VISHU VARDHAN @ VISHNU PRADHAN v. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS

Citation: 2025 INSC 884, [2025] 7 S.C.R. 1371

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: Surya Kant, Dipankar Dutta and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.

Judgment text

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Vishu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. Civil Appeal No. 7777 of 2023 [2025] 7 S. C. R. 1371 : 2025 INSC 884 Vishu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 7777 of 2023) 23 July 2025 [Surya Kant, Dipankar Dutta* and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.

] Issue for Consideration Issue arose whether the impugned order having merged with this Court's order in Reddy Veerana's case, as claimed by R, renders the present appeal which lays a collateral challenge to an order of this Court itself not maintainable; whether the present writ petition is not maintainable, as it seeks to challenge a judicial order which, by its very nature, can never be said to violate Fundamental Rights; whether the appellant can pursue a civil appeal against the impugned order as well as a petition for review of the decision of this Court in which the impugned order has merged, as claimed, simultaneously; whether the appellant has engaged in forum shopping; and whether the R obtained the impugned order, as well as this Court's order in Reddy Veerana's case, by practising fraud and deception upon the courts and, thus, liable to be set aside/recalled. Headnotes† Constitution of India - Arts.

32, 226 - Dispute in respect of ownership of land - Fraud played by one on courts to reap benefits - Land acquired by the New Okhla Industrial Development Authority in 2005 and now forms a part of Sector 18, NOIDA - Land jointly purchased in 1997 by R, one S and the appellant - Relying on joint ownership, the trio initiated various legal proceedings seeking multiple relief from time to time, before and after the acquisition of the land by NOIDA - Appellant's case that R made several attempts to assert his exclusive ownership in proceedings where the appellant and S were not joined as parties; that in one such proceeding, R succeeded and the High Court, by the impugned order, declared him the sole owner - Appellant alleging the conduct * Author 1372 of R as fraudulent, filed instant appeal, petition for review and application for recall: Held: Fraud unravels everything - R tailored a situation to suit his convenience by not impleading the appellant as a party with the sole intention of obtaining an order in respect of not only the quantum of compensation payable for acquisition of the subject land but also a declaration as to his entitlement thereto all, behind the appellant's back, is all fraud - R's failure before the High Court to disclose the earlier series of litigation where he consistently asserted joint ownership with the appellant and S being a fact having a bearing on the merits of the case, sufficient to vitiate the impugned order - Suppression of material facts before the High Court by R is writ large; highlights the fraudulent intent behind R's claim however, his fraudulent conduct not confined to that forum alone - Rapid pleadings, exclusion of a necessary party, and abandonment of the suit clearly reflects a collusive effort by R to manufacture support for his claim of sole ownership - All this confirms that his deceptive practices date back over two decades - Judicial orders procured by R by subverting the judicial process through fraud and concealment of material facts cannot be permitted to stand - Fact of the appellant being a co-owner of the property could not have been discovered by either the High Court or this Court unless the same were placed before such courts - Impugned order and the decision of this Court in Reddy Veerana's case procured by R are tainted by fraud and, thus, lack legal sanctity and validity - As regards the maintainability of petition, writ petition did not disclose violation of any of the fundamental rights including, inter alia, the right to have access to an effective legal remedy, since all the available options for relief are being sought to be explored by him and, hence, is not maintainable - Writ petition cannot lie against a judicial order - There being no challenge to any judicial order, this ground of challenge rejected - Furthermore, this Court is not exercising any "intra-court appeal" jurisdiction - Fraud is an exception to the doctrine of merger and considering that the impugned order of the High Court and the decision of this Court in Reddy Veerana have been found to be vitiated by fraud, the plea of R as regards the non-maintainability of the present proceedings based on the merger doctrine of no significance - When the Court has been the victim of fraud, it's hands cannot be tied down by procedural laws in a manner to defeat the interests and rights of other parties - An appeal against a decree or order, passed or Vishu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v.

The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. made by an inferior court, before a superior court and a review of the same decree/order before the court which passed/made it cannot simultaneously be pursued by the same party - However, on facts there is an absence of a two-pronged assail in two different proceedings by the appellant to the same decree or order: whereas the civil appeal is directed against the impugned order, a petition has subsequently been filed by the appellant for review of the decision in Reddy Veerana's case (which had the occasion to modify the impugned order) - Thus, neither s. 114 nor Or. XLVII r.

1, CPC would create a legal bar for entertaining the two proceedings-appeal and review that have been initiated by the appellant - Due to fraud having been played by R, the doctrine of merger does not apply and, thus, the impugned order is open to interference notwithstanding the decision of this Court in Reddy Veerana's case - Impugned order set aside, since fraud has vitiated the entire proceedings - As a logical corollary of the impugned order, the decision of this Court in Reddy Veerana's case, which too was obtained by playing fraud, will also be a nullity, and thus stand recalled in exercise of the inherent powers - Application for recall of the order whereby this Court directed the appellant to approach the court u/s. 30 of the 1894 Act for appropriate relief allowed.

[Paras 49, 51, 54, 60, 63, 64, 80-82, 84, 89, 122-124, 133, 134, 138-140, 144] Doctrines - Doctrine of Merger - Application of - Explanation: Held: When an appeal is limited to a specific part of the judgment and order of the first-instance court, the merger occurs only to that extent, leaving the rest intact and available for future consideration - Extent of merger is determined by the subject matter of the appeal - Merger can only operate on issues which were the subject-matter of the appellate court's judgment and order and cannot have any application to issues which are not being taken on appeal by either party or which had not been touched upon by the appellate court - Application of the doctrine of merger, in every case, should be accompanied by an awareness of its limitations and should not be wielded to close avenues for addressing genuine concerns - Prioritizing justice and fairness should supersede an absolute insistence on finality - While the latter is commendable, the former is superior - These doctrines, even though are grounded in sound and justifiable public policy arguments, yet, do not limit the powers of the courts in cases where larger public interest is at stake - They have been adapted to accommodate exceptions and qualifications, 1374 leaving room for acknowledging special circumstances, particularly in matters of public significance - Doctrine of merger may not have any application in all cases of cognate civil appeals being carried from the same order (obviously at the instance of a party different from the appellant who approached this Court first in point of time).

[Paras 110, 111, 113, 122, 123] Case Law Cited Ramesh B. Desai v. Bipin Vadilal Mehta [2006] Supp. 3 SCR 414 : (2006) 5 SCC 638 - relied on. E. P. Royappa v. State of T. N. [1974] 2 SCR 34 : (1974) 4 SCC 3; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [1978] 2 SCR 621 : (1978) 1 SCC 248; Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel [1985] Supp. 2 SCR 131 : (1985) 3 SCC 398; D. A. V. College v. State of Punjab : (1971) 2 SCC 269; Ramdas Athawale v. Union of India [2010] 3 SCR 1059 : (2010) 4 SCC 1; Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra [1966] 3 SCR 744 : AIR 1967 SC 1; Nidhi Kaim v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2017] 4 SCR 527 : (2017) 4 SCC 1; S. P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath [1993] Supp. 3 SCR 422 : (1994) 1 SCC 1; Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Bhoopendra Singh (2022) 14 SCC 277; Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal (LAPSE-5 J. ) [2020] 3 SCR 1 : (2020) 8 SCC 129; Reddy Veerana v. State of U. P. [2022] 3 SCR 663 : (2022) 14 SCC 252; Sathyanath v.

Sarojamani [2022] 4 SCR 46 : (2022) 7 SCC 644; Poonam v. State of U. P. [2015] 14 SCR 565 : (2016) 2 SCC 779; Ajay Ishwar Ghute and Ors. v. Meher K. Patel and Ors. [2024] 5 SCR 155 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 681; Neyvely Lignite Corpn. Ltd. v. Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition) Neyvely [1994] Supp. 4 SCR 567 : (1995) 1 SCC 221; S. J. S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar [2004] 3 SCR 56 : (2004) 7 SCC 166; United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajendra Singh [2000] 2 SCR 264 : (2000) 3 SCC 581; Shrisht Dhawan (Smt) v. Shaw Bros. [1991] Supp. 3 SCR 446 : (1992) 1 SCC 534; A. V. Papayya Sastry v. Govt. of A. P. [2007] 3 SCR 603 : (2007) 4 SCC 221; Shri Krishnan v. Kurukshetra University [1976] 2 SCR 722 : (1976) 1 SCC 311; Amina Marwa Sabreen v. State of Kerala (2018) 14 SCC 193; Amrit Lal Berry v. CCE [1975] 2 SCR 960 : (1975) 4 SCC 714; Harbhajan Singh v. State of Haryana [2022] 12 SCR 1113 : (2023) 11 SCC 693; Anita Kushwaha v.

Pushap Sadan [2016] 9 SCR 560 : (2016) 8 SCC 509; Kishan Chand Jain v. Union of India [2023] 14 SCR 477 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1334; Express Newspapers (P) Ltd. v. Vishu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. Union of India [1985] Supp. 3 SCR 382: (1986) 1 SCC 133; Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India Ltd. [1979] 3 SCR 1014 : (1979) 3 SCC 489; Basudeo Tiwary v. Sido Kanho University [1998] Supp. 1 SCR 633 : (1998) 8 SCC 194; Shivdev Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1909; Inderjit Singh Grewal v. State of Punjab [2011] 10 SCR 557 : (2011) 12 SCC 588; Natvarlal Punjabhai v. Dadubhai Manubhai [1954] 1 SCR 339 : (1953) 2 SCC 489; State of Madras v. Madurai Mills Co. Ltd [1967] 1 SCR 732 : 1967 AIR 681; Collector of Customs, Calcutta v. East India Commercial Co. Ltd. and Others [1963] 2 SCR 563; Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala [2000] Supp. 1 SCR 538 : (2000) 6 SCC 359; Khoday Distilleries Limited v.

Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Limited, Kollegal [2019] 3 SCR 411 : (2019) 4 SCC 376; Commissioner of Sales Taxv. Vijai International Udyog (1984) 4 SCC 543; MRF Ltd. v. Manohar Parrikar [2010] 5 SCR 1081 : (2010) 11 SCC 374; Commissioner of Central Excise, Delhi v. Pearl Drinks Ltd. [2010] 7 SCR 808 : (2010) 11 SCC 153; S. Shanmugavel Nadar v. State of T. N. [2002] Supp. 2 SCR 498 : (2002) 8 SCC 361; Jatan Kumar Golcha v. Golcha Properties (P) Ltd. [1971] 3 SCR 247 : (1970) 3 SCC 573; State of Punjab v. Amar Singh [1974] 3 SCR 152 : (1974) 2 SCC 70; State of Punjab v. Shamlal Murari [1976] 2 SCR 82 : (1976) 1 SCC 719; M. V. "Vali Pero" v. Fernandeo Lopez [1989] Supp. 1 SCR 187 : (1989) 4 SCC 671 referred to. Bhoopendra Singh & Ors. v. Awas Vikas Parishad, 2005 (2) Uttaranchal Decision 295; Commissioner of Income-Tax v. Tejaji Farasram Kharawalla, 1953 SCC OnLine Bom 28 - referred to. Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley, (1956) 1 Q. B. 702; King v.

Hoare, (1844) 13 Meeson and Welsby 494; Kendall v. Hamilton, (1879) 4 App. Cas. 504; Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd v. Zodiac Seats UK Ltd. , [2013] UKSC 46 - referred to. Books and Periodicals Cited Black's Law Dictionary (10th Edition) - referred to. List of Acts Constitution of India; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Land Acquisition Act, 1894; Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013; Supreme Court Rules, 2013.

1376 List of Keywords Fraudulent conduct; Fraud; Subverting the judicial process through fraud; Concealment of material facts; Suppression of material facts; Doctrine of merger; Forum shopping; Joint ownership; Exclusive ownership; Quantum of compensation payable for acquisition of the subject land; Violation of fundamental rights; Actus curiae neminem gravabit; Public policy; Public interest; Ownership of a land; suggestio falsi nor suppressio veri; Writ jurisdiction; Deception upon the courts; Fraud played by one on courts to reap benefits; New Okhla Industrial Development Authority; Petition for review; Application for recall;Fraud unravels everything. Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 7777 of 2023 From the Judgment and Order dated 28. 10. 2021 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in CMWP No. 2272 of 2019 With W. P. (C) No. 673 of 2023, MA No. 1737 of 2023 in MA 255 of 2023 in C. A. No. 3636 of 2022, CONMT. PET. (C) No. 23-24 of 2024 in W. P.

(C) No. 673 of 2023, Diary No. 6013 of 2024 and SMC (C) No. 3 of 2024 Appearances for Parties By Courts Motion (for Appellant) Advs. for the Appellant: Dushyant Dave, Niranjan Reddy, Nikhil Goel, Shyam Divan, Devadatt Kamath, Sr. Advs. , Aniruddha Deshmukh, Vipin Nair, Sughosh Subramanyam, Udayaditya Banerjee, Ms. Sanskruti Samal, Mohd Aman Alam, M. B. Ramya, Aditya Narendranath, Ms. Madhavi Yadav. Advs. for the Respondents: Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General, Ms. Garima Prashad, Sr. A. A. G, Shyam Divan, Devakatt Kamath, Pinaki Mishra, Shoaib Alam, Sr. Advs. , Vipin Nair, Sughosh Subramanyam, Udayaditya Banerjee, Ms. Sanskruti Samal, Mohd Aman Alam, Ms. M. B. Ramya, Aditya Narendranath, Ms. Madhavi Yadav, Yashvardhan Singh, Shashank Shekhar Singh, Abhinav Singh, Sameer Jain, Suvigya Awasthy, Vivek Joshi, Deepesh Raj, Soayib Qureshi, Ashutosh Ghade, Ms. Vishu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. Ruby Singh Ahuja, Pravin Bahadur, Amit, Ms. Kanika Gomber, Ms.

Akanksha Thapa, Ms. Uzma Sheikh, Tribhuvan Narain Singh, M/s. Karanjawala & Co. , Abhinav Agrawal. Advs. for Intervenor: Ms. Shalini Kaul, Chaman Choudhary. Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Dipankar Datta, J. Index* Introduction ................................................................................ 3 Facts ........................................................................................... 6 Impugned Order .......................................................................... 20 Before This Court In Civil Appeal No 3636-37 Of 2022 .......... 22 Contentions ................................................................................ 24 Argumentsby Vishnu ............................................................ 24 Argumentsby Reddy ............................................................. 25 Argumentsby NOIDA ............................................................ 28 Replyby Vishnuregardingobjectionstomaintainability ....

29 Issues .......................................................................................... 29 Analysis ....................................................................................... 30 I. Has Reddy Played Fraud On The Courts? ......................... 33 II. Maintainability ....................................................................... 47 A. Maintainabilityofthe Writ Petition .............................. 47 B. Maintainabilityof Civil Appeal/Jurisdictionofthe Supreme 56 Court ............................................................... Intra-Court Appeal ........................................................ 56 Merger ........................................................................... 59 Procedure, If An Impediment To Exercise Jurisdiction . 76 C. Vishnupursuingthecivilappealaswellasthereview 78 petitionandapplicationformodification/recall, simultaneously ................................................................ D.

Forum Shopping .............................................................. 81 Conclusion .................................................................................. 82 * Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment. 1378 Introduction 1. In Nidhi Kaim v. State of Madhya Pradesh1, a three-Judge Bench of this Court emphatically asserted "... stated simply, nothing ... nothing ... and nothing, obtained by fraud, can be sustained, as fraud unravels everything. " 2. At the end of the last century, this Court in S. P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath2 noticed the growing trend of abuse of the process of law by dishonest litigants playing fraud on courts. Fraud was held to be an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another: a deception in order to gain by another's loss.

The opening paragraph of such decision reads as follows: "Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal" observed Chief Justice Edward Coke of England about three centuries ago. It is the settled proposition of law that a judgment or decree obtained by playing fraud on the court is a nullity and non est in the eyes of law. Such a judgment/decree -- by the first court or by the highest court -- has to be treated as a nullity by every court, whether superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any court even in collateral proceedings. This Court then warned that: 5. The principle of "finality of litigation" cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. The courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the court, must come with clean hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, process of the court is being abused.

Property-grabbers, tax-evaders, bank-loan-dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the court-process a convenient lever to retain the illegal gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person, who's case is based on falsehood, 1 (2017) 4 SCC 1 2 (1994) 1 SCC 1 Vishu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. has no right to approach the court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation. 3. "Fraud unravels everything" was famously said by Lord Denning in Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley3, emphasising that fraud can invalidate judgments, contracts and all transactions. The principle highlights the importance of honesty and transparency in legal proceedings and transactions. However, it is a cardinal principle of law that fraud has to be pleaded and proved. Order VI Rule 4, of the Code of Civil Procedure, 19084 may be referred to ordaining that particulars, inter alia, of fraud have to be stated in the pleadings.

4. From the multiple decisions of this Court on 'fraud', what follows is that fraud and justice cannot dwell together, the legislature never intends to guard fraud, the question of limitation to exercise power does not arise, if fraud is proved, and even finality of litigation cannot be pressed into service to absurd limits when a fraud is unravelled. 5. The issue of fraud unravelling everything is pertinent here due to the nature of dispute we are tasked to adjudicate; hence, its reference at the beginning of our judgment. 6. The primary parties involved in these proceedings are the appellant- writ petitioner-applicant, Vishnu Vardhan5, and the respondent no. 7, Reddy Veeranna6. Vishnu has alleged that fraud has been played by Reddy on courts to reap benefits behind Vishnu's back.

The tangled facts involved in these proceedings, the complex web of activities of the primary parties and their associates and the relief claimed in the civil appeal as well as the writ petition by Vishnu would have to be examined in great depth to ascertain whether fraud, as alleged by him, is established; and, if so, how it has affected the flow of judicial proceedings and the manner in which the same has to be dealt with. In the process, other petitions/applications that are on record would also require due consideration. 3 (1956) 1 Q. B. 702 4 CPC 5 Vishnu 6 Reddy 1380 7. In the civil appeal, by special leave, Vishnu has assailed the judgment and order7 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad8 dated 28th October, 2021, whereby the High Court allowed a writ petition9 filed by Reddy. 8. Concurrently with the civil appeal, Vishnu has presented a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution.

He has prayed for diverse relief therein, which we propose to notice a little later. 9. The present lis concerns rival claims in respect of ownership of a land10 situated in Gautam Budh Nagar, Uttar Pradesh, which was acquired by the New Okhla Industrial Development Authority11 in 2005 and now forms a part of Sector 18, NOIDA. The land was jointly purchased in 1997 by Reddy, one T. Sudhakar12 and Vishnu13. Relying on their joint ownership, the trio initiated various legal proceedings seeking multiple relief from time to time, before and after the acquisition of the land by NOIDA. Vishnu alleges that Reddy made several attempts to assert his exclusive ownership in proceedings where Vishnu and Sudhakar were not joined as parties. He further alleges that in one such proceeding, Reddy succeeded and the High Court, by the impugned order, declared him the sole owner.

Aggrieved by the conduct of Reddy (which, according to Vishnu, is fraudulent) and the impugned order, Vishnu has sought relief from this Court by presenting the civil appeal. 10. While the relief claimed in the civil appeal is for setting aside of the impugned order, what is prayed in the writ petition is (i) a declaration that Reddy is not the sole owner of the subject land, (ii) an order setting aside NOIDA's decision (reflected in its letter dated 17th January, 2023) to sanction full compensation for acquisition of the land to Reddy, (iii) a declaration that the trio, as co-owners of the land, be jointly awarded compensation for acquisition thereof and (iv) ordering an inquiry to unearth the fraud and to initiate appropriate legal proceedings against the persons responsible. 7 impugned order 8 High Court 9 Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.

2272/2019 10 referred to as land, subject land or property, interchangeably, hereafter 11 NOIDA 12 Sudhakar 13 the trio, wherever referred to collectively Vishu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. 11. Inter alia, there is a petition for review (defective) and an application for recall, both at the instance of Vishnu. While the former seeks review of the judgment and order dated 5th May, 2022 of this Court in C. A. No. 3636/2022, the latter seeks recall of an order dated 30th January, 2023 in MA 255/2023 in Civil Appeal 3636/2022. Facts 12. Since it is essential to delve deep into the facts for a proper determination of the claims raised by Vishnu against Reddy and the officials of NOIDA, for the sake of clarity and convenience, the full factual details are set out in the table below. 17th April, 1976 Vide Notification No.

4157 dated 17th April, 1976 issued under the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Area Development Act, 1976, NOIDA was constituted by declaring large tracts of land comprising of several villages in Gautam Budh Nagar District, including lands in the village of Chhalera Banger. 1985-1986 Between 1985 and 1986, NOIDA acquired a certain portion of land from one Banwari and Bansha Singh and compensation was received by them. 24th April, 1997 The trio jointly purchased a land measuring 5-13- 10 Bighas at Khasra No. 422 and 427M of Village Challera Banger, Gautam Budh Nagar, for a sum of Rs. 1 crore from Bansa and Banwari Singh. Only 2-18-10 Bighas of land14 which was un- acquired by NOIDA is the subject of the present proceeding. The names of the trio were entered in the revenue records and the record of rights. 1998 The trio instituted a suit15 seeking a permanent injunction against NOIDA from disturbing their First Suit possession and title in the subject land.

14 subject land 15 Civil Suit No. 416/1998 1382 16th February, 2000 The trial court by its decree restrained NOIDA from interfering with the possession of the unacquired land admeasuring 2-18-10 bighas. 26th June, 2000 Vide an agreement to sell, Sudhakar purportedly relinquished his share in the subject land to Reddy for Rs. 10 lakh. 2001 Aggrieved, NOIDA carried an appeal16 from the trial court's decree dated 16th February, 2000 before the First Appellate Court. 30th March, 2001 The First Appellate Court dismissed the civil appeal filed by NOIDA and this decision not being challenged, attained finality. 30th May, 2001 Sudhakar instituted a civil suit17 against Reddy, seeking a declaration of his 1/3rd share in the Second Suit subject land. 31st May, 2001 Reddy filed his written statement in the said suit. On the same day, a compromise agreement was signed by and between Sudhakar and Reddy, conceding that Reddy was the absolute owner of the land.

12th September, 2002 The trial court, declaring that the compromise agreement was not bona fide, refused to act upon it. 5th December, 2002 The civil suit instituted by Sudhakar was dismissed for default by the trial court. 2003-2004 NOIDA introduced a scheme for development of a commercial hub at Sector 18, NOIDA. 11th November, 2003 Sudhakar requested the Deputy CEO to convert the subject land for use from agricultural to commercial, which was denied on 13th January, 2004. 27th March, 2004 An office order set the rates for commercial land at Rs. 1,10,000 per sq. metre and for residential land at Rs. 4000 per sq. metre. 16 Civil Appeal No. 61/2000 17 Civil Suit No. 283/2001 Vishu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. 2003 - 2005 NOIDA allegedly made several attempts to dispossess the trio from the subject land. 12th April, 2004 NOIDA issued an acceptance letter to DLF Universal for allotment of the commercial hub. 2005 The trio filed Execution Petition No.

2/2005 for execution of the decree of the trial court dated 16th February, 2000, restraining NOIDA from dispossessing them from the land. 3rd February, 2005 Vishnu purportedly executed an Agreement for Sale for his share of the land with Reddy for a Agreement for Sale sum of Rs. 25 lakh. 3rd February, 2005 Vishnu executed a General Power of Attorney (PoA) in favour of one Venkataramana. PoA 25th February, 2005 NOIDA and DLF Universal entered into a lease deed for Plot No. M-3, Sector 18, NOIDA for a total premium of Rs. 173 crore for an area admeasuring 54,320. 18 sq. metre. 2nd August, 2005 Execution Petition No. 2/2005 was rejected. 4th August, 2005 The trio, through their power of attorney holders, except for Reddy who was himself present, agreed to sell land measuring 5-13-10 Bighas in favour of M/s Prabhat Home Pvt. Ltd. for 50% of the undivided share of the entire land, for a consideration of Rs. 13. 15 crore.

2nd September, 2005 A Notification under Section 4 of Land Acquisition Act, 189418 in respect of the subject land was Land Acquisition issued. 3rd October, 2005 The trio had filed another execution application bearing Execution Application No. 6/2005. This application was rejected on 3rd October, 2005. 18 1894 Act 1384 November/December WP(C) 66797/2005 was filed before the High 2005 Court by the trio, challenging the orders dated 2nd August, 2005 and 3rd October, 2005 whereby Execution Petition No. 2/2005 and Execution Application No. 6/2005, respectively, were rejected. 22nd November, 2005 A notification under Section 6 of the 1894 Act in respect of the subject land was issued. 21st December, 2005 The General Power of Attorney dated 3rd February, 2005 was purportedly cancelled by Vishnu. PoA - Cancellation December 2005 Vishnu filed WP(C) No. 75152/2005, challenging the land acquisition proceedings initiated by NOIDA authorities.

28th April, 2006 WP(C) 66797/2005 filed by the trio was allowed, and the matter was remanded to the executing court to decide whether the land in question stood acquired by NOIDA. 31st May, 2006 Reddy filed a civil suit19 against Vishnu, praying for a declaration that he was the sole owner of Third Suit the land. 7th June, 2006 Vishnu executed a registered agreement for sale, agreeing to sell his 1/3rd share of the subject land to one Ranbir Singh Narag for Rs. 3 crore. 4th October, 2006 Vishnu, through his Power of Attorney holder (Venkataramana), filed a written statement in Civil Suit No. 370/2006, admitting Reddy's claims. 4th October, 2006 A Joint Compromise Application was filed by Reddy and the PoA holder of Vishnu. Note: Vishnu argues that Venkataramana had no authority to file the written statement or a compromise application, as the PoA had already been cancelled on 21st December, 2005. 19 Civil Suit No. 370/2006 Vishu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v.

The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. 17th November, 2006 Civil Suit No. 370/2006, i. e. , the third suit, was decreed as per the compromise. 18th December, 2006 Execution Petitions, which had been remanded, were rejected by the executing court on 1st August, 2008 because the lands were already acquired by NOIDA. Challenging the rejections, the trio filed WP(C) 70088/2006 on 18th December, 2006. At paragraph 3 (three) of this WP, the trio pleaded that they are the co-owners of the property. 10th December, 2009 While WP(C) No. 75152/2005, filed by Reddy, challenging the land acquisition proceedings was pending, Sudhakar and Vishnu filed impleadment application claiming themselves to be the co- owners of the property. The said application was allowed. 10th December, 2009 WP(C) No. 75152/2005 for compensation was allowed by the High Court in light of the decision of the Uttaranchal High Court in Bhoopendra Singh & Ors. v. Awas Vikas Parishad20.

Note: This Court has upheld the decision of the Uttaranchal High Court in Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Bhoopendra Singh21. 2010 NOIDA challenged the order of the High Court dated 10th December, 2009 in SLP (C) No. 20196-97/2010. 1st September, 2010 Reddy had Vishnu's name deleted from the land records qua the subject land using the compromise decree dated 17th November, 2006. In this regard, Khatauni Entry of Fasli Year 1407- 1412 dated 26th September, 2010 shows Reddy as the sole owner. 20 2005 (2) Uttaranchal Decision 295 21 (2022) 14 SCC 277 1386 10th January, 2011 Notice was issued by this Court in the SLP filed by NOIDA, and operation of the impugned judgmentdated 10th December, 2009 in WP(C) No. 75152/2005 was stayed. On leave being granted, this SLP was numbered as Civil Appeal No. 731/2013. 30th January, 2011 An award for compensation of the subject land was made. This award has not been placed on record.

4th January, 2013 Vishnu was served by paper publication but did not enter appearance before this Court. 4th November, 2015 Civil Appeal No. 731/2013 filed by NOIDA was dismissed by this Court. 2015-17 Reddy made representations to NOIDA and the District Magistrate seeking compensation in terms of the judgment dated 4th November, 2015 passed by this Court. 8th January, 2018 The District Magistrate rejected Reddy's representation. 22nd October, 2018 Reddy initiated action for contempt by filing Contempt Petition No. 1841-42/2018 in Civil Appeal No. 731/2013 and alleged wilful and deliberate non-compliance with the order dated 4th November, 2015. The petition was withdrawn with liberty to avail appropriate remedies before the High Court. 17th January, 2019 Pursuant to the liberty granted by this Court, Reddy filed WP(C) 2272/2019 before the High Court praying for: quashing of the order dated 8th January, 2018. quashing of the award dated 31st January, 2011.

a declaration that the land acquisition proceedings have lapsed and to direct NOIDA to either initiate fresh land acquisition proceedings or pass a fresh award or hand over possession to Reddy. Vishu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. 7th August, 2020 Vishnu instituted Civil Suit No. 471/2020 before the trial court claiming that the compromise decree Fourth Suit dated 17th November, 2006, was null and void. 11th October, 2021 Served with summons, Reddy filed his written statement in Civil Suit No. 471/2020. However, it has not been placed on record. 28th October, 2021 The High Court allowed WP(C) 2272/2019 filed by Reddy and accepted the plea that he was the Impugned order sole owner of the property. The compensation in C. A. No. 7777/2023 was enhanced from Rs. 181. 87 per sq. yard (or Rs. 152. 04 per sq. metre) to Rs. 1,10,000 per sq. metre, with a deduction for development charges at 50%, i. e. , Rs. 55,000 per sq.

metre, along with a 30% solatium and interest @ 15%. 30th October, 2021 Aggrieved by the order of the High Court, Reddy challenged the same in SLP (C) No. 19035/2021 which, on leave being granted, was numbered as Civil Appeal No. 3636/2022. 8th March, 2022 NOIDA filed a counter in Civil Appeal No. 3636/2022. 24th March, 2022 Aggrieved by enhancement of compensation by the order dated 28th October, 2021 of the High Court, NOIDA too challenged the same in SLP (C) No. 5500/2022. Upon leave being granted, the SLP was numbered as Civil Appeal No. 3637/2022. 5th May, 2022 This Court vide a common judgment and order, dismissed the civil appeal filed by NOIDA (C. A. Challenge to the No. 3637/2022) and partly allowed the civil appeal impugned order was filed by Reddy (C. A. No. 3636/2022), setting aside dismissed by this deduction of the development charges ordered Court by the High Court. 10th August, 2022 Review Petition (C) Nos. 874-875/2022 filed by NOIDA were dismissed by this Court.

15th September, 2022 Due to the financial implications arising out of the order dated 5th May, 2022, the then CEO, NOIDA issued a letter to the Deputy Secretary, Govt. of Uttar Pradesh seeking guidance from for filing a curative petition. 1388 19th September, 2022 Vishnu filed IA No. 155895/2022 in C. A. No. 3636/2022 seeking modification of the order dated 5th May, 2022. 30th September, 2022 Pursuant to letter dated 15th September, 2022, the matter was examined by the Law Department and letter dated 30th September, 2022 was issued to NOIDA requesting that instead of filing a curative petition, an attempt be made to negotiate the compensation amount with Reddy. 7th October, 2022 A meeting/negotiation took place between NOIDA and Reddy, where they agreed to have the compensation payable reduced from Rs. 359 crore to Rs. 295 crore, which was paid to Reddy on 28th December, 2022. 30th January, 2023 IA No. 155895/2022 in C. A. No.

3636/2022 was disposed of by a Bench of two-Judges [of which one of us (Surya Kant, J. ) was a member], granting Vishnu liberty to agitate his claim regarding co- ownership before the Reference Court. 3rd July, 2023 Vishnu approached this Court with the civil appeal and the writ petition, which are under consideration. 3rd July, 2023 Vishnu filed MA 1737/2023 in MA 255/2023 in Civil Appeal 3636/2022 seeking recall of order dated 30th January, 2023. 13th August, 2023 Vishnu filed a defective Review Petition Diary no. 33040/2023 praying for review of the judgment MA Diary No. dated 5th May, 2022. As the defects were not 6013/2024 cured within time, registration thereof was (tagged with the declined22 by the Registrar (J-A) vide order present set of dated 4th January, 2024. Vishnu filed an appeal23 matters) against the Registrar's order, registered as MA Diary No. 6013/2024 in Review Petition Diary No. 33040/ 2023.

On 24th October, 2024, the Chamber Judge ordered that the said appeal be tagged with Civil Appeal 7777/2023 and the other connected matters. 22 under Order VIII Rule 6(3) and 6(4) of Supreme Court Rules, 2013 23 under Order VIII Rule 6 (5) of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 Vishu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THIS COURT 14th August, 2023 Notice on the special leave petition, writ petition, miscellaneous application as well as on the application seeking condonation of delay was issued by a bench of this Court (cor. Surya Kant and Dipankar Datta, JJ. ). Reddy was directed to Notice and stay by keep the compensation amount received by him this Court in an FDR and to file affidavits with details of such FDR along with an undertaking not to encash the FDR without prior permission of this Court.

21st November, 2023 After noting his pleading that the compensation amount had been invested in immovable properties, Reddy was directed to furnish details of the immovable properties/lands and investments in the business within three weeks. The two-Judge Reference to a larger Bench (cor. Surya Kant and Dipankar Datta, JJ. ) bench condoned the delay in filing the SLP, granted leave to appeal, issued Rule Nisi in the writ petition and considering the issues likely to be raised in the civil appeal directed that these matters be placed before a larger Bench after obtaining necessary orders from the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India. 10th January, 2024 Vishnu filed Contempt Petition No. 23-24/2024 in WP (C) 673/2023 for violation of the orders dated 14th August, 2023 and 21st November, 2023.

8th May, 2024 This Court disposed of the IAs filed by Reddy seeking recall/modification of orders dated 21st November, 2024 and 14th August, 2023 by directing him to file details of the investments made by him (out of the compensation amount) in a sealed cover, duly signed by him, along with an affidavit/undertaking inter alia stating : (i) that he shall not create any third-party rights in respect of the said properties; (ii) that the compensation amount has been invested only in the assets to be disclosed by him in the sealed cover; (iii) that the said assets have been disclosed in his Income Tax Returns; and (iv) that there are no third-party interests or encumbrances on the said assets, and if any exist, the same shall be disclosed. 1390 August 2024 Suo Moto Contempt Petition (C) No. 3 of 2024 was registered against NOIDA for not having filed SMC (C) No. 3/2024 the counter affidavit within the time prescribed as (tagged with the per order dated 8th May, 2024.

present set of matters) September 2024 The civil appeal, the writ petition and the connected matters were heard on several dates. 3rd October, 2024 This Bench, during the final hearing, opened the sealed cover and, upon perusal of its contents, noted that instead of making full disclosures, Reddy had submitted a vague and misleading certificate from Pradeep Reddy & Co. , Chartered Accountants, omitting essential details regarding the parties involved, the nature and manner of the investments, the terms securing such investments, and the particulars of the properties and loans. Accordingly, the affidavit submitted by Reddy was rejected and he was granted one final opportunity to deposit a sum of Rs. 300 crore with the Registry. Reddy was further restrained from entering into any agreement to sell and/or creating any thirdparty rights in respect of immovable assets owned by him, his family and the companies created by him or his family members.

He was also directed to furnish details of all the movable/ immovable assets owned by him, his family and the said companies. 4th November, 2024 Pursuant to the order dated 3rd October, 2024, Reddy filed IAs praying for deposit of title deeds of immovable properties instead of cash deposit. 22nd January, 2025 This Bench allowed Reddy to furnish securities through his partnership firm Manyata-Pristine. Upon conclusion of hearing, judgment was reserved. Impugned Order 13. The impugned order, as noted above, was passed on 28th October, 2021 partly allowing Reddy's writ petition. Vishu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. 14. Reddy, in paragraph 7 of his writ petition, asserted that as on the relevant dates, he owned the subject land privately in light of the decree in Civil Suit No. 416 of 1998 and that the respondents therein had no 'right, title and interest' over the subject land. 15. A reply affidavit was filed by the State of U. P.

and its officers; but as is usual with official respondents, they did not go beyond averring that contents of paragraph 7 of the writ petition are not admitted and that the entire land acquisition proceedings, for planned development of NOIDA, were in observance of the 1894 Act. 16. Before the High Court, the parties (namely Reddy as writ petitioner, the State of Uttar Pradesh and seven others as respondents) advanced several arguments and placed various documents on record. Preliminary objections on the maintainability of the writ petition including, inter alia, suppression of facts as well as the locus of Reddy to claim compensation for the subject land without there being a decree in his favour were raised by the respondents therein. 17. Regarding the preliminary objections to the maintainability of the writ petition: a. the High Court rejected the same on the ground that Reddy had become the sole owner of the subject land.

This observation was premised on the order of the trial court dated 17th June, 2010 under Section 34 of the "Land Revenue Act, 1996" and Reddy's name was, accordingly, entered in the Khatauni. b. On the same premise, the allegation that Reddy had suppressed the order dated 12th September, 2002 whereby the trial court denied to act on the compromise decree was overruled by the High Court in view of the finding of the trial court dated 17th June, 2010. c. The objection of the respondents in the writ petition to the maintainability of the writ petition asserting that a remedy is available under Section 18 of the 1894 Act was overruled by the High Court holding that the writ petition was filed in view of the liberty given by this Court to approach the High Court vide order dated 22nd October, 2018. 18. Regarding the quantum of compensation: a.

The High Court repelled the submission of Reddy that compensation was not determined as per the direction of the 1392 High Court and, therefore, the award is to be treated as a nullity so as to apply Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 201324 in view of the decision of this Court in Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal(LAPSE-5 J. )25. b. Qua the challenge to the award and the prayer for determination of compensation in accordance with law, the High Court held that the award dated 31st January 2011 had been made subject to the final outcome of the appeal filed by NOIDA. Since that appeal was dismissed by this Court on 4th November 2015, the State ought to have passed a fresh award in compliance with the High Court's judgment dated 10th December 2009. c. The High Court then proceeded to determine the compensation by referring to the circle rate of Sector 18, NOIDA, i. e. , Rs. 1,10,000/- per sq.

metre. The High Court also determined that development charges can be to the extent of maximum 50% (fifty percent) and, therefore, held that the State should have taken Rs. 55,000/- per sq. metre as the market value of the land. It was, therefore, ordered accordingly. Before This Court In Civil Appeal No 3636-37 Of 2022 19. When the impugned order was challenged before this Court in separate appeals, videReddy Veerana v. State of U. P. 26,the civil appeal filed by NOIDA was dismissed and the civil appeal filed by Reddy was allowed in part. Learned senior counsel representing Reddy before us asserted that this decision has therefore upheld the impugned order. However, on a closer perusal of the case records, it is clear that the adjudication stands on a much narrower footing. This Court in paragraph 39 of its decision in Reddy Veerana (supra) noted that it is merely deciding on the quantum of compensation and not the title of Reddy on the scheduled piece of land.

For ease of reference, paragraph 39 is quoted below: 39. In the instant case, since the title of the appellant on the scheduled piece of land has not been contested by the 24 2013 Act 25 (2020) 8 SCC 129 26 (2022) 14 SCC 252 Vishu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. respondents and the adjudication is confined only to the quantum of compensation, we deem it appropriate not to interfere with the findings of the High Court with respect to the ownership... 20. In view of the decision rendered in Bhoopendra Singh (supra), this Court held that NOIDA must determine the compensation by taking into consideration the circle rate which has been determined as per the market value, i. e. , Rs. 1,10,000/- per square metre. Further, dealing with the issue of deduction of the development charges, this Court held that the High Court failed to consider the contextual circumstances in its decision.

Therefore, applying the ratio of previous decisions, this Court concluded that NOIDA's actions, i. e. , the passing of the award after a delay of five years from the date of taking possession, was a violation of Article 300-A of the Constitution, leading to a constitutional tort. Thus, taking note of the aforesaid and in the peculiar facts of the case, it was directed that in addition to the statutorily paid interest, the additional amount of penal interest must be paid in place of shifting the date for determination of the amount of compensation or to determine the compensation as per the 2013 Act, as demanded by Reddy. Contentions Argumentsby Vishnu 21. The principal submission advanced by learned senior counsel for Vishnu is that the impugned order, along with all other orders obtained by Reddy through misrepresentation and suppression of material facts, ought to be treated as void ab initio, relying on the settled legal proposition that "fraud unravels everything". a.

Our attention was drawn to various documents on record indicating that Reddy has taken inconsistent and mutually contradictory positions regarding the extent of his ownership over the property. While he jointly prosecuted various litigation from 2001 till 2019 along with Vishnu and Sudhakar, he asserted sole ownership in other proceedings. b. The written statement filed by Venkataramana, acting as Vishnu's power of attorney holder, admitting Reddy's sole ownership of the property, was without authority, as such power granted 1394 in Venkataramana's favour had been cancelled long before institution of Civil Suit No. 370/2006. It has also been shown that Venkataramana is a partner of Reddy in the partnership firm that offered securities before this Court. c. Using this fraudulent decree dated 17th November 2006, Reddy managed to have his name mutated in the revenue records. d. Even after the decree, Reddy filed several pleadings claiming to be the joint owner of the land. e.

The existence of the said decree was consistently suppressed by Reddy before the courts. 22. As regards the quantum of compensation for the acquisition, it was submitted on behalf of Vishnu that relegating the matter back to the Collector or the Reference Court for computation after a lapse of two decades would be unjust. It has been urged that the subject land should be treated as commercial in nature, and compensation should be awarded accordingly. 23. On this basis, Vishnu has sought that the impugned order, insofar as it records findings with respect to the ownership of the subject land, be set aside. Argumentsby Reddy 24. At the outset, maintainability of this civil appeal and the connected writ petition has been challenged by Reddy on various grounds including the fact that: a.

Vishnu has sought apportionment of the subject land prior to getting the registered Power of Attorney dated 3rd February 2005, full settlement agreement dated 3rd February 2005 and decree of the Trial Court dated 17th November, 2006, nullified. Even though Vishnu instituted CS No. 471/2020 praying that the compromise decree dated 17th November, 2006 be declared null and void, he has not sought any monetary compensation in the aforesaid suit and has, therefore, bypassed the Trial Court in approaching the Supreme Court only to save the payment of the court fee which smacks of mala fide; b. Vishnu has engaged in 'forum shopping' as he has been pursuing various types of proceedings before this Court as well as instituted a civil suit before the Trial Court; Vishu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. c. This Court does not have the original jurisdiction to adjudicate complicated questions of fact under Article 131 of the Constitution; d.

Relying on the decision in Nidhi Kaim (supra), it is submitted that this Court does not have the jurisdiction to decide an "intra-court appeal"; e. The order dated 21st November, 2023 of this Court referring the matter to a three-Judge Bench is against the established principle of stare decisis as the reference order included not just questions of law but complicated questions of fact; f. The writ petition filed by Vishnu is not maintainable as against the order of this Court dated 5th May, 2022 - much less when there is no violation of any Fundamental Right alleged in the said writ petition - since judicial orders of the Supreme Court cannot be challenged in the writ jurisdiction before this Court itself; g. The order of the High Court has now merged with the final order of this Court and, therefore, the civil appeal filed by Vishnu is not maintainable, and that the doctrine of merger would apply; h.

This Court does not have the jurisdiction to conduct a review of a judgment through a miscellaneous application, much less in a second miscellaneous application, by placing reliance on Order XLVII, Rule 5 of the Supreme Court Rules, 201327; i. The listing of the review and chamber appeal is in clear violation of Order XLVII, Rule 3 of the SC Rules, 2013; and j. Vishnu is a chronic litigant coming with unclean hands as he has engaged in supressing material documents before this Court and has played fraud upon this Court. 25. On merits, it has been argued before us that: a. Reddy has perfected his title through the decree of the Trial Court dated 17th November, 2006 in CS No. 370 of 2006. Moreover, Vishnu sold off his entire property to a third party, Ranbir Singh, vide a registered agreement to sell dated 7th June, 2006 while supressing the earlier sale made to Reddy; 27 SC Rules, 2013 1396 b.

The principle that fraud vitiates every proceeding is subservient to the principle of interest rei publicae, ut sit finis litium. It was specifically contended that Reddy has not played any fraud by not making Vishnu a party to the previous litigation; c. On the contrary, fraud has been played upon Reddy as Vishnu has not disclosed material documents; d. Vide decree dated 17th November, 2006, the interest in the subject land passed from Vishnu to Reddy which to this day stands as a valid instrument; e. The three deeds, namely, the full settlement sale agreement, Affidavit/declaration and the Registered Power of Attorney must be read together as part of the same transaction; f. A registered document can only be cancelled/modified by another registered document; in the instant case, the registered irrevocable Power of Attorney dated 3rd February, 2005 could not have been cancelled without registering the document of cancellation; g.

Moreover, no notice of cancellation was provided to Venkataramana and, therefore, it is not a valid cancellation as per Section 208 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and Section 3 of the Power of Attorney Act, 1882; h. Furthermore, a registered Power of Attorney cannot be revoked unilaterally; i. Vishnu is estopped from re-agitating the issue on title as he has relinquished his entire share of the property; and j. Lastly, NOIDA has no right to re-agitate the dispute on merits collaterally. Argumentsby NOIDA 26. NOIDA has argued before us that: a. The doctrine of merger is not applicable when the order of the Court is vitiated by fraud and that fraud is an exception to the rule of stare decisis; b. This Court exercises plenary powers to prevent the abuse of process and to meet the ends of justice under Article 129 of the Constitution; Vishu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. c.

The landowners must be relegated to the reference court under Section 18 of the 1894 Act for determining compensation; and d. The High Court and this Court committed a grave legal and factual error by ignoring vital evidence in the form of exemplar sale deeds of the subject land for determining the true and actual market value for assessment of quantum of compensation. 27. In consequence thereof, NOIDA has prayed for recalling the orders of the High Court dated 28th October, 2021 and of this Court dated 5th May, 2022 in exercise of the powers under Article 142 of the Constitution and to revisit the enhanced compensation of Rs. 1,10,000/- per sq. metre or to direct the landowners to approach the appropriate court under the 1894 Act. Replyby Vishnuregardingobjectionstomaintainability 28. In response to the objections raised regarding the maintainability of the present set of petitions, Vishnu submitted that: a.

Through the present proceedings, he is not seeking to appeal the judgment dated 5th May 2022 and is, therefore, not invoking the appellate jurisdiction of this Court but rather its inherent jurisdiction to prevent a gross miscarriage of justice; b. The provisions of the SC Rules--particularly Order LV Rule 6--preserve the inherent powers of this Court to prevent the abuse of the court's process; c. Fraud constitutes an exception to the doctrine of merger; d. The doctrine of merger is also inapplicable in the present case, as Vishnu was not a party before the High Court; and e. The writ petition is maintainable not only on the basis of infringement of the right under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India, 195028, but also because Vishnu's rights of access to justice and to a fair, equal, and transparent judicial process are at stake. 28 Constitution 1398 Issues 29. On maintainability, a.

whether the impugned order having merged with this Court's order dated 5th May 2022 in Reddy Veerana (supra), as claimed by Reddy, renders the present appeal which, so to say, lays a collateral challenge to an order of this Court itself - not maintainable? b. whether the present writ petition is not maintainable, as it seeks to challenge a judicial order which, by its very nature, can never be said to violate Fundamental Rights? c. whether Vishnu can pursue a civil appeal against the impugned order as well as a petition for review of the decision of this Court in which the impugned order has merged, as claimed, simultaneously? d. Whether Vishnu has engaged in forum shopping? 30. Whether Reddy obtained the impugned order, as well as this Court's order dated 5th May 2022 in Reddy Veerana (supra), by practising fraud and deception upon the courts and, therefore, the same deserve to be set aside/recalled? 31.

Should the answer to the above issues be in favour of Vishnu and against Reddy, what would be the appropriate order to be passed in these proceedings having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances? Analysis 32. We begin with recording the realisation that undoubtedly, there seems to be much more than what have met our eyes. However, like all courts, we are bound to decide cases based on the evidence on record, judicially noticeable facts, and the applicable law. Despite Reddy and Vishnu - and to certain extent Sudhakar - having used the judicial process obviously to secure their personal interests, we cannot be a bystander. If things have happened with a telling effect on public interest, resulting in public funds from the public exchequer being drained, the same has to be dealt with within the bounds of our jurisdiction. In our pursuit for the truth and to uphold the rule of law, we must adhere to established principles unless a valid reason warrants deviation.

Vishu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. 33. Vishnu, as can be gathered from the narrative of events, has not left any stone unturned to have the benefits accruing in favour of Reddy undone. The sheer number of proceedings instituted by Vishnu bear testimony to his struggle to set at naught all such orders that operate to his detriment. Apart from the civil appeal against the impugned order and a writ petition under Article 32 seeking enforcement of what, Vishnu calls infringement of his Fundamental Rights, he has inter alia pursued the alternate channel of filing a petition (which is defective) for review of the decision in Reddy Veerana (supra), an application for modification/recall of the order of this Court relegating him to the remedy under the 1894 Act and a petition for contempt of this Court's order.

The multiplicity of proceedings in this particular case raises a reasonable apprehension that the legal process, including this Court's, is being potentially abused by Vishnu. While, in no uncertain terms has Reddy asserted that Vishnu has indulged in abuse, we need to carefully assess whether it is Vishnu or Reddy, or both, who is/are the real abuser(s). 34. While judicial consuetude ordinarily mandates that we begin with a threshold examination of the issue of maintainability, the sui generis features of the present case impel us to first address the core allegation levelled by Vishnu of fraud having been committed by Reddy. We find that the question of maintainability, in the present case, is a mixed question of fact and law which, ideally, ought to be determined after adjudicating the question of alleged fraud played by Reddy on the courts. We draw support for this approach from the decision of this Court in Ramesh B. Desai v.

Bipin Vadilal Mehta29 where, dealing with Order XIV, CPC, it was observed as under: 13. Sub-rule (2) of Order 14 Rule 2 CPC lays down that where issues both of law and of fact arise in the same suit, and the court is of the opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on an issue of law only, it may try that issue first if that issue relates to (a) the jurisdiction of the court, or (b) a bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in force. The provisions of this Rule came up for consideration before this Court in Major S. S. Khanna v. Brig. F. J. Dillon [(1964) 4 SCR 409 : AIR 29 (2006) 5 SCC 638 1400 1964 SC 497] and it was held as under: (SCR p.

421) "Under Order 14 Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure where issues both of law and of fact arise in the same suit, and the court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on the issues of law only, it shall try those issues first, and for that purpose may, if it thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the issues of fact until after the issues of law have been determined. The jurisdiction to try issues of law apart from the issues of fact may be exercised only where in the opinion of the court the whole suit may be disposed of on the issues of law alone, but the Code confers no jurisdiction upon the court to try a suit on mixed issues of law and fact as preliminary issues. Normally all the issues in a suit should be tried by the court; not to do so, especially when the decision on issues even of law depend upon the decision of issues of fact, would result in a lopsided trial of the suit.

" Though there has been a slight amendment in the language of Order 14 Rule 2 CPC by the amending Act, 1976 but the principle enunciated in the above quoted decision still holds good and there can be no departure from the principle that the Code confers no jurisdiction upon the court to try a suit on mixed issues of law and fact as a preliminary issue and where the decision on issue of law depends upon decision of fact, it cannot be tried as a preliminary issue. (emphasis ours) 35. Recently in Sathyanath v. Sarojamani30, this Court after analysing judgments rendered by various High Courts and also Ramesh (supra) made the following observations: 21. The provisions of Order 14 Rule 2 are part of the procedural law, but the fact remains that such procedural law 30 (2022) 7 SCC 644 Vishu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.

had been enacted to ensure expeditious disposal of the lis and in the event of setting aside of findings on preliminary issue, the possibility of remand can be avoided, as was the language prior to the unamended Order 14 Rule 2. If the issue is a mixed issue of law and fact, or issue of law depends upon the decision of fact, such issue cannot be tried as a preliminary issue. In other words, preliminary issues can be those where no evidence is required and on the basis of reading of the plaint or the applicable law, if the jurisdiction of the court or the bar to the suit is made out, the court may decide such issues with the sole objective for the expeditious decision. Thus, if the court lacks jurisdiction or there is a statutory bar, such issue is required to be decided in the first instance so that the process of civil court is not abused by the litigants, who may approach the civil court to delay the proceedings on false pretext. * * * 23.

The different judgments of the High Court referred to above are in consonance with the principles laid down by this Court in Ramesh B. Desai [Ramesh B. Desai v. Bipin Vadilal Mehta, (2006) 5 SCC 638] that not all issues of law can be decided as preliminary issues. Only those issues of law can be decided as preliminary issues which fell within the ambit of clause (a) relating to the "jurisdiction of the Court" and (b) which deal with the "bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in force". The reason to substitute Rule 2 is to avoid piecemeal trial, protracted litigation and possibility of remand of the case, where the appellate court differs with the decision of the trial court on the preliminary issues upon which the trial court had decided. (emphasis ours) 36. We shall therefore decide the issue of maintainability after examining the allegation of fraud. I. Has Reddy Played Fraud On The Courts? 37.

Upon due consideration of the entire factual matrix, some notable facts stand out which, we believe, are appropriate to highlight. 1402 38. At the inception, the trio - Vishnu, Reddy and Sudhakar - stood as a united front. They consistently projected themselves as co-owners of the property in question in multiple judicial proceedings: a. in 1998, claiming to be the owners of the property, the trio jointly instituted a suit31 seeking a permanent injunction against NOIDA. b. upon securing a decree, they together filed an execution application32. c. they jointly pursued a writ petition33 challenging rejectionof their execution application. d. even when Vishnu singly assailed the land acquisition proceedings in a writ petition34, Reddy and Sudhakar filed an impleadment application reaffirming the narrative of joint ownership. e. NOIDA, in its appeal35 before this Court, arrayed the trio as respondents and not once did Reddy assert exclusive ownership during these proceedings. 39.

Contrary to the consistent earlier stance, Reddy, in a complete volte-face, asserted his sole ownership of the property in not one but multiple judicial proceedings: a. in 2001, Sudhakar sued36 Reddy, seeking his 1/3rd share in the land. Curiously, the written statement was filed the very next day, and even more curiously, a compromise agreement was filed a day later. The Trial Court, sceptical of this sudden turn of events, rejected the compromise finding its bona fides questionable. Ultimately, the suit was dismissed for default as Sudhakar did not pursue it further. b. in 2006, Reddy sued37 Vishnu, claiming to be the sole owner. This suit took a particularly curious turn when one Venkataramana, 31 Civil Suit No. 416/1998 32 Execution Application No. 6/2005 33 WP (Civil) 66797/2005 34 WP (Civil) 75152/2005 35 Civil Appeal No. 731/2013 36 Civil Suit No. 283/2001 37 Civil Suit No. 370/2006 Vishu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.

claiming to be Vishnu's Attorney, filed a written statement admitting the claim. However, records reveal that the Power of Attorney had already been cancelled on 21st December, 2005, a full six months prior to the suit being instituted. Worse still, pursuant to the documents having been filed in the Court by Reddy, it has surfaced that Venkataramana is also a partner of Reddy in the firm Manyata-Pristine. c. Finally, in January 2019, Reddy once again laid exclusive claim to the subject land asserting himself as the sole owner in a writ petition38 before the High Court, challenging the District Magistrate's decision to deny him compensation. Vide the impugned order, his claim was allowed by the High Court. 40. In a judicial landscape that values consistency and candour, this case strikes a discordant note. This trajectory of the contradictory claims made by Reddy can hardly be ignored by this Court. 41.

The impugned order was passed on a writ petition presented by Reddy, wherein he challenged the District Magistrate's refusal to grant compensation for the acquired land and simultaneously sought a declaration of his exclusive ownership. The High Court accepted his claim albeit based on material which was scant, information that was incomplete and knowledge appearing to be fragmentary. 42. Considering Reddy's consistent stance in earlier proceedings that the property was jointly owned with Vishnu and Sudhakar, his failure to implead them in the writ petition is appalling, if not more. This, in our view, was a calculated attempt by Reddy to wrongfully appropriate the entire property keeping the other two - Vishnu and Sudhakar - in the dark. 43. Although the provisions of the CPC do not apply to writ proceedings ex proprio vigore, the principles flowing therefrom, as far as practicable, can be made applicable.

Order I Rule 9, CPC, as originally enacted, ordained that a suit shall not be defeated by reason of misjoinder or non-joinder of parties; however, after its amendment in 1976 introducing the proviso, the implication is that non-joinder of a party could, in a given case, prove fatal for the right to relief claimed by the plaintiff, more so when a necessary party is not impleaded, and 38 WP (Civil) 2272/2019 1404 defeat the suit.

Although Order I Rule 10 does empower a court to implead at any stage of the proceedings a party who should have been joined as a defendant, either upon or without the application of either party, a decree passed by the court in the absence of a necessary or proper party to the suit and affecting his interest could be avoided by such party; however, if the decree is such that it acknowledges and declares the right of the decree-holder to the subject matter of the suit and entitles him to its benefits, such a decree has to be carried either in appeal or review by the affected non-party to divest the decree-holder of whatever the decree entitles him to. 44. Insofar as writ proceedings are concerned, it is no longer res integra that any order made on a writ petition affecting the interest of a party who has not been arrayed as a respondent could be invalidated on the ground of breach of natural justice. 45. We may profitably refer to the decision in Poonam v. State of U. P. 39.

Although the decision was rendered in connection with a selection process for allotment of a fair price shop, this Court after analysing various previous decisions emphasised: 21. We have referred to the aforesaid passages as they state the basic principle behind the doctrine of natural justice, that is, no order should be passed behind the back of a person who is to be adversely affected by the order. The principle behind the proviso to Order 1 Rule 9 that the Code of Civil Procedure enjoins it and the said principle is also applicable to the writs. An unsuccessful candidate challenging the selection as far as the service jurisprudence is concerned is bound to make the selected candidates parties. 46. A reference may further be made to the decision in Ajay Ishwar Ghute and Ors. v. Meher K. Patel and Ors. 40wherein a Bench of two-Judges [of which one of us (Ujjal Bhuyan, J. ) was a member] in an appeal against an order made under Article 226 of the Constitution, held thus: 21.

In the facts of the case, the senior district-level officials of the State had stated on oath that the construction of the 39 (2016) 2 SCC 779 40 2024 SCC OnLine SC 681 Vishu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. compound wall, in respect of which relief was sought in the Writ Petition, would affect the rights of several third parties. However, the Court completely ignored the same. Even in clause 6(iii) of the "Minutes of Order", there was enough indication that the compound wall, if not appropriately constructed, would affect the rights of owners of the other lands. Therefore, it was the duty of the Court to have called upon the 1st and 2nd respondents to implead the persons who were likely to be affected. The 1st and 2nd respondents could not have pleaded ignorance about the names of the concerned parties as they have referred to the owners of the other lands in the "Minutes of Order".

However, the Division Bench of the High Court has failed to make even an elementary enquiry whether third parties will be affected by the construction of the compound wall under police protection. Hence, the order dated 16th March 2022 passed in the Writ Petition in terms of the "Minutes of Order" is entirely illegal and must be set aside. The Writ Petition will have to be remanded to the High Court to decide the same in accordance with the law. 47. More generally, there are umpteen number of decisions of this Court wherein the rights of a third party have been protected in civil litigation. This principle was specifically noted in respect of claims arising out of land acquisition in the case of Neyvely Lignite Corpn. Ltd. v. Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition) Neyvely41as follows: 12.

It is true that Section 50(2) of the Act gives to the local authority or the company right to adduce evidence before the Collector or in the reference under Section 18 as it was specifically stated that in any proceedings held before the Collector or the Court, the local authority or the company may appear and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation. However, it has no right to seek reference. Based thereon, the contention is that the limited right of adduction of evidence for the purpose of determining the compensation does not carry with it the right to participate in the proceedings or right 41 (1995) 1 SCC 221 1406 to be heard or to file an appeal under Section 54. We cannot limit the operation of Section 3(b) in conjunction with sub-section (2) of Section 50 of the Act within a narrow compass.

The right given under sub-section (2) of Section 50 is in addition to and not in substitution of or in derogation to all the incidental, logical and consequential rights flowing from the concept of fair and just procedure consistent with the principles of natural justice. The consistent thread that runs through all the decisions of this Court starting from Himalayan Tiles case [(1980) 3 SCC 223 : (1980) 3 SCR 235] is that the beneficiary, i. e. , local authority or company, a cooperative society registered under the relevant State law, or statutory authority is a person interested to determine just and proper compensation for the acquired land and is an aggrieved person. It flows from it that the beneficiary has the right to be heard by the Collector or the Court. If the compensation is enhanced it is entitled to canvass its correctness by filing an appeal or defend the award of the Collector.

If it is not made a party, it is entitled to seek leave of the court and file the appeal against the enhanced award and decree of the Civil Court under Section 26 or of the judgment and decree under Section 54 or is entitled to file writ petition under Article 226 and assail its legality or correctness. When the award made under Section 11 of the Collector is vitiated by fraud, collusion or corruption, the beneficiary is entitled to challenge it in the writ petition apart from the settled law that the conduct of the Collector or Civil Judge is amenable to disciplinary enquiry and appropriate action. These are very valuable and salutary rights. Moreover in the language of Order 1 Rule 10 CPC, in the absence of the beneficiary who ultimately is to bear the higher compensation, no complete and effectual determination of binding just and proper compensation to the acquired land would be made.

So it is concomitantly a proper party if not a necessary party to the proceedings under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC. The denial of the right to a person interested is in negation of fair and just procedure offending Article 14 of the Constitution. Vishu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. 13. The reasons are not far to seek. It is notorious that though the stakes involved are heavy, the Government plead or the instructing officer do not generally adduce, much less proper and relevant, evidence to rebut the claims for higher compensation. Even the cross-examination will be formal, halting and ineffective. Generally, if not invariably the governmental agencies involved in the process take their own time and many a time in collusion, file the appeals after abnormal or inordinate delay. They remain insensitive even if the States (sic Stakes)involved run into several crores of public money. The courts insist upon proper explanation of every day's delay.

In this attitudinal situation it would be difficult to meet strict standards to fill the unbridgeable gaps of the delay in filing the appeals and generally entails dismissal of the appeals at the threshold without adverting to the merits of the hike in the compensation. On other hand if the notice is issued to the local authority etc. it/they would participate in the award proceedings under Sections 11 and 18, adduce necessary and relevant evidence and be heard before the Collector and the court before determining compensation. For instance that without considering the evidence in the proper perspective, the court determined the compensation. 14. If there is no right of hearing or appeal given to the beneficiary and if the State does not file the appeal or if filed with delay and it was dismissed, is it not the beneficiary who undoubtedly bears the burden of the compensation, who would be the affected person?

Is it not interested to see that the appellate court would reassess the evidence and fix the proper and just compensation as per law? For instance the reference court determined market value at Rs 1,00,000 while the prevailing market value of the land is only Rs 10,000. Who is to bear the burden? Suppose State appeal was dismissed due to refusal to condone the delay, is it not an unjust and illegal award? Many an instance can be multiplied. But suffice it to state that when the beneficiary for whose benefit the land is acquired is served with the notice and brought on record at the stage of enquiry by the Collector and reference court under Section 18 or in an appeal under Section 54, it/they would be interested to 1408 defend the award under Section 11 or Section 26 or would file an appeal independently under Section 54 etc. against the enhanced compensation.

As a necessary or proper party affected by the determination of higher compensation, the beneficiary must have a right to challenge the correctness of the award made by the reference court under Section 18 or in appeal under Section 54 etc. Considered from this perspective we are of the considered view that the appellantCompany is an interested person within the meaning of Section 3(b) of the Act and is also a proper party, if not a necessary party under Order 1 Rule 10 of the CPC. The High Court had committed manifest error of law in holding that the appellant is not a person interested. The orders of the High Court are accordingly set aside. 48.

However, it is clarified that we do not seek to make any opprobrious remarks against the High Court as it was incumbent upon Reddy to implead Vishnu and Sudhakar as respondents in his writ petition and the High Court could not have been expected to know the longstanding disputes or the fact that Reddy had procured change in the revenue records on the basis of the compromise decree whereupon further proceedings between Vishnu and Reddy in the shape of a suit were pending unless the same was brought to its notice. 49.

In any event, having regard to the events preceding presentation of the writ petition by Reddy, out of which the present proceedings have arisen, we have no hesitation to hold that Reddy tailored a situation to suit his convenience by not impleading Vishnu as a party with the sole intention of obtaining an order in respect of not only the quantum of compensation payable for acquisition of the subject land but also a declaration as to his entitlement thereto - all, behind Vishnu's back. An attempt by Reddy to steal a march over Vishnu is clearly discernible which, without reference to anything more, does border on fraud. 50. Moving ahead, it is equally well settled that suppression of even a single material fact can be fatal before writ courts. In this context, one may usefully refer to the decision of this Court in S. J. S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar42 where the law has succinctly been stated as follows: 42 (2004) 7 SCC 166 Vishu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v.

The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. 13. As a general rule, suppression of a material fact by a litigant disqualifies such litigant from obtaining any relief. This rule has been evolved out of the need of the courts to deter a litigant from abusing the process of court by deceiving it. But the suppressed fact must be a material one in the sense that had it not been suppressed it would have had an effect on the merits of the case. It must be a matter which was material for the consideration of the court, whatever view the court may have taken ... (emphasis ours) 51. In the present case, Reddy's failure before the High Court to disclose the earlier series of litigation - where he consistently asserted joint ownership with Vishnu and Sudhakar being a fact having a bearing on the merits of the case, is alone sufficient to vitiate the impugned order. 52. However, the concealment runs deeper. It stems from the suit43 that Vishnu had instituted on 7th August, 2020, referred to hereafter. 53.

During the pendency of the writ petition (in which the impugned order was passed), Vishnu instituted the suit praying to declare the compromise decree dated 17th November, 2006 as null and void on the ground that the written statement (admitting Reddy's sole ownership over the property) filed by Venkataramana on his behalf was without any authority as the Power of Attorney in his favour already stood cancelled. Reddy filed his written statement in that suit on 11th October 2021 - which is 17 (seventeen) days before the High Court disposed of the writ petition. Despite being a party to the suit, Reddy chose not to inform the writ court of pendency of the suit. Notably, the decree dated 16th February, 2000 in the suit44 instituted by the trio and the change in the land records based on the compromise decree dated 17th November, 2006 in the suit45 instituted by Reddy were relied on by Reddy to have a ruling in his favour.

As per the records available from the website of the High Court, it is noted that judgment was reserved on 6th October, 2021. Therefore, 43 Civil Suit No. 471/2020 44 Civil Suit No. 416/1998 45 Civil Suit No. 370/2006 1410 between 7th August, 2020 (date of institution of the fourth suit) and 28th October, 2021 (date of the impugned order), ample opportunity was available for Reddy to disclose the factum of a suit having been instituted by Vishnu. This deliberate suppression, of a material fact, f