ZENITH STEEL TUBES AND INDUSTRIES LTD. AND ANR. v. SICOM LIMITED

Citation: [2007] 12 S.C.R. 413

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: ALTAMAS KABIR, B. SUDERSHAN REDDY

Case summary

ZENITH STEEL TUBES AND INDUSTRIES LTD. AND ANR. v. SICOM LIMITED.pdf

Judgment text

~· ZENITH STEEL TUBES AND INDUSTRIES LTD. AND ANR. v. SICOM LIMITED NOVEMBER 21, 2007 •. ' [ALTAMAS KABIR AND B. SUDERSHAN REDDY, JJ. ) _J SickIndustrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985-s. 22- Expression 'suit' whether includes other proceedings before legal forum-Divergent views ofco-ordinate Benches-Matter referred to larger Bench-State Financial Corporation Act, 1951-s. 31(I)(aa). The first appellant-Company obtained financial assistance amounting to Rs. 1. 42 lacs from respondent. It created a security for ' repayment ofamount by hypothecating plant and machinery. On the .. ( same day, the second appellant executed a personal guarantee for repayment of the loan amount in case of default by the appellantcompany. The first appellant company defaulted in repayment ofthe amount. Inspite of several notices demanding the payment, the first appellant failed to make payment.

" Therespondent issued a notice to second appellantto pay the entire amount by invoking the personal guarantee given by the second _, appellant. The second appellant also did not make the payment as " demanded and consequently respondent filed a petition against the --i second appellant under s. 31(1)(aa) ofthe State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 for enforcing the personal guarantee given by the said appellant. Single Judge of the High Court held that the liability of the guarantorwas independentofthatofthe principaldebtor and accordingly ,,__; the guarantee could be invoked. On appeal, the Division Bench ofthe High Court held that the provision ofs. 22 ofSICA, as amended in 1994, did not prohibit any proceeding, other than a suit for enforcement of anysecurityagainsttheguarantor.

Onsuch findingand also upon holding that the liability ofthe guarantor was co-extensive with the principal debtor and that the creditor was not required to exercise his right as a mortgagee beforeproceedingagainstthe guarantor, the Division Bench dismissed the appeal. In appeal to this Court, appellants contended that the decision in *Kai/ash Nath Agrawal's case had been rendered by this Court in the context ofinterpretation ofthe expressions 'suit' and 'proceedings' used ins. 22(1) ofSICA, 1985. In construing the said two expressions, this Court was ofthe view thatwhile the expression 'proceedings' used in s. 22(1) would have to be confined to companies alone, the expression 'suit' had been introduced by amendment to extend the protective cover ofs. 22 to guarantors aswell; thatthe purpose forwhich such amendment had been effected, namely, to extend the protective cover of s.

22 to guarantors also, would be rendered meaningless if coercive action continued to be taken against guarantors who could even be the Directorsofthe company in question; thatthecontinuingambiguitywas sought to be explained in the **ParamjitSingh Patheja casewherein it was explained that the expression 'suit' would have to be understood in a larger context to include other proceedings as well before a legal forum. Referring the matter to larger Bench, the Court HELD: In the decisions of this Court two divergent views have been expressed in respect ofthe same issue involved in this appeal. In *Kai/ash Nath Agrawal's case this Court has taken the view that the legislature appears to have knowingly used two different expressions in s. 22(1) of SICA, namely, 'proceeding' in the first part and the expression 'suit' in the second part and the protection ofs.

22 extended to guarantors in respect of suits alone and the use of the expression 'proceeding' could not be extended to include suits as well nor could \_. the expression 'suit' be extended to include the expression 'proceeding' also. On the other hand, in **ParamjeetSingh Patheja 's case itwas held that the expression 'suit' which extends the protection of s. 22(1) to guarantors, would have to be interpreted to include 'proceeding' also, in view of the intention of the legislature to protect sick industrial companies where references were pending before the BIFR. It is also evident from the decision in **ParamjeetSingh Patheja 's case thatthe views expressed in *KailashNathAgrawal's case had not been brought to the notice ofthe learned Judgeswho decided the matter. Even ifthis Court agreewith one ofthe two interpretations, the anomalous situation will continue since the decisions are that ofcoordinate Benches.

[Para24] (424-A-E] Industrial Corporation ofMaharashtra Ltd, (1993] 2 SCC 144; PathejaBros. Forgings&StampingandAnr. v. ICICILtd andOrs. , (2000] 6 SCC 545; Madalsa International Ltd v. Central Bank ofIndia, AIR (1998) Born 247; *Kai/ash Nath Agrawal&Ors. v. Pradeshiya Industrial & Investment Corporation of UP. Ltd & Anr. , (2003] 4 SCC 305; **Paramjit Singh Pathejav. ICDS Ltd, JT (2006) 10 SC 41; State Bank ofHyderabadv. Vasudev AnantBhide etc. , (1969] 2SCC 491; Pandurang RamchandraMandlikv. Shantibai Ramchandra Ghatge andOrs. , (1989] Supp 2 SCC 627; Secretary ofState v. Mask and Company, AIR (1948) PC 105; Dewal Singhal v. State ofMaharashtra, (2001) 106 Company Cases 587; BSILtd andAnr. v. Gift Holdings Pvt. Ltd and Anr. , [2000) 2 SCC 737 and Gujarat State Financial Corporation v. Mis. Natson Manufacturing Co. (P) Ltd. , (1979] 1 SCR 372, referred to. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5347 of 2007. . , . From the Judgment and final Order dated 29. 1.

2007 ofthe High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Appeal No. 1/2007 in Misc. Petition No. 64 of 2000. Shekhar Naphade, Shivaji M. Jadhav, Himanshu Gupta, B1ij Kishor Sah and Rahul Joshi for the Appellants. Jay Savla and Meenakshi for the Respondent. The Judgment ofthe Court was delivered by ALTAMAS KABIR, J. 1. Leave granted. t 2. The appellant no. I company was carrying on business of manufacturing galvanised pipes. In November, 1992 the appellantcompany approached the respondent for financial assistance amounting to Rs. 1,42,000/- to meet a part of the cost for setting up a factory in village Madap, Taluq Kolhapur in the District of Raigarh for the manufacture ofgalvanised pipes. The said amount was duly sanctioned and the said sum of Rs. 1,42,000/- was advanced by the respondent to the appellant company.

An agreement was entered into for a term loan and the appellant-company also created a security for repayment of the amount by hypothecating its plant and machinery and creating an equitable mortgage ofits factory premises situated in the above mentioned village. loan agreement was executed on 30. 3. 1993 for repayment ofthe loan in various instalments. On the same day, the second appellant executed a personal guarantee for repayment ofthe loan amount in case ofdefault by the appellant-company. 3. The appellant-company committed several defaults in repayment ofthe loan amount compelling the respondent to issue a notice on 16. 10. 98 calling upon the appellant-company to pay the overdue amount within a stipulated period. Despite such notice, the appellant-company failed to make payment and accordingly, by a further notice dated I0. 1. 1999 the respondent called upon the appellant-company to repay the entire amount due and payable to the respondent by 3. 2.

1999 failing which the possession of the assets of the appellant-company would be taken on 5. 2. 1999. 4. Since, despite such notice the appellant-company failed and neglected to pay the entire amount as demanded, the respondent issued notice to the appellant no. 2 on 13. 6. 2000 calling upon him to pay the entire amount by invoking the personal guarantee given by the second appellant. As in the case ofthe appellant-company, the second appellant did not also make the payment as demanded, and consequently, the respondent filed a petition against the second appellant under Section 31(1 )(aa) ofthe State Financial Corporations Act, 1951, on I0. 10. 2000 for enforcing the personal guarantee given by the said appellant. 5.

In the meantime, the appellant-company applied to the Board for + Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) and was declared sick company by the BIFR under the provisions of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, (SICA), and the company is still under the said Board. 6. Taking advantage ofthe aforesaid position, the second appellant .. contended before the single Judge ofthe Bombay High Court that in view -' of Section 22 of the aforesaid Act, the personal guarantee given by the second appellant could not be invoked. It was also contended that the respondent could not enforce the guarantee till such time as the assets which had been mortgaged in its favour had not been realised. Both the said contentions were rejected by the learned single Judge upon holding that the liability ofthe guarantor was independent ofthat ofthe principal debtor, and accordingly, the guarantee could be invoked and the amount could be recovered from the guarantor.

The guarantor was directed to pay Rs. 1,67,89,225/-with further interest on the principal amount ofRs. 92 lakhs from the date ofthe petition till payment at the rate of 12%. The said decision ofthe learned single Judge was challenged by the appellants herein before the Division Bench ofthe Bombay High Court in Appeal No. l/2007. The Division Bench on consideration ofthe different decisions ofthis Court came to the conclusion that the provisions ofSection 22 of SICA, as amended in 1994, did not prohibit any proceeding, other than a suit for enforcement ofany security against the guarantor. On such finding and also upon holding that the liability ofthe guarantor was co-extensive with the principal debtor and that the creditor was not required to exercise his right as a mortgagee before proceeding against the guarantor, the Division Bench dismissed the appeal with costs on 29. 1. 2007.

It is the decision both ofthe learned single Judge as also the Division Bench of the High Court which is the subject matter ofthis appeal. 7. Appearing in support of the appeal, Mr. Shekhar Naphade, learned Senior Advocate, submitted that both the learned single Judge ---1 and the Division Bench ofthe High Court had erred in giving a narrow meaning to the word 'suit' as used in Section 22 of SICA. He submitted that the context in which the expression 'suit' had been used in Section 22 of the aforesaid Act made such expression all pervasive to include other proceedings as well before a court or other authority empowered to recover debts and other dues against the company. It was urged that in the case of Maharashtra Tubes Limited v. State Industrial Corporation ofMaharashtra Ltd.

, [1993] 2 SCC 144, it had been held that the expression "proceedings" in Section 22(1) ofSICA must be widely construed and could not be confined to legal proceedings understood in the narrow sense of proceeding in a court of law or a legal tribunal for attachment and sale of the debtor's property. However, since the said decision could be applied to companies only and not to guarantors, the legislature amended the provisions of Section 22(1) so as to extend the protection given to companies to guarantors also so that they too were given the protection of Section 22 ofthe Act. Mr. Naphade submitted that the object with which the 1985 Act was enacted was primarily to assist sick industries which had failed to meet their financial obligations.

It was urged that in certain cases it was the Directors of the company who themselves stood guarantee for the loans advanced to the company and the enforcement ofsuch guarantee against the Directors would cause obstructions in the way ofthe BIFR to revive the said company, which was also one of the objects ofthe 1985 Act. 8. In this regard, Mr. Naphade also referred to the decision ofthis Court in Patheja Bros. Forgings & Stamping and Anr. v. ICICI Ltd. and Ors. , (2000] 6 SCC 545, where the question involved was whether Section 22 ofthe SICA would cover a suit against a guarantor of a loan or advance that had been granted to an industrial company. Mr.

Naphade pointed out that upon holding that the words of Section 22 were crystal clear and there was no ambiguity therein, this Court had held that no suit for enforcement of a guarantee in respect of a loan or advance granted to the industrial company concerned would lie or could be proceeded with without the consent ofthe Board or the Appellate Authority under the Act. Mr. Naphade also submitted that while dealing with the aforesaid question, this Court had overruled the decision ofthe Bombay High Court in Madalsa International Ltd. v. Central Bank ofIndia, AIR (1998) ~- Born 247, wherein it had been held that Section 22 would apply to companies only and not to guarantors who would be affected personally and the words "ofany guarantee in respect ofany loan or advance granted to the industrial company'' would have to be read as the guarantee given by the industrial company itselfand none else. 9. To emphasise his aforesaid submission Mr.

Naphade laid particular emphasis on the decision of this Court in Paramjit Singh Patheja v. ! CDS Ltd. JT (2006) 10 SC 41 where in connection with the enforcement ofan arbitral award and the issuance of an insolvency notice under Section 9(2) ofthe Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 "'~ this Court, inter alia, held that it is a well established rule that a provision must be construed in a manner which would give effect to its purpose and to cure the mischiefin the light ofwhich it was enacted. It was further observed that the object of Section 22 of SICA in protecting guarantors from legal proceedings pending a reference to BIFR by the principal debtor was to ensure that a scheme for rehabilitation would not be defeated by isolated proceedings adopted against the guarantors ofasick company.

In order to achieve such purpose, it was imperative that the expression "suit" in Section 22 be given its plain meaning, namely, any proceedings ' adopted for realisation of a right vested in a party by law. -i, 10. Mr. Naphade then submitted that the Bombay High Court had wrongly relied upon the decision ofthis Court in Kai/ash Nath Agrawal & Ors. v. Pradeshiya Industrial & Investment Corporation of UP. Ltd. & Anr. , [2003] 4 SCC 305, wherein the decision rendered by this Court in the Maharashtra Tubes case (supra) as also in Patheja Bros. Forging case (supra) were distinguished and it was held that in both the cases while considering the effects ofthe amendment to Section 22(1) of SICA, the Courts were concerned with 'suits' which had been dealt with .. in the case of Patheja Bros, and not with 'proceedings' indicated in the first part ofSection 22(1) ofthe 1985 Act. Mr.

Naphade added that the decision in the Maharashtra Tubes case (supra) had been rendered prior to the amendment of Section 22(1) of SICA, where as Patheja's case, as also the case ofParamjit Patheja were rendered after the amendment was effected, to extend the protection ofSection 22 to guarantors as well. ~ 11. Mr. Naphade submitted that the decision in Kai/ash Nath Agrawal 's case had been rendered by this Court in the context of interpretation ofthe expressions 'suit' and 'proceedings' used in Section 22(1) ofSICA, 1985. In construing the said two expressions this Court was ofthe view that while the expression 'proceedings' used in Section 22(1) would have to be confined to companies alone, the expression 'suit' had been introduced by amendment to extend the protective cover of Section 22 to guarantors as well.

It was submitted that the purpose for which such amendment had been effected, namely, to extend the B protective cover of Section 22 to guarantors also, would be rendered meaningless if coercive action continued to be taken against guarantors who could even be the Directors ofthe company in question. It was urged that the continuing ambiguity was sought to be explained in the Paramjit Singh Patheja case (supra) wherein it was explained that the expression 'suit' would have to be understood in a larger context to include other proceedings as well before a legal forum. 12. Mr. Naphade submitted that, in any event, the liability of the appellant No. 2 under the guarantee given could be enforced under Section 31 (l)(aa) ofthe State Financial Corporations Act, 1951, only ifand when the appellant made a default in repayment of the loan. Having regard to the fact that the appellant NQ.

l had made a reference to the BIFR under Section 15 ofthe 1985 Act, the liability ofthe appellant-company stood suspended under Section 22 of the said Act. As the liability of the appellant-company stood suspended, there could be no question of any default having been committed by the appellant company towards repayment ofthe loan. According to Mr. Naphade, since the respondent had filed an application under Section 3l(l)(aa) ofthe above Act making only monetary claim against the appellant no. 2, on a true construction ofthe above provisions the said Section permits enforcement only ofthe security given by the guarantor and since in the instant case the respondent had filed an application not for enforcement ofany security but for claiming only the amount ofguarantee the same could not be enforced against the appellant No. 2. According to Mr. Naphade the appellant No. 2 has not given any other security which could be proceeded against by the respondent. 13. Mr.

Naphade submitted that the Bombay High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application made under Section 31(1)(aa) of the Act and the order passed there above was a nugity. ::...... -· 14. It was also submitted that I. A. No. I of 2007 was filed in the special leave petition for leave to place on record additional grounds as set out in the application and prayed that the same be allowed to be placed on record by way ofadditional grounds. Inasmuch as, such prayer was objected to on behalf of the respondent, Mr. Naphade referred to the decision ofthis Court in the Management ofState Bank ofHyderabad ~ . I v. Vasudev Anant Bhide etc. , (1969] 2 SCC 491, wherein while considering as to whether a claim was barred under Article 137 ofthe Limitation Act, an objection was taken that such ground had not been raised either before the Labour Court or even in the special leave petition filed in this Court.

In the said case, on an application made to permit the appellant to raise the question oflimitation based upon Article 137 ofthe Limitation Act, this Court permitted the appellant to raise such plea as no fresh facts were required to be investigated and the matter could be dealt with as a pure question of law. ' 15. Mr. Naphade also referred to the decision of this Court in ~. Pandurang Ramchandra Mandlik v. Shantibai Ramchandra Ghatge and Ors. , [1989] Supp 2 SCC 627 which was a case dealing with ousting ofjurisdiction ofthe Civil Court with regard to the provisions ofSection 80 and Section 85 ofthe Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. Referring to the decision ofthe Judicial Committee in Secretary ofState v.

Mask and Company, AIR (1948) PC 105, where it was observed that the exclusion ofthe jurisdiction ofthe Civil Court was not to be readily inferred, but that such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied, it was held that there was nothing in the language or context of Section 80 or Section 85 of the above Act to "' suggest that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was expressly or by necessary implication barred with regard to the question as to whether the defendants have become statutory owners ofthe land. 16. Mr. Naphade concluded his submissions by urging that both the v learned single Judge and the Division Bench ofthe Bombay High Court had misconstrued the provisions of Section 22 of the 1985 Act, as amended, in holding that the amended provisions granting protection to guarantors in suits for enforcement, could not be stretched to include proceedings for enforcement as well. ~ 17. Appearing for the respondent, Mr.

Jay Savla, learned advocate, contended that the controversy regarding the protection given by Section 22 of SICA to guarantors had been set at rest by this Court in Kai/ash Nath Agrawal 's case (supra). He submitted that while in the case of Patheja Bros. Forgings & Stamping case (supra) this court had to consider whether a suit against a guarantor would be covered by the protection provided under Section 22(1) ofSICA, the question in Kai/ash • Nath Agrawal 's case this Court was concerned not with a "suit" but a "proceeding" for recovery ofdues and in those circumstances this Court had examined the use ofthe expressions "proceeding" and "suit" used in different parts of Section 22(1) of SICA. It was in that context that this Court distinguished the earlier decision in Patheja Bros.

Forgings & Stampings case and upon holding that since the legislature had expressly chosen to make a distinction between suits for recovery of money and enforcement ofguarantees and proceedings for the recovery ofmoney, such distinction had to be given effect to. It was held that even under the amended provisions only a limited protection had been afforded to \ guarantors with regard to the recovery ofdues by way of suit, but not by way ofproceedings, and, accordingly, a proceeding for recovery ofmoney against a guarantor would stand outside the protection afforded under Section 22(1) of the 1985 Act. 18. It was urged that in the instant case, a situation similar to that in Kailash Nath Agrawal 's case had arisen, since the proceeding had been initiated against the guarantor under the relevant provisions ofthe State Financial Corporations Act, 1951, which stood outside the purview of Section 22(1) of SICA. 19. Mr.

Savla submitted that although the decision in Kailash Nath Agrawal's case was not referred to by the Division Bench ofthe Bombay High Court, a similar decision rendered by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Dewal Singhal v. State ofMaharashtra, (2001) 106 Company Cases 587, was relied upon. In the said decision it was \_; held that the protection conferred on guarantors under Section 22 ofSICA is limited protection and the bar is restricted only to a suit and did not apply to any other proceedings. . ~- 20. Mr. Savla referred to the decision ofthis Court in BSI Ltd. and Anr. v Gift Holdings Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. , [2000] 2 SCC 737, which was rendered in a slightly different situation involving a fine imposed on company in a criminal case against the company and its Directors under Section 138 ofthe Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

It was held in that case that the ban envisaged in Section 22(1) of SICA would not be attracted in case ofpunishment offine imposed on the company for such offence if it was with the consent of the BIFR. Furthermore, the ban imposed underthe said provision ofSICA against maintainability of suit for recovery ofmoney would not cover prosecution proceedings for an offence under Section 138 ofthe Negotiable Instruments Act. This Court observed that as the ambit of"suit" has been clearly delineated in Section 22(1) itself, it could not be stretched by employing the maxim that contemporaneous exposition is the best and strongest in law. 21. Mr. Savla urged that a proceeding under the State Financial D Corporations Act could not be equated with a suit as had been held by this Court in Gujarat State Financial Corporation v. Mis. Natson Manufacturing Co. (P) Ltd.

, [1979] 1 SCR 372 and having regard to the decision in Kailash Nath Agrawal's case (supra) such a proceeding would not be entitled to the protection envisaged under Section 22(1) of E SICA. 22. As to the second limb ofMr. Naphade's submission regarding the right ofthe respondent to proceed against the guarantor before realising its securities, Mr. Savla reiterated the High Court's view that the claim against the guarantor was against him personally and was independent of F the sureties given in mortgage by the Principal Debtor. Mr. Savla submitted that the decision rendered in Kailash Nath Agrawal 's case does not appear to have been brought to the notice ofthe Hon'ble Judges deciding the Paramjeet Singh Patheja case (supra) and same was decided on other earlier decisions ofthis Court which dealt essentially with suits for recovery of dues. 23.

It was submitted that since the Division Bench ofthe High Court took a view which finds support in Kailash Nath Agrawal's case, no case had been made out for interference with the same. --,,....!. :' 24. In the decisions ofthis Court cited before us, two divergent views have been expressed in respect ofthe same issue involved in this appeal. In the other decisions, this Court had no occasion to go into the said issue which involved the interpretation ofSection 22(1) ofthe SICA in respect ofeither 'proceedings' or 'suits' respectively.

In Kailash Nath Agrawal's case (supra) this Court has taken the view that the legislature appears to have knowingly used two different expressions in Section 22(1) ofSICA, • namely, 'proceeding' in the first part and the expression 'suit' in the second part and the protection of Section 22 extended to guarantors in respect of suits alone and the use of the expression 'proceeding' could not be extended to include suits as well nor could the expression 'suit' be extended to include the expression 'proceeding' also. On the other hand, in Paramjeel Singh Patheja 's case (supra) it was held that the expression 'suit' which extends the protection ofSection 22(1) to guarantors, would have to be interpreted to include 'proceeding' also, in view ofthe intention ofthe legislature to protect sick industrial companies where references were pending before the BIFR.

It is also evident from the decision in Paramjeet Singh Patheja 's case (supra) that the views expressed in Kailash Nath Agrawal's case (supra) had not been brought to the notice ofthe learned Judges who decided the matter. Even ifwe are inclined to agree with one of the two interpretations, the anomalous situation will continue since the decisions are that ofcoordinate Benches. 25. In such circumstances, we consider it fit and proper that the matter should be referred to a larger Bench to resolve the existing anomaly resulting from the different views expressed in the two above-mentioned cases. 26. Accordingly, the Registry is directed to place this matter before the Hon'ble the ChiefJustice oflndia for appropriate orders in the light ofwhat has been stated hereinbefore. D. G. Matter referred to larger Bench.