YADVENDRA ARYA AND ANR. v. MUKESH KUMAR GUPTA

Citation: [2007] 12 S.C.R. 615

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: ARIJIT PASAYAT, LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA

Case summary

YADVENDRA ARYA AND ANR. v. MUKESH KUMAR GUPTA.pdf

Judgment text

YADVENDRA ARYA AND ANR. v. MUKESH KUMAR GUPTA NOVEMBER 28, 2007 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND LOKESHWARSINGHPANTA,JJ. ] Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation ofLetting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972: s. 21 (1)(a)-Applicationforrelease ofshop-On groundofbona fide need oflandlord to start his independent business-Other shops being rented accommodations in possession of tenants-HELD: Prescribed Authority and High Court rightly allowed application of landlord-Tenants would vacate the premises as directed in the judgment. Respondents-landlord filed an application for release of his shop under Section 21(1)(a) ofthe Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation ofLetting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, on the ground that he being an unemployed educated and married youngman, in order to earn his livelihood, bonafide needs to start his independent business and there was no possibility ofhis being employed in the business of his father.

It was also stated that the other shops were rented accommodations in occupation ofthe tenants. The Prescribed p Authority allowed the application, but the appellate authority allowed the appeal ofthe tenants. However, the High Court allowed the writ petition ofthe landlord. In the instant appeal filed by the tenants it was contended for the appellants that parameters relating to bona fide needs and comparative hardship were not considered in proper perspective and the matter should have been remanded to the authorities for consideration. Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: Considering the factual background in the light of principles as stated by this Court*, the inevitable conclusion is that the application of the landlord has rightly been allowed by the High Court. In such matters practice of remanding the case to the 8 authorities for further consideration has been deprecated by this Court in a large number of cases.

** Considering the fact that the tenants are carrying on business in the premises, time is granted to them to vacate the premises in question as directed in the judgment. [Para 16 and 17) [624-E, FJ *Akhileshwar Kumar and Ors. v. Mustaqim and Ors. , AIR 2003 SC 532; Ragavendra Kumar v. Firm Prem Machinery & Co. , [2000) 1SCC 679; Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal, [2002) 5SCC 397; G. C. Kapoor v. Nand Kumar Bhasin, AIR (2002) SC 200 and Mst. Bega Begum & Ors. v. Abdul Ahad Khand (d) by Lrs. & Ors. , [1979] 1sec 273, relied on. **R. VE. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami and VP. Temple andAnr. , (2003] 8 SCC 752, relied on. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5483 of 2007. From the Judgment and final Order dated 23. 8. 2006 of the High Court ofUttamachal at Nainital in W. P. No. 247/2002 MIS. Yunus Malik, Abhishek Vikas and Prashant Chaudhary for the Appellants. N. D. B. Raju, C. M. Angadi and Rameshwar Prasad Goyal for the ,. Respondent.

The Judgment ofthe Court was delivered by DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a learned Single Judge ofthe Uttranchal High Court allowing the writ petition filed by the· respondent. Said respondent undisputedly is the landlord ofthe premises which were let out to the present appellants. 3. An application under Section 2l(l)(a) ofU. P. (Urban Building (Regulation ofLetting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, (Act No. 13 of 1972) (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') was filed by the respondent against the appellants praying for the release ofthe Shop situated at Mahalia Bazar Ganj (Park Road), Kashipur, District Udham Singh Nagar, which was under tenancy on the ground that the respondent has passed High School Certificate Examination and is unemployed and he has no independent business to earn his livelihood and, therefore, he wants to do the business ofElectrical Goods, T. V. , V. C. R. , Music System, Cooking Range etc.

in the said Shop. 4. It was, further, stated by the landlord in his release application that his father Sri Mithilesh Kumar Gupta is doing the independent business in the name ofMithilesh Kumar and Brothers ofwhich his father is the sole owner and there is no possibility ofemploying any other person, as the shop in possession of his father is not so elaborate 'so as to accommodate the respondent also. It was also stated that he also does not want to join the business along with his father, as he wants to do the independent business. It has further been stated in the release application that he has already been married in 1994 and is separate from his father and as such, the shop in dispute is required for his own use and occupation for settling himselfin the independent business. 5. A written statement was filed by the present appellants in which it was stated that the landlord can be accommodated in the business of the father. 6.

An affidavit was filed by the respondent who has deposed that he wants to run the independent business and he cannot settle himselfalong with his father. So far as the availability ofthe other shops are concerned, it was specifically stated that all other shops are rented accommodation and the tenants are occupying the same. 7. The prescribed authority, Kashipur District Udham Singh Nagar allowed the application ofthe respondent directing the appellants to vacate the shop within a period of 30 days. 8. Being aggrieved the appellants preferred an appeal which was allowed by the appellate authority. The respondent filed Writ Petition under Article 227 ofthe Constitution ofindia, 1950 (in short the 'Constitution'). The High Court as noted above allowed the writ petition ofthe respondent and directed the appellants to vacate the premises. 9.

In support ofthe appeal, it was contented by learned counsel for the appellants that the parameters relating to bona fide needs and comparative hardship have not been considered in the proper perspective. 10. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand supported the judgment ofthe High Court stating that the High Court has kept in view the factual scenario and applied the appropriate and applicable principles and, therefore, no interference is called for. 11. So far as the basic need concept is concerned in Akhileshwar Kumar and Ors. v. Mustaqim and Ors. , AIR (2003) SC 532 it was inter alia held as follows: "In our opinion, the approach adopted by the High Court cannot be countenanced and has occasioned a failure of justice. Overwhelming evidence is available to show that the plaintiffNo. 1is sitting idle, without any adequate commercial activity available to him so as to gainfully employ him. The plaintiffNo. 1and his father both have deposed to this fact.

Simply because the plaintiff No. 1is provisionally assisting his father in their family business, it does not mean that he should never start his own independent business. What the High Court has overlooked is the evidence to the effect, relied on by the trial Court too, that the husband of plaintiffNo. 4, i. e. son-in-law ofRam Chandra Sao, was assisting the latter in his business and there was little left to be done by the three sons. 4. So is the case with the availability ofalternative accommodation, as opined by the High Court. There is a shop in respect ofwhich a suit for eviction was filed to satisfy the need ofplaintiffNo. 2. The suit was compromised and the shop was got vacated. The shop is meant for the business of plaintiff No. 2.

There is yet another shop constructed by the father of the plaintiffs which is situated over a septic tank but the same is almost inaccessible inasmuch as there is a deep ditch in front of the shop and that is why it is lying vacant and unutilized. Once it has been proved by a landlord that the suit accommodation is required bonafide by him for his own purpose and such satisfaction withstands the test ofobjective assessment by the Court offacts then choosing ofthe accommodation which would be reasonable to satisfy such requirement has to be left to the subjective choice ofthe needy. The Court cannot thrust upon its own choice on the needy. Of course, the choice has to be exercised reasonably and not whimsically. The alternative accommodation which have prevailed with the High Court are either not available to the plaintiffNo. 1 or not suitable in all respects as the suit accommodation is.

The approach ofthe High Court that an accommodation got vacated to satisfy the need of plaintiff No. 2, who too is an educated unemployed should be diverted or can be considered as relevant alternative accommodation to satisfy the requirement ofplaintiffNo. 1, another educated unemployed brother, cannot be countenanced. So also considering a shop situated over a septic tank and inaccessible on account ofa ditch in front of the shop and hence lying vacant cannot be considered a suitable alternative to the suit shop which is situated in a marketing complex, is easily accessible and has been purchased by the plaintiffs to satisfy the felt need of one ofthem. " 12. In Ragavendra Kumar v. Firm Prem Machinery & Co. , [2000] 1 SCC 679 it was held as follows : "It is settled position oflaw that the landlord is best judge ofhis requirement for residential or business purpose and he has got complete freedom in the matter. See: Prativa Devi (Smt. ) v. TV Krishnan, [1996] 5 SCC 353.

In the case in hand the plaintifflandlord wanted eviction ofthe tenant from the suit premises for starting his business as it was suitable and it cannot be faulted. " 13. In Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal, [2002] 5 SCC 397 it was held as follows: } "In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. , (1998) 2 SCC I this Court emphasized the need ofsocial legislations like the Rent Control Act striking a balance between rival interests so as to be just to law. "The law ought not to be unjust to one and give a disproportionate benefit or protection to another section ofthe society". While the shortage ofaccommodation makes it necessary to protect the tenants to save them from exploitation but at the same time the need to protect tenant is coupled with an obligation to ensure that the tenants are not conferred with a benefit disproportionately larger than the one needed.

Socially progressive legislation must have a holistic perception and not a shortsighted parochial approach. Power to legislate socially progressive legislation is coupled with a responsibility to avoid arbitrariness and unreasonability. Alegislation impregnated with tendency to give undue preference to one section, at the cost ofconstraints by placing shackles on the other section, not only entails miscarriage ofjustice but may also in constitutional invalidity. xxx xxx xxx The need for reasonable interpretation ofrent control legislations was emphasized by this Court in Bega. Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan, (l979) AIR SC 273. Speaking in the context ofreasonable requirement oflandlord as a ground for eviction, the Court guarded against any artificial extension entailing stretching or straining of language so as to make it impossible or extremely difficult for the landlord to get a decree for eviction.

The Court warned that such a course would defeat the very purpose ofthe Act which affords the facility of eviction of the tenant to the landlord on certain specified grounds. In Kewal Singh v. Lajwanti, (1980) l SCC 290 this Court has observed, while the rent control legislation has given anumber offacilities to the tenants, it should not be construed so as to destroy the limited relief which it seeks to give to the landlord also. For instance, one ofthe grounds for eviction which is contained in almost all the Rent Control Acts in the country is the question of landlord's bona fide personal necessity. The concept of bonafide necessity should be meaningfully construed so as to make the reliefgranted to the landlord real and practical. Recently in Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr Mahesh Chand Gupta, [1999] 6 SCC 222 the Court has he! d that the concept of bona fide need or genuine requirement needs a practical approach instructed by the realities oflife.

An approach either too liberal or too conservative or pedantic must be guarded against. 9. The rent control legislations are heavily loaded in favour ofthe tenants treating them as weaker sections ofthe society requiring legislative protection against exploitation and unscrupulous devices ofgreedy landlords. The legislative intent has to be respected by the courts while interpreting the laws. But it is being uncharitable to legislatures ifthey are attributed with an intention that they lean only in favour ofthe tenants and while being fair to the tenants, go to the extent ofbeing unfair to the landlords. The legislature is fair to the tenants and to the landlords - both. The courts have to adopt a reasonable and balanced approach while interpreting rent control legislations starting with an assumption that an equal treatment has been meted out to both the sections ofthe society.

In spite ofthe overall balance tilting in favour ofthe tenants, while interpreting such ofthe provisions as take care of the interest ofthe landlord the court should not hesitate in leaning in favour ofthe landlords. Such provisions are engrafted in rent control legislations to take care of those situations where the landlords too are weak and feeble and feel humble. xxx xxx xxx In providing key to the meaning ofany word or expression the context in which it is set has significance. Color and content emanating from context may permit sense being preferred to mere meaning depending on what is sought to be achieved and what is sought to be prevented by the legislative scheme surrounding the expression.

Requirement of landlord for his own use, is an expression capable for attributing an intention to the legislature that what was intended to be fulfilled is such requirement as would persuade the landlord to have the premises vacated by the tenant, to forego the rental income, and to put the premises to such use as the landlord would deem to be his own use and in the given facts and circumstances of a case the Court too would hold it to be so in contradistinction with a mere ruse to evict the tenant. The ) legislature intending to protect the tenant also intends to lift the protection when it is the requirement of landlord to put the accommodation to such use as he intends, away from leasing it out. xxx xxx xxx 32. lfwe do not meaningly construe the concept ofrequirement the provision may suffer from the risk of being branded as unreasonable, arbitrary or as placing uncalled for and unreasonable restrictions on the right ofthe owner to hold and use his property.

We cannot place a construction on the expression 'for his own use' in such a way as to deny the landlord a right to evict his tenant when he needs the accommodation for his own son to settle himself well in his life. We have to give colour and content to the expression and provide the skin ofa living thought to the skeleton ofthe words, which the Legislature has not itselfchosen to define. The Indian society, its customs and requirements and the context where the provision is set in the legislation are the guides leading to acceptance ofthe meaning which we have chosen to assign to the words 'for his own use' in Section 13(3)(a)(ii) ofthe Act. 33(1)In the present case, the requirement oflandlord ofthe suit premises for user as office ofhis chartered accountant son is the requirement oflandlord 'for his own use' within the meaning of Section l3(3)(a)(ii). " 14. Again in G. C. Kapoor v.

Nand Kumar Bhasin, AIR (2002) SC 200 it was noted as follows: "It is settled position of law that bonafide requirement means that requirement must be honest and not tainted with any oblique motive and is not a mere desire or wish. In Dattatraya Laxman Kamble v. Abdul Rasul Moulali Kotkunde and Anr. , [1999] 4SCC 1this Court while considering the bonafide need ofthe landlord was of the view that when a landlord says that he needs the building for his own occupation, he has to prove it but there is no warrant for 'presuming that his need is not bona fide'. It was also held that while deciding this question. Court would look into the broad aspects and if the Courts feels any doubt about bona fide requirement, it is for the landlord to clear such doubt. 10. In Raghunath G. Panhale G. Panhale (DJ By Lrs. v. Chaganlal Sundarji and Co.

, [1999] 8 SCC 1 his Court inter alia held that it was not necessary for landlord to prove that he had money to invest in the new business contemplated nor that he had experience of it. It was a case for eviction on the ground of bonafide requirement ofthe landlord for non-residential purpose, as he wanted to start a grocery business in the suit premises to improve his livelihood. " 15. In Mst. Begam Begum & Ors. v. Abdul Ahad Khan (d) by Lrs & Ors. , [1979] 1 SCC 273 this court had occasion to deal in detail with the comparative hardship's aspect as follows: "Moreover Section 1l(h) of the Act uses the words 'reasonable requirement' which undoubtedly postulate that there must be an element of need as opposed to a mere desire or wish. The distinction between desire and need should doubtless be kept in mind but not so as to make even the genuine need as nothing but a desire as the High Court has done in this case.

It seems to us that the connotation ofthe term 'need' or 'requirement' should not be artificially extended nor its language so unduly stretched or strained as to make it impossible or extremely difficult for one landlord to get a decree for eviction. Such a course would defeat the very purpose ofthe Act which affords the facility ofeviction ofthe tenant to the landlord on certain specified grounds. This appears to us to be the general scheme of all the Rent Control Acts, prevalent in other State in the country. This Court has considered the import ofthe word requirement and pointed out that it merely connotes that there should be an element ofneed. In this connection our attention was drawn to the evidence led by the defendants that the main source oftheir income is the hotel business carried on by them in the premises and ifthey are thrown out they are likely to get any alternative accommodation.

The High Court has accepted the case ofthe defendants on this point, but does not appear to have considered the natural consequences, which flow from a comparative assessment ofthe advantages and disadvantages ofthe landlord and the tenant ifa decree for eviction follows. It is no doubt true that the tenant will have to be ousted from the house if adecree for eviction is passed, but such an event would happen whenever a decree for eviction is passed and was fully in contemplation ofthe legislature when Section l l(l)(h) of the Act was introduced in the Act. This by itselfwould not be valid ground for refusing the plaintiffs for eviction. Thus, on careful comparison and assessment of the relative advantage and disadvantages ofthe landlord and the tenant it seems to us that the scale is titled in favour of the plaintiff. The inconvenience, loss and trouble resulting from denial ofa decree for eviction in favour ofthe plaintiffs far outweight the eviction from that point ofview. " 16.

It is to be noted that learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the matter should have been remanded to the authorities for further consideration. Such a practice has been deprecated by this court in a large number ofcases. [See: R. V. E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami and V. P. Temple and Anr. , [2003] 8 SCC 752. 17. Considering the factual background in the light ofthe principles as stated above, the inevitable conclusion is that this appeal is without merit. Considering the fact that the appellants are carrying on the business in the premises, time is granted to them to vacate the premises in question by the end ofJune, 2008 subject to filing the usual undertaking with the prescribed authority within a period of four weeks from today. 18. Appeal is dismissed but without any order as to costs. RP. Appeal dismissed.