enacting provision as other relevant enacting words have to be found elsewhere in the Act, and (3) the utility of the preamble diminishes if the statutory provisions are themselves capable of given a literal meaning. (See Union ofIndia v. Elphinstone Spg. & Wvg. Co. Ltd & Ors. [2001] 4 SCC 139. ) Preamble of a statute, as stated in State ofRajasthan & Ors. v. Basant Nahata (supra), however, provides for a key to understand it. It, togeth~r with the Statement of Objects and Reasons which are called heart and soul of the statute, may have to be considered in a given situation for the purpose of giving effect thereto. In Vasantlal Maganbhai Sanjanwala v. State ofBombay & Ors.

, [1961] 1 SCR 341 a provision empowering Provincial Government to fix a lower rent of the maximum rent payable by the tenants was upheld on the ground tqat the legislation policy and principles may be found out from the preamble and provisions ofthe Act. Subba Rao, J. , while expressing his dissention, opined: ".... When the decisions say that the legislature shall lay down the legislative policy and its formulation as a rule of conduct, they do dot mean vague and general declaration of policy; but a definite policy controlling and regulating the powers conferred on the executive for carrying into effect that policy. " Both the majority and minority, therefore emphasized on the importance of the legislative policy which must not be vague and should be definite and bona fide. It is equally well settled that a policy underlying the statute should be gathered from reading the statute, including its preamble as a whole.

Once, however, the words used in statute have a plain meaning, the courts should not busy themselves to find out the supposed intention or the policy underlying statute. (See Sardar Gurmej Singn v. Sardar Partap Singh Kairon, [1960] l SCR 909. ) But we are herein concerned with somewhat a different question, viz. , whether the impugned notification is violative of the legislative policry. In Lachmi Narain and Ors. v. Union ofIndia & Ors. , [1976} 2 SCC 953, this Court was considering the effect of a notification issued in terms of Section 2 of the Union Territories (Laws) Act, 1950, where the words "not less than three months' notice" were substituted by the words "such previous notice as it considers reasonable" were struck down stating that : "The impugned notification, dated December 7, 1957, transgress the limits which circumscribe the scope and exercise of the power conferred by Section 2 of Laws Act, at least in two respects.

Firstly, the power has not been exercised contemporaneously with the extension or for the purposes of the extension of the Bengal Act to Delhi. The power given by Section 2 of the Laws Act had exhausted itself when the Bengal Act was extended, with some alterations, to Delhi by notification, dated April 28, 195I. The impugned notification has been issued on December 7, 1957, more than 6Y:i years after the extension. " It was further. held that: "Secondly, the alteration sought to be introduced by this notification (December 7, 1957) in Section 6(2), goes beyond the scope of the "restrictions and modifications" permissible under Section 2 of the Laws Act; it purports to change the essential features of subsection (2) of Section 6, and the legislative policy inherent therein.

" This Court was also ofthe opinion that Section 6(2) ofthe Act embodies a determination of a legislative policy and its formulation as an absolute rule ofconduct which could be diluted, changed or amended only by the legislature in exercise of its essential legislative function. Necessarily taking recourse to executive action was. forbidden. In State of Rajdsthan & Ors. v. Basant Nahata (supra), the question as to whether the public policy could be the subject matter of delegation of essential legislative function, this Court opined: "There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the court shall not invalidate a legislation on the ground of delegation of essential legislative function or on the ground of conferring unguided, uncontrolled and vague powers upon _the delegate without taking into account the preamble of the Act as also other provisions of the statute in the event they provide good means of finding out the meaning of the offending statute. " VASU DEV SINGHv. U. 0. 1. (S. B.

SINHA, J. ] 58~ It was further held : "Hence, Section 22-A ofthe Act through a subordinate legislation cannot control the transactions which fall out of scope thereof. We have noticed hereinbefore the effect of a power of attornex under the Indian Contract Act or the Power-of-Attorney Act. subordinate legislation which is not backed up by any statutorY guideline under the substantive law and opposed to the enforcement of a legal right, in our opinion, thus, would not be valid. " Analysis : The decisions of this Court clearly point out the distinctive feature~ between the power of the Administrator in terms of a provision of the nature of Section 3 of the Act and the power of the legislature to amend the law.

The executive government can exercise its power ofexemption in the following, ·circumstances: (l) Where such exemption had been granted only for a limited period; (2) in respect of new buildings; (3) in respect of the government buildings, buildings belonging to the local self-government and other public sector undertakings; and (4) areas belonging to the Cantonment Board which was outside the , purview of the applicability of the original Act having regard to the fact that such areas of the cantonment are governed by separate Act, like. Cantonment Acts. (5) Where the same would come within the purview ofthe delegated , legislation. (6) Where the tenants or tenanted premises form a distinct and separate class.

(7) Where having regard to the constitutional scheme that any State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India would not treat its tenants in an unfair and arbitrary manner despite the rent control laws being not applicable in their case; as they would be treated to be forming a separate class; and (8) Where the exemption notification is granted for a limited period ,H or in respect of new buildings for a limited period. In other words, the Administrator will have no jurisdiction to issue a notification which would have a permanent impact. The Administrator cannot change the basic features of the law or act contrary to the legislative policy. The legislature, on the other hand, can not only repeal the statute, it can change the basic features of the law. The only limitation. on the part of the legislature is that ordinarily it cannot take away a vested right.

Validity of the impugned notification : At the outset, we may notice that the learned counsel appearing on behalf of Appellants did not question the constitutionality of Section 3 of the Act. We are, therefore, concerned only with the validity of the impugned ·-. notification dated 7. 11. 2002. For the aforementioned purpose we would proceed on the basis that the rental fetched by a tenanted building or a part thereof can give rise to reasonable classification. The principal question, therefore, wh! ch would arise for consideration is as to whether the impugned notification satisfies the tests laid down in P. J Irani (supra). One ofthe grounds for invalidating the notification would be ifirrelevant factors have been taken into consideration. Another test which can be applied is as to whether the notification is otherwis. e malafide in the sense that the same has been used for unauthorised purpose.

The Administrator is said to have taken into consideration the National Housing Policy, which was circulated as far back in the year 1992. Such a balancing procedure indisputably was recommended to be done by way of legislation and not by executive action. The National Housing Policy recommended for step by step ·repeal of the Act and substituted the same by a new permanent Act. By reason thereof the fact that most of the States had enacted temporary Acts which had been extended from time to time, was, thus, taken into consideration. Only because some exemption notifications had been issued under the Punjab Act by itself may not be a ground to follow the same blindly inasmuch as the Punjab Act applies to the entire State. There may not be any town in the said State which may be as important as Chandigarh and where the rental of the tenanted premises would be as high ·. · as in the said town.

We have seen hereinbefore how the Administrator himself has described the status of Chandigarh. Despite the same, he equated Chandigarh with other towns of the State of Punjab. VASU DEV SINGH v. U. 0. 1. [S. B. SINHA, J. ] 587 The Administrator in issuing the notification has missed the relevance of the distinction between the National Housing Policy and the legislative policy. The power of exemption could be exercised having regard to th~ legislative intent and policy whereas the National Housing Policy could be given effect to by the legislature in modifying, varying or altogether doing away with the existing legislative policy and laying down a new policy therefor. Change of legislative policy with the aid of the National Housing Policy was not within the domain of the Administrator. It was the sole prerogative of the legislature. A statute can be amended, partially repealed or wholly repealed by the legislature only.

The philosophy underlying a statute or the legislative policy, with the passage of time, may be altered but therefor only the legislature has the requisite power and not the executive. The delegated legislation must be exercised, it is trite, within the parameters ofessential legislative policy. The question must be considered from another angle. Delegation of essential legislative function is impermissible. It is essential for the legislature to declare its legislative policy which can be gathered from the express words used in the statute or by necessary implication, having regard to the attending circumstances. It is impermissible for the legislature to abdicate its essential legislative functions. The legislature cannot delegate its power to repeal the law or modify its essential features. Section 3 of the Act, indisputably, is constitutionally valid. It, however, "? provides for an enabling provision.

The Central Government, by reason of the said provision, has been empowered to direct that all or any of the said provisions would not apply to any of the building or rented buildings or any class of buildings or any rented lands. Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Act dealt with the determination of fair rent F: Submissions of Mr. Nariman and Mr. Venugopal, both appearing for the landlords, however, are, inconsistent with each other. Whereas Mr. Nariman submitted that Sections 4, 5 and 6 for all practical purport and intent are not applicable as regard to the town of Chandigarh; according to Mr. Venugopal, Section 4(4)(ii)(c) would be applicable and thus enhancement of rent even in G' respect ofthe buildings, which came into existence after 1965-66, is permissible. When the 1949 Act was passed, there was no 'building' in Chandigarh within the meaning of the said Act.

In terms of Section 4(3)(i) & (ii) of the said Act, the increase in the basic rent was contemplated where the rate of rental was Rs. 25/- to R. s. 50/-. It may not, thus, be correct to contend that Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Act did not provide for enhancement of rent at all. Any rent which exceeded a sum of Rs. 50/- would also come within the purview of Section 5 of the Act but by reason thereof, it cannot be said that the Act sought to provide for a cut-off mark as regard the quantum of rent which could have been the subject matter of enhancement. However, it cannot be denied that having regard to the fact that the question as regard enhancement of rent was required to be considered by the Rent Controller with reference to rent payable when the Act came into force, hardly any relief could be granted in favour of the landlord.

Appellants also in their writ petition stated: "That at this stage, it is important to mention here that Sections 4 and 5 of the Punjab Act of 1949 are not applicable to Chandigarh, as no building existed in the year 1939.. The Parliament, while enacting the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Extension to Chandigarh) Act, 1974 intentionally did not provide fixation of fair rent or increase in the fair rent and gave more protection to the tenants of Chandigarh than the tenants of State of Punjab. " If the rental of Rs. 50/- cannot be considered to be a cut-off mark, the same by itself would not mean, as was contended by Mr. Venugopal, that exemption granted in respect ofa building the rent whereof exceeds Rs. 1500/ - would meet the object of the Act as the philosophy underlying it was to protect only such buildings where only tenants belonging to weaker sections reside. Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Act are not the only provisions which provide for the protection of the tenants.

What shall be the criteria to determine the question as to who would fall within the purview thereof depends upon a host of factors. Due application of mind was, thus, necessary for determining the said question. Section 13 of the Act enumerates the grounds upon which the landlord may seek eviction of a tenant. Section 13-A is an exception to Section 13 in the sense that the same provides for grounds for eviction of a tenant in certain cases enumerated therein. Section 13-B enables the landlords named therein to recover immediate possession ofthe residential building or scheduled building and/or non-residential building to accrue to Non-resident Indian. The legislature itself, therefore, provided for speedy relief to a section of landlords. It is interesting to note that whereas eviction of a tenant from a residential building was permissible, it was made impermissible so far as nonresidential premises are concerned, but, the same has been declared ultra VASU DEV SINGH v. U. 0. L [S.

B. SINHA, J. ] 589 vires by this Court. The provisions have been enacted for the purpose of protection of tenants of certain provisions. The words "certain premises", thus, for the purpose of ascertaining the legislative policy must be construed having regard to their definition of :$ "building" only. The words "certain premises", having regard to its applicability in the urban areas, would also mean that the premises situated in the urban area and not in rural area. The reason behind the enactment of the 1949 Act is well known and has been noticed by this Court in a large number of cases. It was conceived as a measure to overcome shortage of rental accommodation in the wake of Second World War and the influx ofrefugees following partition.

The Union of India also accepts that the object of the State Act to provide for control and regulation ofthe rental housing market, determination offair rent, protection of tenants against indiscriminate eviction at the hands of landlords and the rights of the landlords for recovery of tenanted premises in specific cases. The reasons for which the impugned notification was issued was stated to be that the social objective of the Rent Control Act had not been realised and it had various other adverse effects including simulation of investment in rental housing especially from the lower and middle income groups. model Rent Control legislation was circulated in the year I992 wherein proposal was made to give exemption to residential non-residential premises carrying more than specified rental of Rs. 1500/- per month.

The Government of India had been advocating urban section reforms and had introduced an urban reforms incentive scheme whereunder funds are to be provided by it and to urban sector reforms such reform was to be carried out for removing the rental laws. . However, National Housing Policy itself suggests that the existing rent control laws were to be repealed. The National Housing Policy, it was proposed, should be achieved step by step so as to enable the States to enact a permanent law. What was, therefore, contemplated was amendment of the existing legislation by the legislature so as to achieve partial repeal of the Act. The National Housing Policy or the Central Government did not and could not recommend that what can be done only by the legislature, can be achieved through the route of notification issued by the Administration under section 3 of the Act. Mr. Nariman contended that it is a virtual amendment by the Administrator but an Administrator cannot make an amendment.

Concept of virtual amendment of a legislative Act by the executive is unknown. He has a limited jurisdiction and such jurisdiction must be exercised within the parameters of Jaw as laid down in P. J. Irani (supra). In D. C. Bhatia (supra) it has clearly been pointed out that it is the legislature's function alone to make amendment and such measures are permissible so as to enable the legislature to achieve the goal as set down in terms of the national policy. The Government of Delhi did so. Even in Motor General (Supra) this Court has held that what can be done by a temporary measure cannot be done for an indefinite period, inasmuch as the exemption <:annot be granted in perpetuity. This Court clearly pointed out that an earlier notification which was applicable for a limited period cannot be sustained after a lapse of 23 years.

Kandasamy (supra) is again an authority for the proposition that certain institutions, as for example, charitable institution which let out its property can be granted exemption having regard )to the purport and object for which the same had been constituted. It is not disputed that a delegate must act within the four corners of the Act; the guidelines wherefor must be provided for in the Act itself. The classification as regards the premises occupied and possessed by the State the Local Self Governme~t or other public sectors, however, stand on a different footing. It is now beyond any controversy that this Court treated the houses stated to be belonging to the State or public sector undertaking absolutely on a different footing on the pre-supposition that they would not unreasonably· enhance the rental of the premises and they would conduct themselves in such a manner so as to make a tenant feel that they would be subjected to unreasonable eviction. In Baburao Shantaram More v.

Bombay Housing Board & Anr. , [1954] SCR 572 :AIR (1954) SC 153, this Court has held: "It is not to be expected that the Government or local authority or the Board would be actuated by any profit-making motive so as to unduly enhance the rents or eject the tenants from their respective properties as private landlords are or are likely to be. Therefore, the tenants of the Government or local authority or the Board are not in need ofsuch protection as the tenants ofprivate landlords are and this circumstance is a cogent basis for differentiation. The two classes of tenants are VASU DEV SINGHv. U. 0. 1. [S. B. SINHA, J. ] 591 not by force of circumstances placed on an equal footing and the tenants of the Government or local authority or the Board cannot,' therefore, complain ofauy denial ofequality before the law or ofequal protection of the law. " Mis. Dwarkadas Marfatia & Sons v. Board of Trustees ofthe Port of .

Bombay, [1989] 3 SCC 293 is another instance where the Court placed faith on the public sector stating: "The field of letting and eviction of tenants is normally governed by the Rent Act. The Port Trust is statutorily exempted from the operation of the Rent Act on the basis of its public/governm(fntal character. The legislative assumption or expectation as noted in the observations ofChagla, C. J. in Rampratap Jaidayal case cannot make such conduct a matter ofcontract pure and simple. These corporations must act in accordance with certain constitutional conscience and whether they have so acted, must be discernible from the conduct of such corporations. In this connection, reference may be made on the observations of this Court in Som Prakash Rekhi v. Union of India reiterated in MC. Mehta v. Union ofIndia wherein at p. 148 this Court observed: (SCC p.

480, para 55) "It is dangerous to exonerate corporations from the need to have constitutional ·conscience; and so, that interpretation, language permitting, which makes governmental agencies, whatever their mien, amenable to constitutional limitations must be adopted by the court as against the alternative of permitting them to flourish as an imperium in imperio. " Therefore, Mr. Chinai was right in contending that every . acti011Jactivity ofthe Bombay Port Trust which constituted "State" within Article 12 of the Constitution, in respect of any right conferred or privilege granted by any statute is subject to Article 14 and must be reasonable and taken only upon lawful and relevant grounds of public interest. " (See also Jamshed Hormusji Wadia v. Board ofTrustees, Port ofMumbai & Anr. , (2004] 3 SCC 214 and Municipal Corpn. , Chandigarh & Ors. v. Shantikunj Investment (P) Ltd & Ors. , (2006] 4 SCC 109).

Even the criterion underlying the policy is required to be changed by way ofmodification or variation in the standard of rent, object whereof should 592 SUPREME COURT REP0RTS [2006] SUPP. 8 S. C. R. have been achieved only by making suitable amen<lments in the Act itself. The Administrator could not have tinkered with the provisions of the Act. What should have been the criterion for fixing the quantum of rent so as to render the classification constitutional and valid in Jaw although is not a matter w! tich would ordinarily fall for consideration of the court, but the question as to whether by reason of fixation of such a rent which would render the Act inapplicable to a large section of the tenants, in our considered view, would come within the scope ofjudicial review.

We, however, cannot accept the submissio:i that as Appellants themselves in the writ petition contended that as in the year 1978 a building standing on a land of 1500 square yards with 3 to 4 bed rooms, one drawing and dining room, garage and servant quarter, was available on a monthly rent of Rs. I000/-and, thus, on that premise a presumption can be raised that such tenanted premises used to be occupied by the affluent families, those who are paying less than Rs. 1500/- continued to be protected and, thus, the same would come within the purview of the legislative policy and the object and purport of the Act. The criterion which was required to be considered was not as to what rent a building could have fetched in 1978 but what would have been a fair criterion as regard the quantum of rent when the notification was issued. For that purpose, no data has been collecte~ nor has any study been made. As to how the said criterion had been fixed is not known.

Except stating that the rent of Rs. 1500/- to Rs. 3500/- was ~ade the criterion in terms of the National Housing Policy, the Administrator did not assign any other reason. Ifthe contention of Appellants is correct that in Chandigarh 99% ofthe lands have already been leased out, the scope of applicability of the new housing scheme might not be of much relevance. The Administrator while issuing the impugned notification misdirected himself in Jaw insofar as he failed to take into consideration that he could ,1ot have exercised any jurisdiction in terms thereof as the National Housing Policy, inter a/ia, contains the guidelines for the State legislatures for enactment of law and the same was not meant to be taken recourse to by the Executive Government of the State. While exercising his jurisdiction under Section 3 of the Act, the Administrator was required to apply his own mind to the relevant facts.

Application of mind on the part of the Administrator was also necessary having regard to the rate of inflation and other factors includinr. the prevalent rental in the neighbouring areas of the States of Punjab and Haryana. He further failed to take into consideration that in terms of National Housing Policy, that quantum of rent . ,,, VASU DEV SINGHv. U. O. I. [S. B. SJNHA. J. ] 593 was made flexible. Only a broad guideline had been provided therefor. What was necessary to be applied was the principle and not the minimum rent specified therein. For the aforementioned purpose, it was necessary to collect relevant d<·ta. Rental of Rs. 1500i- could not have been applied mechanically. ! he High Court has followed D. C. Bhatia (supra) but it has failed to notice that in D. C. Bhatia (supra) itself whereas the proposal in the bill was to fix Rs. 1500/- as the outer limit, the members of t! ie legislature upon deliberation in the matter, had fixed the quantum of rent at Rs. 3500/-.

Furthermore, for the aforementioned purpose, the lowest "Ceiling of Rs. 1500/- might have been treated to be fair in the year 1992 but the same would have lost much significance and relevance in the year 2002 in view of the passage of time. The rate of inflation and other relevant factors as well as the fact that the per capita income in UT of Chandigarh is considered to be the highest in the country, were necessary to be taken into consideration. This Court, in Prabhakaran Nair & Ors. v. State ofTamil Nadu & Ors. , [1987] 4 SCC 238, opined that a National Housing Policy should be formulated and the observations made therein had been given effect to. But, this Court never intended that a National Housing Policy would be applied in a manner not contemplated under our constitutional scheme. A new legislative policy indisputably was framed having regard to the new economic policy ofthe Central Government as was fonnuiated in the year 1991.

However, by reason thereof only it cannot be said that the social justice doctrine, as adumbrated in the preamble of the Constitution, need not be given effect to under any situation. Social justice legislations and other legislations beneficent to the weaker sections of the country are still on the statute book. The rent Acts would continue to control the tenns and conditions of tenancy. On some occasions, only the same can be interpreted differently having regard to change in time. But, it was not for the executive government to do so. They have not been repealed. Repealing of such Acts can be brought about by the competent legislature. What would be the legislative policy in relation thereto was within the exclusive domain of the Central Government.

The Constitution of India, having regard to the provisions of Articles 24 5 and 246 of the Constitution of India clearly demarcate the fields of legislation and, thus, it would not be correct to contend that only because that the Central Government has changed its economic policy, the same must be reflected in all the legislative fields occupied by the State legislature. In D. C. Bhatia (supra), this Court clearly held that what can be done by the legislature cannot be done by the delegatee. Yet again, in B. K. Industries & Ors. v. Union ofIndia & Ors. [1993] Supp. 3 SCC 621, this Court clearly opined that by reason of such notification the delegatee cannot take recourse of the virtual repeal of the Act. Having regard to the fact that the rental of Rs. 1500 per month for the town of Chandigarh was too low a rent, the submissions of Appellants are of some significance that by reason thereof, over 9/lOth of the tenanted premises would go out of the purview of the Rent Act.

In Rattan Arya & Ors. v. Staie of Tamil Nadu & Anr. , AIR (1986) SC 1444, this Court categorically observed that fixing exemption li! Ilit at Rs. 400/ - had become unrealistic with the passage of time particularly fri view of the hike in re. nts. In this case, the manner in which the rate ofrent of the tenanted premise or the value of the property has gone up as evident from the data furnished by Appellants in their writ petition. The same was not denied or disputed. For the aforementioned purpose, our attention has been drawn to certain documents to show the effect of the said notification, i. e. , that immediatety thereafter exorbitant rent was claimed from the tenants by the landlords. We, therefore, in this case, have sufficient materials on record to hold that Rs. 1500/- could not have been fixed as the quantum of rent for the purpose of extending the exemption provision under Section 3 of the Act to the Administrator.

The legislative objective and poli<,:y indisputably must be considered having regard to the preamble and other core provisions of the Act. Section 3 although is a part of the Act, but the same cannot be said to contain an in-built policy so as to empower the Administrator to do all such things which can be done by the legislature itself. By taking recourse to the preamble, it cannot be said, as has been submitted by Mr. Nariman, that the power to exclude the tenanted premises can be exercised without taking into consideration the legislative policy and the object of the Act. It may be true that by reason of Section 3 of the Act, n·J arbitrary power as such has been conferred in view of the fact that the Act applies only to certain classes of land and building but the same would not mean that the . Administrator is free to take any action in any manner he likes. The action of the Administrator is indisputably subject to judicial VASU DEV SINGH v. U. O. I. [S. B. SINHA, J. ] 595 review.

It is also true that the term 'building' having regard to its definition would mean tenanted building and, thus, the building fetching a rent to a prescribed extent can form the base for determining criterion for the purpose of classification but the same would not mean that the Administrator would be entitled to lay down a criterion which would be applicable only to a large section of the tenants. " Moreover, the notification has not been issued for a limited period. It will have, therefore, a permanent effect. Submission of Mr. Nariman that having regard to the provisions of the General Clauses Act, the same can be modified, amended at any time and withdrawn, cannot be accepted for more than one reason. Firstly, Respondent proceeded on the basis that the said notification has been issued with a view to give effect to the National policy, i. e. , amendments must be carried out until a new Rent Act is enacted.

Whether the Act would be enacted or not is a matter of surmises and conjectures. It would be again a matter of legislative policy which was not within the domain of the Administrator. Secondly, the Administrator in following the National Policy proceeded on the basis that the provisions of the Act must ultimately be repealed. When steps are taken to repeal the Act either wholly or in part, the intention becomes clear i. e. the same is not meant to be given a temporary effect. When the repealed provisions are sought to be brought back to the statute-book, it has to be done by way of fresh legislation. In any event, the General Clauses Act shall not apply to an executive action. Executive actions can be taken by a person who is statutorily authorized therefor. He is required to apply his own mind. What can be done in future by another authority cannot be a ground for upholding an executive act.

Conclusion : For the reasons, aforementioned, the impugned judgments cannot be sustained which are set aside accordingly. The appeals are allowed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. N. J. Appeals allowed.